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The thesis examines the role of verbal labels in category learning by adults.
In an investigation of the effects of category learning and exemplar labelling on 
quantitative judgements about exemplars, it was found that only labels provided at the time 
o f testing biassed subjects* judgements, although this effect did rely on the labels having 
been previously learned
Adults' default assumptions ccmceming the extension of novel names among newly 
learned categories were examined: subjects used an assumption of mutual exclusivity 
between names (as predicted by Markman. 1989), but did not adhere to the principle of 
linguistic contrast (Qark, 1987).
In a series of experiments where exemplars were labelled with verbal (non-word) labels 
or complex visual patterns, category learning was superior with the verbal labels. This 
superiority spanned categories consisting of arbitrary collections of familiar or unfamiliar 
objects, and prototype-based polygon categories. Arbitrary collection learning was better 
when subjects reported inventing names for the non-verbal labels.
When the verbal and non-verbal labels were compared on a speeded discrimination task, 
few errors were made but decision times were reliably shorter (c. 0.1 second) with the 
verbal labels. With other non-verbal labels which were faster to discriminate dian the verbal 
labels, arbitrary collection learning was ai a level intermediate between learning with the 
verbal arid original non-verbal labels.
The role of category names as feedback was investigated in a prototype-based category 
learning task. Learning was no better with named exemplars or right-wrong feedback than 
when unaided, although learning with named exemplars plus right-wrong feedback was 
better than with right-wrong feedback only. No interaction between task difficulty and 
feedback conditions was found (cf. Homa and Cultice, 1984).
Thus in these experiments verbal labels produced better fcategory learning than non-verbal 
labels, even for schema-based categories which were learned equally well uruuded.
Four possible functions of category names in category learning are suggested as a 
framework for future investigations.
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The topic o f  the thesis is introduced as an examination of the role o f verbal labels in 
category learning. The background to this investigation is then described, starting with 
some (rfiilosophers* views o f the role of category names in the formation ksK concepts, and 
moving onto the function attributed to category names by behaviourists in this century.
The terms used in the thesis title are examined. The psychological status of “category 
names” is considered, and an overview of empirical studies and theoretical models of 
“category learning” is drawn. It is noted that studies of animal cognition imply that category 
names are not a  prerequisite for category learning, but that studies of shape recognition by 
humans suggest that names may be influential in category learning tasks. It is observed that 
this matter has received little attention in the modem literature on concept formation, and that 
the thesis begins the task of filling this gap.
The Introduction concludes with a precise specification of the empirical questions to be 
addressed, and an overview of the experimental chapters.
I. The topic of this thesis.
What makes human behaviour stand out from that of other members of the animal 
kingdom? The commonest answers to such a question refer to our superior intelligence and 
our unique linguistic abilities.
A large proportion of human intelligence relies on the facility to learn about categories of 
things • tigers, kiuves, timetables, fruits, containers, and such like. When we encounter a 
novel item we can categorise it, and then treat it appropriately. When looking for a solution 
to a novel problem, we can re-examine the categorical possibilities of the materials we have 
available, and use them to achieve our goal.
Category learning has been extensively studied in psychology and extensively speculated 
about in philosophy, resulting in various theories of how people abstract categorical
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knowledge f m  their experiencet with individual objectt aral events. Human language has 
of course been even more thoroughly examined, across many disciplines. In view of the 
importance accorded lo language and category learning individually, the extent to which the 
two mental processes intersect and influence one another, although hardly overlooked, has 
received surprisingly little attention, particularly from empirical researchers.
One o f the most apparent connections between human language and htvnan category 
learning is that, by and large, for each significant concept there exists a verbal label which 
can be used to refer to that concept. When a concept that has no label becomes nxne 
significant (e.g. “a set of stored, coded instructions for a machine**), then either at an 
individual level or at the level of die language community, a label is eventually or
invented to apply to that concept (e.g. a  **program*’).
Given the close correspondence in humans between categories and verbal labels, the topic 
of whether or how category names are involved in the learning of concepts is undoubtedly 
one which deserves investigation. The question which concerns this thesis is, then, “Are 
verbal labels important for category leamingT*.
II. Philosophical and psychological background.
Category names were not considered important for category learning by the Greek 
philosophers Plato and Aristotle (Woozely, 1967, for a review of philosophical theories of 
universals).
According to Plato, all things of the same kind share an “essence” which exists timelessly 
and independently of **particulars’*, the imperfect instances of categories. Knowledge of 
categories or **universals** was considered by Plato to be somehow innate, with only 
knowledge about particulars being learned.
Arismcle developed the realist (i.e. pro universals) position by rejecting the idea of 
universals existing at an independent, abstract level. According to Aristotle, universals are 
the common elements of particulars, and diese common elements nmy be learned or 
abstracted from experience with particulars.
Ute role of words in the formation o f  mental categories did begin to receive emphasis in 
the writings of the English “conoeptualisu”, Locke, Berkeley, and Hume. The 
conceptualists differed from Aristotle*s view in that for them, universals existed as “general 
ideas'* in people's minds rather than in the particulars themselves, but both views agreed that 
the understanding of concepts was learned rather than innate.
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Locke'f theory o f the formation of a general idea involved language. People notice a 
feature (or features) common to several particulars, and consequently name that feative or 
name the **type**. Subsequently, according to Locke, one particular may mentally stand in 
for another belonging to the same category, although words on their own could not deputise 
for a general idea like this. Berkeley untied words from images of particulars, saying they 
could be used mentally even when they did not call up particular images or ideas. Htane 
kept to Locke’s restriction of words necessarily being linked to particulars in thought, 
although his description of the formation of general ideas relied on people noticing 
resemUances between particulars rather than just noticing shared identical features.
In Hume’s description of the formation of general ideas, words play a crucial role in 
making different particulars equivalent instantiations o f  the same general idea or concept A 
word reminds us o f the similar features of a class of objects:
**When we have found a resemblance among several objects, that often occur to us, we 
api^y dte same name to all of them, whatever differences we may observe in the degrees 
of dieir quantity or quality, and whatever other differences may appear among them. 
After we have acquired a custom of this kind, the hearing o f  that name revives the idea of 
one of these objects, and makes the imagination conceive of it with all its particular 
circumstances and proportions. But as the same word is suppos’d to have been 
frequently applied to other individuals, that are different in many respects from that idea 
which is immediately (Mesent to the mind: the word not being able to revive the idea of all 
these individuals, but only touches the soul, if 1 may be allow’d so to speak, and revives 
that custom, which we have acquir’d by surveying them.”(Hume, 1739, book 1, part 1, 
section vii).
The category name allows particulars to represent universals: ’’all abstract ideas are really
nothing but particular ones.... but, being annex’d to general terms, they are aMe to represent
a vast variety.” Or. more simply, ”A particular idea becomes general by being annex’d to a 
general term” (ibid.)
To summarise Hume’s view, if we notice a similarity between different th inp , we call 
them all by the same n«ne. and subsequently the name reminds us of thdr similarity and the 
name somehow enables a particular object to mentally represent others of the same class. 
Hume does not. however, appear to allow the name itself to be used directly to represent the 
class of objects. According to Hume, you think about universals using particulars, not 
names.
Category names feature most prominently in the theory o f universals which has been
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temied **extreme nominalism**. Acconting to this doctrine, whose origin is sttribuied lo the 
eleventh century philosopher Roscellin (Carré, 1946, Oilby, 1967), imiversab do not exist 
at all, the only similwity between particulars called by the same name being the name itself. 
This view, although associated with William o f Ockham and Thomas Hobbes, im y not have 
actually been held by them as a distinct theory of universals in such an extreme form 
(Wooaely, 1967): Hobbes did say that only the name is common lo objects in a class, but 
added that these objects are all given the same name due to the similarity between them. As 
for Ockham*s brand of nominalisin, according to Gané he rejected the Roacellian extreme, 
held views somewhat similar lo those of the later conceptualista, yet sdU propoimded a 
theory o f  universals requiring the dismissal as fictitious the belief that common principles 
may be sought for in particular things.
Extreme nominalism has been rejected on philosophical grounds as self contradictory 
(Wooaely 1967, Armstrong, 1978). The nominalist view treats difTerent tokens o f the same 
word as belonging to the same type, and so cannot reasonaMy refuse to apply the same type> 
token distinction lo objects (Woozely 1967) and even if it did, would have admitted the 
existence of universals in the form of types o f  word (Armstrong, 1978).
Bambrough (1961) appealed simply to common sense to reject the extreme nominalist 
position, asking the reader to imagine a situation where quite arbitrarily selected objects w oe 
all called by the same name. For example, Bambrough suggests that if the star Sirius, his 
fountain pen, the Pardiencm, the colour red, the number five, and the letter Z were all called 
“alpha**, this would be a  situation which extreme nominalism considers the norm, but 
obviously does not correspond lo reality: the only way to learn the extension o f “alpha** 
would be by being taught it for each item, and the term would not automatically extend to 
any new items. Bambrough suggested that the proMem o f universals had been finally 
strived in Wittgenstein's (1967) description o f a pattern o f “family resemblances’* between 
the instances of a category (see Section tV  . below).
In the twentieth century, some early behaviourist theorists attributed an important role to 
words as “mediaton” in concept learning (see Goss, 1961a for a review). Watson (1920) 
described a theory of concepts which was somewhat similar to that of the concepcualists 
Locke and Hume in obliging general ideas to be mentally represented only by particulars. 
“One o f  the first stumbling blocks I had in structural psychology was its treatment of 
concepts and general ideas. Long before behaviourism took me in tow, I came to the 
conclusion that such things were mere nonsense; that all our responses are to definite and 
particular thinp. I never saw anyone react to tables in general, but always to some
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particular icpicaentative.”
He denied the exinenoe o f  mental concepu per le, aaciibing behaviour which appeared to 
rely on concepts to litnple stimulus-ieiponae chaini, where a word associated with different 
tdinuli formed the connection between them. Wataon uied the example of a man learning in 
childhood to aaaociate the word “iieep" with puffing and sweating, and walking ttxind 
instead o f  over a hill. As an adult, faced with the task of constructing a bridle path, the 
man’s reaction to the hill is determined by Ms prior associations mediated by the concept 
label:
“....the MU itself (the situation) calls out the word “steep" (conditioned) and steep in nan 
caUs out “turn right or left and circle”. I can see nodiing in Ms reactions not explainafaie 
by conditioned word responses and simple trial and error learning.” (Page 102, original 
parentheses.)
For Weiss (1925) and Gray (1931) mental concepts are likewise embodied solely in the 
association between particulars and a common concept label, with any simUarity which 
exists between particulars o f the same type being incidental and unimportant in the casegory 
learning process. According to  this view, the formation of concepts is an essentially didactic 
process where the learner puts any items which he has heard labelled with the same word 
into the sarrre category. Weiss described generalisation as
“a type of sensory-irrotor mechanism in which many different receptor patterns 
representative of many different sensory situations and reladons are connected to the same 
language response and through diis common path the individual may react in a specific 
manner to aU the objects, situations and relations thus connected, even though there is 
very little sensory similarity between them.” (Weiss 1925, p. 297, quoted in Gray, 1931.) 
This view of concept fonrration does not appear to differ significantly from the extreme 
nominalist position described above. Which particulars receive the same label is determined 
entirely by the labeUing haMts o f  the people from whom the language user originally learned 
the labels, with no appeal »  sinularities or resemblances between particulars of the same 
type;
“a concept.... is a group o f  responses which have been’ classified together and labeUed by 
a common verbal symbol. Concept formation is the process of making responses of a 
certain type and then labelling them according to social custom. A specific concept can be 
defined only by naming all the lesponaes and stimuU which arc convemionaUy claaaified 
under the tame concept word.” (Gray, 1931.)
G ray look issue with another contemporary view of concept formation which was
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proposed by Thorndike (1931). This alto placed importance on the external labelling o t 
paiticidan but regarded labelling as a means for the learner to determine which properties are 
common to members of the same category and which, varying between exemplars of the 
category, are irrelevant to category membership. In Thorndike’s view, concept formation 
could come about by two routes: the process just mentioned o f abstracting common 
properties from labelled instances, or from simply being given a verbal definition of ”the 
combiruttion of characteristics n^ich entitles a thing or event to membership of that class.** 
(Thorndike, 1931, p. 143). C ray’s objection was that he was sceptical about the existence 
of the properties which Thorndike assumed objects and events to be composed of. Cray 
preferred to base the explanation of people’s behaviour on their reactions to the stimulus as a 
whole, not the stimulus arutlysed into its posited constituent features.
Although, as Goss (1961a) noted, Watson and his contemporaries’ q>eculations about the 
rc^  of verbal mediation in concept formation and thinking generated a number of potentially 
testable hypotheses, an experimental literature on the subject simply ”failed to materialise”.
Around this time, some interest was being devoted to the itde o f  veriNtl mediation in 
experiments on what has since been termed (Medin and Smith. 1984) ‘‘classical concept 
formation”. In this paradigm, discussed at more length in Section A ', subjects are required 
to identify criterial features or combinations of features to classify sets o f  stimuli according 
to rules, the stimuli typically being sets of coloured geometric forms.
If the classification rule is changed mid-ivay through a task, without warning the subject 
about the switch, it was found that subjects recovered their sorting performance faster if the 
new rule was simply a reversal of the old one than if it required the subject to attend to a 
different, previously irrelevant dimension of the stimuli (Buss, 1953). For exanqile, if 
subjects had been learning to classify all squares (regardless of colour, size, etc.) as ”A”s 
and all circles as ‘‘B”s, shifting to a new rule where circles should be classified as ”A”s and 
squares as *‘B”s is easier than learning to call all red forms ”A”s and all blue forms ‘‘B”s 
ignoring the |ffeviously important dimension of shape.
It was argued that the relative difficulty of the *‘non reversal shift” compared with the 
“revenal shift” was Ate to the use of verbal mediating responses by the subjects to perform 
the rule learning task ( Ooss, 1961b, Kendler A  Kendler, 1962). The kind of mediating 
responses tetributed to the subjects were verbalisations of which dimensions were relevant 
to dw classification, and/or which featives were (wired with which response. The (post hoc) 
argument was explained by Kendler arxl Kendler as follows: in a reversal shift, the sul^ect 
could keep to the same mediated response, with only the overt response needing to be
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chwifed; in a non reversal shift, however, a new mediating response had to be learned in 
addition to the task of associating the mediating and overt responses.
Buss's original exfrtanation o t the reversal shift advantage was in terms o f the incorrect 
response still being partially reinforced after the non reversal shift Although this hypothesis 
was suoceufuUy undermined (Kendler A  D'Amaio, 19SS). the mediating response 
explanation remained ptoe speculation. A plausible alternative explanation o f the reversal 
shift advanuige, requiring fewer "mediating assumptions’', could be couched simply in terms 
of subjects' prefored hypotheses: when a rule changes, subjecu prefer to look for a new 
sc^ution based on a dimension dtat was previously relevant rather than a  solution involving a 
previously irrelevant dimension. The importance of verbalisations in rule learning 
experiments has previously been questioned (Humphrey. 1951, p.p. 252 - 253) on the basis 
of Smoke's (1932) report that subjects could perfonn a selection task with geometric stimuli 
without being able to accurately describe the rule they were using.
D^MUe over the explanation of the reversal shift advantage has, in any case, very little 
potential to contribute materially to the task o f  clarifying the role of category names in 
concept formation. Rule learning tasks, and rule shifting tasks in particular, might 
justifiably be considered as a highly artificial and specialised forms of category learning (this 
matter is discussed in the next section). The verbalisation of the solution to a rule learning 
task, using already known words and already kiKiwn concepts, bears little resemUance to 
the learning of a new category and new category lerm, the process which concerned the 
philosophical inquiry into universals and the behaviourists’ explanation of the generalisation 
o f responses.
One of the most widely known theories cortceming the influence of category names on 
the category learning process is embodied in the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis (e.g. Whorf, 1956. 
p.p. 207 • 219). The essence of this theory is that the nature of the mental concepts we 
extract feom ovr experience with die world is determined by the structures embodied in the 
language we speak. Whoif maintained that different language groups do not merely have 
different sets of synonyms for a universal set o f concepu, but contain different seu of 
conceptual structures.
WhorTs hypothesis claims that the grammar erf a language moulds our thoughts, and the 
availability of cMegory names within a language determines how the world will be carved up 
into categories. Only the latter claim is directly relevam to the topic of this thesis.
The most obvious Aawback with the Whoifian hypothesis regarding category names aitd 
categories is the problem of proving the direction o f the causal relationship. Whorf claimed
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that speakers of different languages make particular categorical divisions in a domain of 
otgecu or eventt because they have a particular set of category terms in their language. The 
matter can also be viewed from the other side, however, such as the hypothesis that the 
number of separate categories in a domain which have relevaitce for people in a certain 
physical and cultural envirorunent determines the number of category names which they 
invent and keep alive in their language.
Empirical tests of W horfs hypothesis concerning categories and category names have 
been largely restricted to studies of the use of colour categories and colour terms. The 
flnding that the ease of naming a colour correlates with the reliability with which it is 
recognised after a delay (Brown A Lenneberg. 1954) w u  initially taken as support for the 
Whoifian hypothesis. Later cross-cultural studies, however, provided strong evidence diat 
regardless of the colour naming practices of a ^xaker’s language, a  particular set of **focal” 
colours are universally the most memorable and the easiest to learn names for (Heider, 
1972). Physiological, developmental, cross cultural and cross species evidence converge to 
show that the domain o f  colour is divided into colour categories that are not dependent on the 
colour names of particular languages (Bomstein, 1987). Other Hata has also been presented 
(Roach, 1973) to suggest that basic geometric forms are similarly focal, regardless of 
language naming practices.
Regarding WhorTs general thesis, debate shifted to a more promising arena with the 
puMicadon of Bloom’s (1981) claims concerning the relative abilities o f English and Chinese 
speakers to grasp the sense of “counterfactual” statements, for which English but not 
Chinese has a distinct linguistic marker . Thus the stttement ‘i f  I could swim, I would take 
up sailing”, which in English uses the subjunctive tense as a counterfactual marker, would 
rely in Chinese on the if-then construction preceded by a negation the antecedent - 
cannot swim. If (I can swim) then (I take up sailing)”. Bloom reported that Chinese 
speakers were much less likely than English speakers to give a counterfactual interpretttion 
of a counterfactual story, implying that the absence of a counterfactual marker in their 
language made it difficult for the Chinese to understand counterfactual statements. In a 
series of replication studies, however, Au (1983) found ho difference between Chinese and 
English speakers' interpretations of counterfactual stories, and attributed Bloom's ftndinp 
to the unidiomatic language in which Bloom’s Chinese versions o f the stories were written.
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III. What are category names?
Evidence from studies of people who have suffered brain injury suggests that knowledge 
of category names is quite distinct from other semantic or categorical knowledge, and  dua 
name information is embodied in a number of separate subsystems for different modalidet 
and processing tasks.
Anomia, the inability to name objects, can be found in patients who, it is claimed, have 
intact categorical knowledge about objecu (Ellis St Young, 1988). The patient EST, 
described by Kay and Ellis (1987), had intact conqvehension o€ spoken words, but in  his 
qtontaneous speech and in object naming tasks he had considerable difficulty accessing die 
names of objects (some output representation o t  names was ai^iarently still available, 
however, since he was considerably better at repeating real words than invented non­
words).
In other cases, although the patient may be unable to articulate names, the ability to  m al» 
rhyming judgments or tap out the number of syllaUes in the name of a presented object 
indicates that he still has the name available for internal speech. Further evidence fo r die 
existence of separate, modality specific sources of name information come from cases where 
the recognition of spoken words is in^iaired but word production is intact. Some such 
patients can neither repeat spoken words aloud nor understand them, while others have been 
found who can repeat heard words but still cannot comprehend them (Ellis A Young, 1988). 
In some cases the patient can write down the word, read it to themselves, then apprehend its 
meaning.
The separation of semantic knowledge from naming in models of object recognition (e.g. 
Warren & Morton, 1982, Humphreys A Bruce, 1989) is supported by evidence from normal 
subjecu as well as from neuropsychological patients. An analogy has been drawn (e.g. Ellis 
A Young. 1988) between anomia and the common, ”tip of the tongue** experience w here a 
person feels they have a c o n c ^  in mind but cannot quite access its name, which they 
nevertheless are sure they know. The distinction between semantic knowledge and names 
has also been argued on the basis of evidence from priming studies. Although in some 
studies "cross facilitation'' has been found, where prior presentation o f an olject's name aids 
subsequent speeded recognition of a picture of the object and vice versa, in other studies the 
prindng effect has been found to be one-sided. Whether or not priming occm  between 
pictures and words has been attributed lo the existence of separate picture and word 
recognition mechanisms, and whether or not the task requires acceu to a seim ntic
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information system which is separate from both but may be accessed by either (W «ien A 
Morton, 1982, Bajo, 1988).
In die models o f object recc^nition based on neuropsychological evidence mentioned 
above, caiegocy names are not only considered separate from semantic knowledge, but 
secondary to i t  Presented objecu are first categorised, then their names can be retrieved. 
There is no provision for links between the perceptual analysis of an object and nane 
retrieval except through the semantic system, so names cannot be invcdved in categorising 
objecu according to these models.
One justification o f this assun^Kion is dutt althou^ neurok^ically impaired patienu are 
found who can access semantic information about objecu but not name them, no cases have 
been reported o f padentt who can name objects without access to any semantic information 
(Humphreys A Bruce. 1989). Wanen and Morion also based an argument on priming 
effectt and assumptions about the time taken to access names from pictures, althou^ Bajo 
(1988) found sub}ecu could perform a name verification task faster than they performed a 
category verification task for pictures.
In asking "what is a category name?", it is obviously not sufficient just to say that a name 
is "separate" from semantic knowledge. Models of object recognition are concerned with 
names only as an output device - a way for someone to indicate to someone else that they 
have classified an object. The sine qua non of names, however, is their unseparateness 
ffom their categories. Names mime. Names n/er.
The relationship between names and their categories, termed the '^problem of reference”, 
has caused a great deal of worry (see Fodor, Bever. and Garret, 1974, C h^ ter 4 for a 
review) to linguists and philosophers.
O ie aspect of the relationship is that reference appears to be a “conventional relation”: the 
surface form of names i^rpears to be arbitrary, in that any other surface form would have 
done equally well as the name associated with any category.
Arguments for the existence of a non-arbitrary relation between names and their 
categories (termed “phonetic symbolism”) have been advanced, on such grounds as the 
obaervation that faced with a pair of nonsense syllables such as “mil” and “mal”, and asHfd 
which one means “big”. English speakers tend to concur on choosing “mal” (Brown, 1958, 
Chapter 4 for a review).
Nevertheless. Brown and Fodor et al. conclude that the general rule seems to be that 
reference is purely conventional. Groups of categories that are semantically related, such as 
house, tent, bungalow, appanment, maisonette, do not have similar names (although
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Brown, 1956. points out that the triad breakfast-brunch-lunch is a  rare exception lo this 
principle). Similarly, words that on the surface are identical, e.g. bank-bank, may have 
quite unrelated meaninp.
One conception of a cttegory name is as a leqxmse which is common to all members of a 
category. This view was embodied in the early behaviourists' theories of the role of names 
in generalisation, as described in Section t l  o f this chapter, where a  name was assumed to 
mediate a  connection between stimuli and responses appropriate to  that class of object or 
event
Alternatively, a category name can be viewed as an attribute of members of that category. 
This attribute can only be learned from the naming behaviour of other people, unlike other 
attributes which may, for simple types thing, be directly observable.
A further distinction (Brown, 1956) between names and other attributes is that names are 
categorical. Many attributes, such as size, weight, cost, or dangerousness to children, can 
take any value from a continuous range. Names, on the other hand, are discrete entities. 
Both a rolMn and an ostrich are called a "bird", regardless of the relative "birdness" or 
typicality o f these two creatures. Within the range of sounds that are perceived as the word 
"bird", differences in pronunciation are treated as meaningless and ignored. As Brown 
(1956) pointed out, in English and most languages graduated differences in the 
pronunciation of phonemes are not used to signify graduations of meaning (although he 
noted an exception to this rule in the use by the Ouarani Indians of the suffix "-yma", 
pronounced more slowly with increasing temporal remoteness, to signify past tense). If a 
category name is viewed as an attribute of members of a category, then, it is unlike other 
attributes in taking exactly the same value for each exemplar. The categorical perception of 
speech sounds is discussed in some detail in Chaptor 2.
As for the distribution of names to categories, the general pattern is a one-to-one ratio. 
This pattern is marred to some extent by synonyms such as pail-bucket, although these are 
rare (Clark, 1987, argues they do not exist at all) and by homophones such as bank-bank.
In summary, a category label could be described as an arbitrary, discrete speech code, 
associated usually with just one category. The label is l»th a potential response to and an 
attribute o f  members of a category.
IV. What is category learning?
In simple terms, category learning might be described u  coming to react to things, when
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it is advanugeous to do so. as members of classes rather than as individual objectt and 
events.'
O f course, such a  simple description takes a great deal for granted. Even ignoring for the 
moment the question of what is advantageous about dcting this, there is the problem o f how 
it can be known when a person reacu to a thing as a member of a class, and what that class 
actually encompasses.
Category learning cannot be directly observed*; category learning is only what is inferred 
from the observation of discriminative re^xmaes. From the range of stimuli which have 
elicited a  particular response, an observer can attempt to deduce the set of stimuli which 
contains all such eliciting stimuli.’
In fact, the process is not even as clear cut as this. For one reason, the observer can only 
sam|rfe from the infinite set o f all possible stimuli, and the chance always remains that some 
untried stimulus outride the inferred set o f eliciting stimuli would also (Moduce the response 
in question, or some untried stimulus from inside the inferred set would fail to elicit the 
response.
Secondly, the process of studying category learning itself relies on learned categories; no 
two responses produced by the subject are identical, but the observer treats the responses as 
members of particular categories o f  response (Brown, 1956). 'Hiis problem is dealt with in 
practical terms by limiting the range of responses the subject can make, ignoring the vast 
majority o f their req>onses which are not the mtes specified in advance as the ones to be 
recorded, and thenceforth pretending that the categorisation of these responses is objective.
Rather than pursue the question trf *'What is category learning?” any further, the 
remainder of tfiis section will take a more pragmatic ^»proach and address the related, but by
DeHaitions of category learning often specify the ability to classify new exemplars correctly the 
flrst time they are encountered. I have chosen lo regard this attribute as characteristic rather than 
defining. Oik  motivation is the desire to avoid excluding the possibility that learning arbitrary 
collectioas may represent one form of category learning. The other motivation is lo avoid excluding 
ctoMd cimsMs. If one is shown every member of a finite class, such as the paintings of Van Oogh, wiUi 
a class label, the opportunity to classify novel exemplars does not exist It seems unreasonable to deny 
that one might leant a category concept in such a cireumstance.
* W khout that b . resorting to neurophysiological techniques to monitor the activity of cells in the 
brain and infer patterns of connectivity between cells; whethec such techniques have yet thrown any 
light on category learning is outside the scope of the present discMskm.
* Other, more ^wciflc proposals have been made regarding appropriate tests for category learaii^. 
Leo (1984) made two suggestions for assessing whether pigeons can learn class concepu. One 
suggestion Is that a new response should be established for one member of a teamed equivalence class, 
then the pigeon observed to see if it behaves as if that response applies to the other members of the 
class as well. This seems to require category based inferences which humans would often comider 
unjustified. If chair A’s teg is loose, should we sstume that chair B is also dangerous to sM on, b trau tf 
both belong to the class of chairs? Lea’s second proposed test for true category teaming for pigeons 
effectively requires them to deduce that a reversal riiift has taken place in a polymorphous rule. People 
(unlike pigeons) And it diffteult or impossible to team such rules in the Arst place (Dennis. Hampton 
and Lea. 1973): again, a lest of category teaming for the animal appears to require behaviour which 
could rule out attributing category teaming to human subjects if it was applied to them.
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no means equivalent topics of how category learning has been studied empirically, and 
what, on the basis of empirical research, people have suggested category learning consists 
of. The coverage of die literature, which spans seventy years* tilling of a fertile experimental 
field, is not intended to be exhaustive. The intention is to convey an outline o f some o f the 
main themes which have grown and. in some cases, subaequendy withered. Useful 
overviews of the literature are contained in Medin and Smith’s (1984) review, and 
collections o f papers edited by Rosch and Lloyd (1978) and Neisser (1987).
Category learning as finding a common feature.
The earliest empirical study o f concept formation still widely cited is Hull’s (1920) aeries 
o f experiments in which s u b ^ ts  learned nonsense syllable names for sets of pictograms 
copied by Hull from a Chinese dictionary. The subject learned a name, paired-associates 
fashion, for each character in a set of 12. He then moved onto a new set of 12 characters 
with the same 12 names, learned once more to give the correct name for each characto’, 
moved onto another new set o f characters and so on. After mastering the names for six sets 
of characters, the subjects were given a funher six sets as a transfer test.
Chttacters with the same name always had a particular brush-stroke embedded in them, 
so that if the subject learned to recognise the common feature in all characters with the same 
name, new charactoY could be named the first time they were presented.
The main issue Hull investigated using this method (which he refined over die com e of 
six years* work) was whether concept learning progressed more effectively when the 
characters in which the essendal features were embedded became increasingly comfdex in 
successive sets, or when the characters started off relatively complex and became 
progressively simpler. Hull found that the simple-to-complex order facilitated learning, but 
only if subjects were allowed to spend longer studying the earlier, simpler sets.
The view o f concepu as classes o f  stimuli united by a  common feature has echoes of the 
Aristotelian view of luiiversals, although Hull did emphasise the role of labelling in concept 
formation, as a signal to the learner of where to look for common features. Hull (1920) 
described concept formation with the exanqde of a child hearing numerous dc^s labelled 
“dog”, and conaequendy forming a meaning of the word “dog”consisting of “a characteristic 
more or lew common to all dogs and not common to cats, dolls and teddy-bem”. The 
problem in attempting to apply this view of concept formation to natural kinds is perhaps 
evident in Hull's self-contradiction. The defining brush strokes in his experimental concepts
C /i^ fer I 13
were not **more or leu** common lo all members o f a category, they were unfailin^y preaent 
in all category members. When talking about a real category Jiowever. Hull hedged by using 
the iirfiraae **more or le u  common**, presumably becauu he could not think o f a defining 
characteristic for the category of dog.
Research on concepts defined by a common feature flourished, a lthou^  afiKr Hull’s 
work the paradigm stabilised on stimuli rather different from the Chinese characters, 
tjrpically invtrfving sets of geometric shapes in various sixes and colours. Selected research 
findings include observations that an increau in the number of irrelevant dimensioru in the 
stimulus population impairs subjects* performance, increasing the subject*s time for 
reflection between trials improves performance, and the length of the delay between 
response and feedback h u  no effect on how many trials it takes subjects to solve a feature 
identification problem (see Kintsch, 1970, Chapter 7 for a review).
Category learning as identifying a clauification rule.
The attribute identification task just described can be thought of u  a task requiring 
subjects to learn a classification rule based on just one feature. Much more complicated 
tasks can be u t  for subjects, however, involving two or more dimensions of the stimuli: the 
rule *all red squares are **A**s, and all blue circles are **B**s*, for example.
*n)e ease of learning of different classification rules has been examined in some detail. 
W ith two relevant dimensions, the easiest rule is the conjunctive (e.g. all square, red shiqies 
belong to class A), ft^lowed in ascending order of difficulty by disjunctions (e.g. red or 
square or both), conditionals (e.g. everything except red non-squares) and, most difficult of 
all, bicorvlitionals (the con^lement of the exclusive-or, e.g. anything except red or square 
imms, unless they are red and square) (Haygood and Bourne, 1965, Bourne. 1967, 1970). 
In the same studies it was found that knowing the relevant attributes but having to discover 
the rule was easier than knowing the rule and discovering the relevant attributes, which in 
turn was easio* than having to discover the rule and the relevant attributes. As with the 
single relevam feature tasks discussed above, the addition of irrelevant dimensions impaired 
rule learning, and more so for intrinsically harder rules (Haygood and Stevenson, 1967).
SheiMid, Hovland and Jenkins (1961) compared classification rules involving one. two, 
o r three dimensions. The eight stimuli used represented all the possibilities that can be 
generated from tivee binary dimensions (e.g. large-small, black-white, square-triangle) and 
the six classifleation rules examined represented all die six types of rule which could be
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formulmied to divide the e i ^ t  stimuli into two sets of four. Shepard et tl. found that the one 
dimensional rule (e.g. all white stimuli are “A'*s) was the easiest lo learn, followed by the 
two dimension rule (e.g. all Mack squares or white triangles belong to set A). The three 
different rules involving three dimensions, but taking the form of a simple one dimensional 
rule with one exception to  it (e.g. all white shapes and the small Mack triangle are **A**s) 
were in equal diird place for learning difficulty, with the remaining possible dvee 
dimensional rule (e.g. the large Mack triangle and small Mack square and the small white 
triangle and the large white square are in set **A**> the hardest to learn of all but benefiting 
more chan any other rule from pMitive transfer in a series of logically identical problems.
Bruner, Ooodnow, and Austin (1956) examined the strategies for rule discovery that 
subjects en^loy when they have some control over the order in which items are classified, 
an example of such a strategy being Making out a series of instances to try to eliminate 
irrelevant features. More recently, Medin, Wattenmaker, and Michalski (1987) examined the 
rules which subjects invent themselves to solve classification proMems. From their 
analysis, it appeared that people do not necessarily invent the simplest possiMe rule to sMve 
a proMem, and often include redundant information in their rules. Medin et al. suggested 
subjects find a salient featue which comes close to solving the proMem with a one 
dimensional rule, then **patch up” the gaps arul the counterexamples with extra disjunctions 
or (preferably) conjunctions.
Category learning as extracting parameters o f  a distribution.
The rejection of the notion that cognitive categories can be adequately explained in tenns 
o f rules has been one o f  tite major movements in cognitive psychMogy in the second half of 
this century. The case against rule-deffned categories was neatly expressed by Wittgenstein 
(1953) in his discussion o f  the nature language, or “language games” in his terminology. 
Wittgenstein asked himself for clarification of what the term “language game” meant, and 
proceeded to discuss the definition of the category “game”. There is no rule for classifying 
something as a game, said Wittgenstein, no feature cocMnon to all games such as chess, 
tennis, and patience, only webs of relatedness:
**..... we see a complicated networir of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing:
sometimes overall simil«ities, sometiiites similarities of detail. 1 can think o f no better 
expression lo characterise these similarities than ‘family resemMances*.” (Philosophical 
Investigations I. sections 66,67.)
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If caiefones consist o f patterns of family resemblance ratfier than rules, then how do 
people leam to caieforise new objecu as belonging lo familiar categories? One solution that 
has been proposed is that in learning about a category, people build up a mental 
representation of what a typical or average member of the category is like: if a new item is 
more similar to a typical X than anything elae, it is categorised as an X. The process 
involved in building up the mental representation of the category is abstraction, similar to the 
process described by Locke, but abstraction o f  typical properties rather than necessary 
properties.
The idea o f category learning as a process o f  abstracting the typical properties of category 
members has a relatively long history in experimental psychology, considerably pre-dadng 
W itt^nsiein 's remarks. Bartlett’s (1932) schema theory invt^ved such processes as new 
exemfriars modifying a learned ’’schema” resident in the memory, and the schenm 
’’conventionalising” the representation of the exenr^lar so that it would later be remembered 
as less idiosyncratic or unusual than it actually was. Oldfield (1934) applied the schenui 
formula to theories of how binary strings could be recoded and remembered, while Attneave 
(1937) demonstrated that learning category schemata aided later learning of labels for 
particular letter matrices and pcriygons.
Schema learning, i.e. acquiring a represenution of the typical member of a class, has 
been studied empirically by teaching subjects to  classify stimuli which are distortions of an 
ideal or ’’prototype” stimulus for that class. If subjects can leam to classify distortions 
correctly the first time they see them, one possible explanation for this ability is that the 
subject has acquired a represenution of the propenies of a typical member of each category.
Early experimental studies of schema learning (e.g. the studies reviewed in (Chapter 3) 
tended to take it for granted that such a ‘‘prototype extraction” |m>cess was taking place. 
Posner and Keele’s (1968) study stands out from earlier schema learning studies due to their 
attention to the question o f what is actually being learned by the subjects. In their task, 
subjects learned to classify patterns dots which were generated as distortions (i.e. each 
dot moved a random amount in a random direction) of prototype patterns which the subjecu 
did not see during training. In transfer teats, not only could subjects classify new 
distortions, they were as good at classifying the prototypes, which they were seeing for the 
first time, as they were at classifying the distorted patterns used in training. They were 
better at clasaifying both these types of pattern than new distortions of the prototypes.
It was clear from Posner and Keele’s (1968) findings that if. as seemed likely. sut>jecu 
were learning a prototype for each category o f dot pattern, that was not all they were
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learning: classification of old exemplars on the transfer test was significantly better than 
classification of new exemplm . Similarly, the mote distorted the training exemplars were, 
the better the subjects were at classifying h i^ ly  distorted transfer test patterns. Subjects 
were not ju s t learning the average position of the dots in the prototype patterns, they also had 
some m eans of recognising the particular exen^ilarv they had seen before, and access to 
some information on how far the dots were likely to  move in new exemptars.
In the ir 1968 paper, Posner and Keele remained agnostic as to whether the prototype was 
abstracted  during the original learning, or reconstructed from learned exemplars at the time 
of the transfer tests. In a subsequent piqier, Posner and Keele (1970) argued diat the 
prototype extraction took {dace during learning, not at test If test performance was 
compared between subjects who were tested immediately after learning, and subjects who 
were tested after a one week delay, classification performance for old exemplars suffered 
more from  the delay than classification performance with the category prototypes. Posner 
and Keele argued that if the prototypes were “abstracted” at the time o f test, forgetting a  lot 
of the o ld  exemplars should have resulted in a marked fall in performance at classifying the 
prototypes.*
Proto type extraction theories category learning have obvious advantages over rule- 
based theories. For one thing, as described above, categories do not appear, in the light of 
modem philosophical reflection, to be definable by rules. Secondly, people can leam to 
attribute new  exemplars to rule-ftee prototypically structured categories when required to do 
so in the laboratories of experimental psychologists. Thirdly, when asked to judge how 
typical an exemplar is of a panicular artificial or real world category, p eo f^  readily comfriy, 
tend to agree with each ocher, and the typicality ratings are correlated with performance on 
other categorisation tasks.
For real world categories such as fruit, sciences, and sports, Rosch (1973) asked 
subjects lo  rate particular examples (e.g. apple) for how good a representative of their 
categories they were. There was considerable agreement between subjects on which items 
were good aiKl bad examples of each category, and these **typicality ratings” predicted how 
fast their category membership was verified in a reactioh time task. Roach, Simpson, and 
Miller (1976a) obtained similar results with exemplars of pioiotypically defined, dot pattern 
categories similar to those used by Posner and Keele, as well as with distortions of stick
* This argwawit is perhaps a liuk  shaky - it assumes that there is a linear relationship between 
the number  o f  exemplan you can remember and how well you can abstract a useful prototype from 
them “on the spot**. If. for example, five reatembered exemplars gives you an estimaia of ths cealral 
isadeacy wMch is practically as gotte as you would achieve from 20 exemplars. Posaar and Kaele’s
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fifure protticypes and letter strings, where typicality (which closely matched subiects’ 
typicality ratings) was defined as the amount of difference between the exem|4ar and the 
category prototype.
In prototype models o f  cate^xy learning, the effects of exemplar typicality can be 
accommodated particulariy easily: typicality is the perceived difference between an 
exemplar's (Mopertiet and the central tendency of the category it belonp to. However, 
typicality effects are not necessarily evidence that categories are learned as prototypes, as 
Rosch (1978) and proponents o f  other models (see below) have pointed out.
Numerous versions o f  prototype abstraction models of category learning have been 
proposed, differing in which parameters of the central tendency are assumed to be learned by 
the subject Reed (1972) compared 18 versions of various category learning models with 
subjects' classification perfo rmance on a task involving schematic faces: the best correlation 
with the subjects’ data was provided by a prototype extraction model in which the deviations 
from the prototypes' average values for each feature were weighted according to a scheme 
which clustered and separated the exenplars of the two categories.
In a different class of prototype extraction models, the prototype consists not average 
values for the features, but o f  tallies of which particular values on each feature occur most 
often in each category, and may also include tallies of the occurrence of combinations of 
feature values (e.g. Hayes-Roth and Hayes-Roth, 1977).
Models which code the co-occurrence of combinations of features as well as just the 
values or frequencies of features individually may provide a better description of subjects* 
category learning performance by extracting these extra parameters. As Rosch (e.g. Rosch, 
1978) has pointed out, the probability of occurrertce of features may not generally be 
independent of other features - in animal types, for example, wings oo-occur with feathers 
more often than with fur.
If a model, such as a simple prototype model, treats features or feature values 
independently of one another, it misses out on the extra predictive information that 
combinations of features can give in situations were the the predictive value of two features 
together (e.g. wings and feathers) is greater than the sum of their predictive values if they 
occuned on their own. Co-occunences of features have been shown to affect subjects* 
typicality judgements for exemplars from natural categories (Malt and Smith, 1984). With 
aitiflcial stimuli, Richardson (1987) showed that typicality judgements were predicted better 
by a **ielational coding** model than an independent cue model, as were subjects' choices of 
features to fill in missing parts o f  exemplars.
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Fried and Holyoak (1984) pfopoaed a prolocype extraction model of category learning in 
which the parameters of the central tendencies learned by the subject are the variance as well 
as the mean value for each feature. In the U ^ t  o f their experimental findings that subjects 
could still learn to categorise new exenq>lars without being told how many categories they 
were siqiposed to be learning about. Fried and Holyoak modified their model to include the 
initial storage of exemplars. From these stored exen^rfars, subjects were supposed to  form 
an estimate of how many category clusters were represented in the stimuli.
Category learning as memorising individuals.
Models based on just the storage of information about the central tendency of a category 
provide reasonable accounts of how people can classify new exemplars. They fall down, 
however, when it comes to explaining why (e.g. in Posner and Keele, 1970) categorising 
performance may be better with old exemplars than with new, equally valid, exemplars, or 
even with the category prototype. And to account for explicit learning about individual 
objects or events as well as categories, a prototype storage model must be bolstered up with 
assumptions about some separate memory mechanism which takes responsibility for 
learning about particular items.
Attempts have been made to account for category learning purely in terms of memory for 
individual exemplars, with no stored prototype included in the model. This approach, 
although parsinKMikxis in one sense, is nevertheless somewhat unecononucal, when 
compwed with prototype extraction theories, in terms of the volume o f  information people 
would have to store in order to perform categorisation tasks.
Some relatively sim|Me exemplar storage models were reviewed by Reed (1972). In one 
model, the “nearest neighbour model“, when presented with a new pattern to classify, the 
subject is assumed to examine the exenq>lars he can remember and choose die category 
containing the remembered pattern which is most similar to the test pattern. In variants of 
this model, the subject examines a number (x) of patterns which are nearest to  the test 
pattern, and assigns the test exen^lar to the ca t^ory  to which the minority o f the x 
compared-exemfdars belong. In a slightly different model, the subject is assumed to 
calculate the average distance between the test pattern and all category 1 exemplars, and 
similarly for all category 2 exenplais, and assign the test pattern to the category with the 
lowest average distance. In another class o f  model, the subject calculates “cue validity“, or 
the probability of an exemplv being in a caregory given that it has a given value of a
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particulir feature. Having worked out what i t  the best category 1 cu e 's  cue validity, and the 
best category 2 cue's cue validity, the subject uses the better of the tw o cues. (Alternatively, 
the subject may average across the cue validity of several cues.)
In Reed’s study, none of the exemplar storage models (weighted or unw eigh^ ) 
performed as well overall in predicting the subjecu' responses as a  weighted version of the 
prototype extraction model, but the average distance model's performance was very cloae to 
i t  The deciding factor for Reed was that subjects were more accurate at classifying a 
previously unseen prototype in the transfer test than they were at classifying another 
exemirfar which, according to the average distance model, was equivalently central to the 
category.
The exemplar storage model of category learning proposed by Medin and Schaffer 
(1978), which they called the "context theory", has received a  consideraMe amount of 
detailed empirical investigation. Medin and Schaffer's model proposes that a new exem|4ar 
is classified according to the number of highly similar exemplars which it cues retrieval of 
from each category. A key assumption, which Medin and Schaffer use to distinguish the 
model from a similar, earlier exemplar-based theory (the average distartce model discussed 
by Reed, 1972), is that “similarity" to retrieved, stored patterns is calculated between the 
features of an exemplar multiplicatively rather than additively. In other words, finding one 
highly similar exenplar can result in a higher similarity score than finding several stored 
exemplars which are similar to the target on most features but very dissimilar on just one 
feature.
Like prototype theories, the context model can account for ty{Mcality effects: a highly 
typical exemplar would be similar to, and therefore cue the retrieval of, a greater number of 
stored exen^lars, so that (given a few assumptions) it would be categorised with more 
speed or accuracy than less typical exemplars.
The predictions of the context model and the models (including cue validity, simple 
feature frequency, Reed's weighted prototype model and the average distance model) which 
Medin and Schaffer term the independent cue models are broadly similar. Per the context 
model, however, classification decisions are in f lu e n t  by the number of retrieved 
exen^ars which closely match the target exemplv on any given feature, whereas 
independent cue models do not take this into account. Medin and Schaffo’ (1978, 
expoiments two and three) found that subjects classified a novel exemplar into a category 
where it closely resembled known exemplars deqxie the target exemplar being more similar 
to die prototype of an alternative category, supporting the context model.
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Subaequendy, Medin and Schwanenflugel (1981) reported that whether the exem plan of 
categories can be partitioned by a w ei^led, additive combination of their features C'linear 
separability”) did not affect the ease with ^ i c h  subjects could learn a classificttion problem, 
contrary to the predictions of independent cue models.
Memorising individual exemplars, even in the absence of any intention to categorise 
them, does appear to be a sufficient foundation on which to base later classification tasks 
Brooks (1978) found that subjecu who attempted to learn to classify letter strings were 
poorer on a subsequent classification test than subjects whose previous experience with the 
stimuli had only involved learning assorted words as paired associates for the letter strinp. 
The subjects who had performed the paired associates task protested that they had no idea 
which category letter strings should be put into, but when obliged to guess, performed 
substantially better than at chance. Brooks suggested that there could be a continuwn 
between the strategies of exemplar learning and rule learning in categorisation tasks, with 
such factors as a very large number of comfrfex stimuli, or salient, category-related features 
encouraging rule abstraction, and pressure to recognise individuals or uncertainty over future 
task demands encouraging the storage of exemplars.
Whedter category learning proceeds by learning exemplars or by storing information 
about class prototypes is probaMy dependent to some extent on the details o f  the learning 
task, as Brooks suggested. The ease with which exemplars that belong to the same category 
can be told apart appears to affect whether category learning relies on prototypes or 
exemplars (Reed, 1978, Medin, Dewey, and Murphy, 1983). In tasks where subjects had to 
learn individual names and/or category names for exemplars, Reed, using schematic face 
stimuli containing very little idiosyncriitic information which could aid discrimination, found 
individual names were learned slowly relative to category names. With more individually 
distinctive photographs of real faces, however. Medin et al. found individual name learning 
was faster than category name learning, but learning the individual names impaired subjects’ 
performance on a later categorisation task.*
Other perspectives on category learning
The approaches to category learning discussed so far have tended to give competitive 
rather than complementary accounts of the process, although, as will be described later in
’ T ils rsMli can be accommodated by the conlexi theory, which doei not assume that all features 
of an exem ite  are stored, only those which are more salient or relevani to the subject's hypotheses 
while leaniing the categorisation.
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this section, they should probebly not be considered mutually exclusive. Some 
investigators, meanwhile, have focussed attention on aspects o f  the represenution of 
category information that transcend the debate about rules, prototypes, and exemplars.
Rosch and her colleagues have considered die different levels of categories which exist, 
a id in g  that a category (e.g. chair) which is intermediate between being very general (e.g. 
fwniture) and very specific (e.g. armchair) is the default level categorisation used by 
people (Rosch, Mervis, Gray. Johnson, and Boyes-Braem, 1976b). Rosch et al. 
demonstrated that categories at this intermediate or “basic” level, are the most inclusive 
categories whose members possess many attributes in common, have similar shapes, and are 
interacted with by people using similar motor programs. Additionally, Rosch et al. argued 
that categories at the basic level are learned by children before other levels of categorisation, 
basic level names are learned first, and that adults tend to name objecu at the basic level 
when describing them to children.
Explanations of category representation which rely on the notion o f features, which 
people are supposed to decompose objects and events into, have been criticised for 
overlooking the question of what determines the features which people consider to be 
relevant to category membership (Murphy and Medin, 1983, Medin and Wattenmaker, 
1987).
Murphy and Medin argue that models based on similarity between the featines of 
exemplars give an inadequate account of category “ctrfiermce”, since similMity rraght be 
looked on as the outcome of conceptual coherence as much as the cause of i t  What Murphy 
and Medin suggest may play the role of the glue that binds different exemplars into the same 
mental category is people's “theories” about categories. As they admit, the term “theory” is 
rather vague. Putting it another way, Murphy and Medin suggest that a category is coherent 
to the extent that it fits in with all the rest of a person’s knowledge or beliefs. Their 
examples help to clarify the “theory” notion.
A plum and a lawnmower, according to similarity-based accounts of categorisation, are in 
diffierent categories because they have few featioes in common. Murphy and Medin point 
out that a plum and a lawnmower actually have an infinite nianber of features in common, 
such as that both weigh less than 10.000 kg. both can be dropped, both cannot hear... and 
so on. A similarity-based account must be backed up by some explanation o f  how people 
decide which features are relevant for the categorisation task in question. Apfrtes and prime 
numbers appear to have no common features, but n u ^ t  be categorised together if there is 
some explanation such as having a mathematician friend whose hobby is apple farming.
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Ocher knowledge structures, which m i ^ t  in Murphy and Medin’s terms be called 
theories, have been described by Lakoff (1987, 1989) as “idealized cognitive models”, and 
“metigihors” which supposedly pervade categorical th o u ^ t Idealized cognitive models 
appear somewhat akin lo the idea of class prototypes, but would not, according to Lakoff, 
exist cognitively as simple collections of features, but take a  mote propositional form. 
Concepts rmy embody a numba* of cognitive models • Lakoff discusses the exanq>le of the 
concept of motherhood, which may be cony oaed of models of motherhood as nurturance, 
motherhood as birthing, motherhood as genetic contribution, and so on. Cognitive models, 
and the process o f metonymy where an exemfrfar is used lo cognitively stand in for the class 
ideal, may exi^ain prototype effects according to Lakoff. The notion conceptual 
metaphors described by Lakoff involves the idea of concepts which are used to conceptualise 
other concepts, again very like Murphy and Medin's theories, such as the met^)hor of the 
container-contained relationship which runs through many diverse areas of cattgorical 
kiM>wledge.
Further evidence for the importance o f “theories” in understanding concepts, and further 
evidence that categories defy simple explanations and generalisations, comes from 
Barsalou’s work on the perceived typicality o f  exemi^ars of categories that are made up on 
the spur of the moment.
Barsalou (1983) found that exemplars of categories such as “ways to escape being killed 
by the Maña” and “tilings that could fall on your head” are reliably rated for their typicality, 
within and between subjects, much as some exemplars of a category such as “fruit” are 
generally rated as more typical than others. Barsalou (1987) has also poinwd out the relative 
instability of typicality judgements for exemplars of ordinary categories • the agreement 
between ratings of different subjects typically yielding a correlation coefficient of around 
0.5, and individuals agreeing with their own ratings at roughly rM).8. Such ñndings have 
prompted Barsalou to suggest that mental concepts are unstable, short lived constructions 
put together from a selection o f  categoric knowledge from long term memory, with tiie 
selection process heavily influenced by situation specific factors such as context and the 
subject's goals.
Evidence that “graded structure”, or a gradient of typicality, is a rather more pervasive 
property of concepts than might once have been imagined comes from tiie investigation of 
categories such as “even numbers”, where membership can be deñned by a clear rule. 
Armstrong. Oleitman, and Oleitman (1983) reported that reliable differences are found in the 
ntted typicality o f members of sudi rule-defined categories - 22 is a more typical even
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number than 12. for example - and that typicality pndicts category verification dmea a t haa 
been reported with other typea of categories (e.g. Roach and Mervia, 1975).
Anmatrong el al. argued that graded typicality should not be interpreted as evidence for 
probabilistic or prototype bated category repfeaentadons, and suggested that categories in 
general might be represented by a nile-baaed “core" and probabilistic "identification 
procedures” svhich could give rise to typicality effecu. These poinu, and the allied 
aigumenu of Osherson and Smith (1981) concerning the unpredictabUily of typicality ratings 
for conceptual combinations such as “pet fish”, were rebutted in LakofTs (1987) defence of 
prototype (in the broad sense, including cognitive models etc.) theories. Lakoff argued that 
rule based cores fail to explain conceptual combination effects just as they fail to explain 
category membership in general (see also Hampton, 1979), and that the suggestion of 
identification procedures simply renames the original problem of explaining typicality effects 
for nile defined categories and conceptual combinations, without proposing a solution (see 
also Hampton, 1988).
The extent to which people apparendy believe that any categories have rule-based cores, 
or defining attributes, has been investigated by Malt (1990). From ratings of the 
acceptability of hedged sentences such as “technically speaking, that's an orange”, and role- 
playing scenarios where subjects were asked to imagine they were teaching category names 
to a visitor from another planet. Mall found that suljects behaved as if  natural kinds do have 
defining attributes, but that aitifscis do not.
Theories of category learning do not have to be mutually exclusive. There may exist 
many different types of category, or many different types of category learning process, as 
various theorists have suggested. Brooks (1978) described the grounds for believing that 
there may be a continuum between rule learning and exemplar storing, or “non-analytic” 
concept formation. Murphy and Medin (1985) criticised contemporary similarity-based 
theories of category learning as being inadequate, but argued nevertheless that there is 
probably some truth in all of them. Studies of category learning have unearthed a large 
number of mechanisms which people might use to group individual items into classes, but 
no evidence to suggest that any one categorisation prooess dominates behaviour in a wide 
vviety of contexts. This leaves an eclectic and not unattractive null hypothesis in place: 
people have a wide range of categorisation strategies availaUe, and the strategy or strategies 
they use in any particular context may be determined by whatever is easiest to satisfy the 
demands of the task, by habit, or, perhaps, by people’s own “theories” concerning the 
category learning process.
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V. What pan do category names pUy in caiegory learning?
The dominant contemporaiy  view of adult category learning emphasises the role of 
category cohesiveness in the formation of concepu. For the most part this cohesiveness is 
thought to stem from the resemblance between members of a category: the category is held 
together by dte similaity between its members, or the similarity between its members and a 
prototype.
In reaemMance-based accounts of cohesiveness, the names of categories play no greater 
role than the function ascribed to  them by Hull (1920). The label may provide a pointer as to 
which exemplars to assess for similarity to one another, but ocK:e this similarity is 
discovered, the role the label, except as an output device, it  over.
An alternative slant on cohesiveness, as die quality of fitting in with all the rest the 
subject’s knowledge, may or may not involve verbal processes, depending on how this 
knowledge is assumed to exert its influence. Whatever the case, it is die knowledge 
structures which exert the influence in this account, not verbal processes, and not category 
names.
These positions contrast with an earlier view of the role of category names in 
cohesiveness. Where category learning was assumed to be an entirely didactic process - as 
in the extreme nominalist view, and the conceptions of Watson, Weiss, and Gray described 
in Section t  - cohesivencss was attributed to the unifying power the category name.
Two functions of category names in cale^iry learning are highlighted in the above 
analysis: i) the role of category names in providing a pointer o f where to look for similarity, 
and ii) the role of category names in supplying category cohesiveness. These two points 
will be returned to in Section V! .
The remainder of diis section addresses the question. What empirical evidence is there 
concerning the importance o f names in category learning?
Category learning without names.
Studies of learning with animals suggest that names are not necessaiy for behaviour 
which satisfy a category learning criterion such as the simple definition at the start of
SectionfV  .
Compelling evidence for this assertion comes from experiments with pigeons. 
Hermsiein, Loveland, and Cable (1976) reported a set of experiments in which pigeoru
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were taught lo peck a response key for food when presented with colour slide pictures 
containing a certain type <3f object, and not to peck when presented with pictures which did 
not contain a view the key object
Separate groups of pigeons were trained to peck when presented with slides containing 
any view of any tree, any view o f  water, and any view of a particular young woman as the 
positive instances. The composition of the positive and negative pictures (each set 
containing roughly 8(X) of each) varied widely in locations, seasons, complexity and so on. 
After roughly 73 training sessions widi sub sets of 80 pictures selected from the pool, the 
pigeons were given transfer test sessions in which only pictures that had never been 
presented during training were used. Pecking to positive pictures was markedly greater than 
peddng to negative pictures, and the agreement between the various pigeons in each group 
was high for which pictures elicited pecking.
If the logeons had an innate ability to recognise the classes of objects used as stimuli in 
Herrnstein et al.'s study, it could be argued that the pigeons' behaviour did not demónstrale 
category learning, only learning a new response lo a pre-established concept This 
interpretation might be sustainable in the cases of water and trees, but is obviously untenable 
in die case learning to respond to pictures of a particular person. Moreover, Herrnstein 
and DeVilliers (1980) reported similar cattgory learning performance by pigeons who 
discriminared underwater photographs of scenes containing físh from underwarer scenes 
with no fîsh in them.
Pigeons appear lo be able to form a concept from experience of as little as one positive 
exemplar. O rella  (1979) trained pigecms to peck a key when shown phottigraphs of leaves 
from oak trees, and not to peck when shown photographs of leaves from trees that were not 
<Mks. Training was just as effective when the pigeons were trained on one oak leaf seen 40 
times intermixed with ocher species as it was when they were trained on a selection of 40 
different oak leaves and 40 other-species leaves. Cerella also found that experience of 
negative instances, i.e. the ocher-^iecies leaves, was not necessary during training for the 
subsequent discrimination between oak leaves and ocher species. Along with diis 
demonstration of the birds' ability for rapid concept formation from limiied experience. 
Cerella found that a discrimination between a particular oak leaf and any other oak leaves 
was extremely difficulc (but not impossible) for the pigeons lo learn. It might appear that 
pigeons do not satisfy the “when it is advantageous to do so" pan of the category learning 
criterion with as much facility as they satisfy the ocher pans of it, although this may be 
peculiar to the leaf stimuli.
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Hie nature of the category representations formed by pigeons has been scrutinised «id 
speculated upon. Although a rough correspondence appeared in Herrnstein et al.'s (1976) 
experiments between pictures which people rated as harder to classify and the pigeons* 
discrinanadve pecking performance, in other studies human and pigeon classification 
schemes have not ccnesponded. Cerella*s experiments with line projections of cubes and 
occluded triangles (Cerella 1977, 1980) sug^sted that pigeons may be unable to use 3D 
representations, although Hermstein’s (1984) preferred interpretation is that pigeons may be 
unable to extract 3D information from line drawings. Sinalar interpretations can be put on 
Cerella*s (1980) finding that pigeons trained to respond to pictures of the Peanuts cartoon 
character C!harlie Brown, in preference to other characters, responded equally to normal, or 
inverted, or partial, or segmented and rearranged Charlie Browns.
Might pigeons represent categories using some sort of abstracted central tendency or 
prototype? Watanabe (1988) reported two experiments where pigeons were trained to peck 
to  patterns of dots generated as distortions of a (xolotype, in which it was found that the 
birds did not subsequently generalise this responding to the prototype pattern itself. 
However, since no dots in Watanabe’s training exemplars ever took the positions of the 
hypothetical prototype, the pigeons* behaviour is less convincingly non-prototype based 
than it at first ^ipears. Negative evidence for the use o f prototypes by pigeons also comes 
from Pearce’s (1989) experiment in which pigeons learned to peck to short rather than tall 
patterns composed of three bars of varying height. Pearce compared transfer reqxmding to 
tw o patterns, one representing the mean b v  heights for the short stimuli (3-3-3) and the 
other, three te rs  which were shorter still (1-1-1). The (xgeons pecked more to die super­
short stimulus than lo the averagely-short stimulus, which Pearce vgued was evidence that 
the pigeons’ representations of the categories did not take the form of prototypes, or u  least 
not prototypes consisting the mean values of the positive stimuli for each feature. Pearce 
suggesu that some account in terms of associations between individual features, or 
configurations of features, and reward, coupled with a ’‘peak shift” away from the tall 
stimuli associated with non reinforcement, may account for the pigeons’ behaviour.
It would be no surprise if human subjects in a sindlar experiment lo Pearce’s, asked lo 
nne the patterns for typicality, rated the 1-1-1 pattern more typical than the 3-3-3 pattern. If 
this happened, it would probaMy be attributed to the subjects having decided th«  “short” 
was the important property for the positive instances. Might the pigeons have been 
reqionding to some abstract concept such as “shortness”? It has, after all. been suggested 
(Delius and Habers, 1978) that pigeons can master the concept of symmetry.
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Shape recognition and vertial labels.
Two label learning effecu that have been examined in the experimental literature on shape 
recognition are of interest here because of possible parallels they suggest with category 
learning processes. One is the effect of learning labels for novel visual stimuli on later 
recognition of these stimuli. The other is the effect of learning labels for novel stimuli on 
later transfer learning involving the same stimuli and new responses
Recognition memory for shapes has been found to be aided by the the paired associate 
lesning of verbal labels for the shapes, but this beneficial effect may be largely or wholly 
attributable to the connotation of the vcrtwl label helping the subject treat an otherwise 
meaningless shape in a more meaningful way, either at the time of encoding (Ellis. 1968. 
1973) or retrieval (Price and Slive, 1970. Nagae. 1980).
Most studies of labelling effects on shape recognition have used stimuli selected from the 
random polygons pubUshed by Vanderplas and Garvin (1959a) which each consist of a 
number of randomly placed points (e.g. 6 ,12  or 24) joined by lines and coloured in to form 
irregular black shapes. In a  study of labels and recognition memory for shapes, Vanderplas 
and Garvin (1959b) required subjects to learn meaningless letter trigram labels for such 
polygons and found no facilitating effect of learning the labels on later shape recognition 
performance.
Using verbal labels that were both meaningful and relevant, however, such as the label 
"swan" for a Vanderplas and Garvin shape which looks vaguely swan-like, Ellis and Muller 
(1964) demonstrated recognition test superiority for shapes that subjects had received veibal 
label pre-training with over shapes which subjects had observed without labelling.
Several studies subsequently confirmed the beneficial effect of using such labels on later 
shape recognition performance. Ellis and Daniel (1971), Daniel and Ellis (1972) and Nagae 
(1980), using Vanderplas and Garvin shapes paired with meaningful, relevant woid labels, 
all found significant facilitation of prior label learning on shape recognition.
Ellis (1968, Experiments 1 and 2) compared label pre-training using three types o f label • 
meaningless, iirelevam labels (consonant-vowel-consonant |CVC] trigrams), meaningful but 
irrelevant labels, and meaningful, relevant labels (modal associates o f the shapes). 
Recognition performance was best with the meaningful, relevant labels, and worst with the 
CVC Ingrams.
Unfortunaiely, as no obaervation-only control condition was included in the study, it is 
not clear whether the meaningless, irrelevant labels had no effect on recognition, as reponed
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by VanderpUs and Gwvin (19S9b) or facilitated recognition less than the other labelling 
conditions. To my knowledge, no other published study has included this comparison, and 
Vanderplas and Oarvin's negative result with meaningless labels remains unchallenged.
The second issue of interest regarding the influ^ice of labelling on memory for shapes is 
the effect of label pre-training on transfer learning. Ooss (1933), for example, showed diat 
subjects who learned nonsense syllaUe labels for each of foiv light intensities and 
subsequently had to leant to press a particular switch for each one, found it earier to learn 
the second task than subjects who had previously observed the stimuli without learning to 
label them.
In a review of label learning - transfer learning studies, Amoult (1957) concluded that 
vnbal label pre-training for visual stimuli had aided motor learning over and above the extent 
to which just observing the stimuli aided learning in around fifty per cent of studies. Where 
the meaning of the label matched the nature of the motor response (e.g. learning 
'*up*7*down** for a red/green light then learning to press a lever up or down) Amoult noted 
that label learning had facilitated transfer learning in a larger proportion of experiments.
Many failures to find an effect of label learning on transfer learning (e.g. Hake and 
Eriksen 1955,1956) might be attributable to the use of meaningless or irrelevant labels such 
as letters and non-words. In a label learning - switch press learning experiment using 
Vanderplas and Garvin shapes as stimuli, Ellis (1968, Experiment 3) demonstrated a 
significant transfer effect when subjects learned labels that were modal associates o f  the 
shapes (i.e. meaningful, relevant labels) but no significant transfer effect when subjects 
learned irrelevant words or meaningless CVC trignuns as labels for the shapes.
The label learning effects in transfer learning studies (such as those reviewed by Amoult 
1957 or the experiments of Goss 1953 or Ellis 1968) are consistent with the acquired 
distinctiveness of cues (ADC) hypothesis of Miller and Dollard (1941). This hypothesis 
states diat attaching distinctive responses to stimuli causes learned distinctiveness, 
decreasing the extent to which instrumental responses generalise from one stimulus to 
another. Thus if, after label learning, there is less tendency for responses to generalise from 
one stimulus to another, acquiring distinct motor responses for each of the labelled stimuli 
should be faster or more thorough, peihaps because the learned distitKtiveness due to the 
labels should provide inhibition of a response learned to one stimulus from being produced 
in response to others.
Miller aitd Dollard also proposed that learning the same response to different stimuli 
should reduce the distinctiveness of the stimuli, increasing the extent to which instrumental
1
retponaet fen en liae  ftwn one stimului lo olhen. In the c*ie of label learning, thii acquiied 
equivalence o f cuea (AEC) hypodwaia predicta dial learning the aame label to more than one 
admulua ahould make it harder to leam diadnct leaponaea to any of them.
The learned equivalence effect deactibed by Miller and DoUaid waa evident in a labeUing
experiment w ith aeta of progieaaively dialoiled ahapea reported by Malloy and EUia (1970). 
In the firat atage of thia experiment, aubjecta learned a CVC label common to a prototype 
ahape and alao a  second shape that had been produced by distorting the first. In other 
comUdona, subjects learned distinct labels for the prototype and the variant, or obaerved 
both thapea without labelling, or learned a label for one and obaerved the other, or received 
no pre-triining w ith the shapes.
The second stage of the experiment consisted of learning a word response (an irrelevant 
noun) to the prototype shape previously teamed in sUge 1. The third stage was a recognition 
test aimed at assessing the subjects' generalisation of the noun response fiom the prototype 
to the variant tha t had also been (Mired with the CVC label in sUge one, and lo other novel 
variations o f the prototy|>e.
Malloy and Ellis found that pairing the target stimulus and the similar variant with the 
same label resulted in significantly more ^neralisation of the noun response to the variant 
than control conditions where the target shape and the variant of it received no pre-training or 
were observed without labelling. The noun response also generalised to novel varianu of the 
prototype that were similar to the one that had shared the CVC label with the prototype 
during pre-training.
Although it supported the AEC hypothesis, the results of this experiment did not provide 
unequivocil support for the psrallel ADC hypothesis. LabelUng the prototype shipe and the 
virisnt with different CVC Übels in stage 1 did not result in less generalisation of the noun 
response than in  control conditions.
In other studies relying on recognition data, learned equivalence effects have been 
observed while learned distinctiveness effecu have proved more elusive. Using Vandeiplas 
and Grevin shapes presented laenuUly (subjects felt them with their hands at the bottom of a 
long opaque tube), Ellis et al. compared the recognition lesl performance of subjecu who 
leamed distinctive, meaningful names for each of eight shapes, with that of subjects who 
learned to label four shapes “wide” and four "nairow", and control subjeett who felt the 
shapes without labelling them (Ellis, Bessemer, Devine, and Trafam, 1962, Ellis, Feuge, 
Long, and Pegram, 1964). Learning equivalent labels led so poorer recognilion lest 
performance than the observation only condition, which did not differ significantly from the
C h tp fr  1
diuinctive Ubelt condition.
A nmilar account of theae labelling effects to that given by the AEC and ADC hypolheaes 
ia provided by Gibaon'a (1940) hypotheaia of learned diacrimination. whereby verbal pre- 
training aids learning of new responses due to the transfer of learned discrimination ainang 
the stimuli fh m  one task to the ocher. Acccading to Gibson's view, a tnnior part o f leaning 
involves acquning the ability to diacriminale between stimuli. Positive transfer will occur, 
she predicted, when a second task draw s on discrimination learned in a previous one.
Gibson described leaned discrimination as a reduction in intra-list generalisation - 
essentially the same idea as that expressed in the AEC and ADC hypotheses of Miller and 
DoUaid. However, Gibson made the  additional prediction that leaning should first go 
through a phase of increased tendency to confuse items, then later confusions should fall as 
discrimination between the stimuli is  acquired. According to Amoult (1957), this prediction 
was not confirmed by experimental tests other than one conducted by Gibson (1942).
The relevance of the shape recognition experiments discussed above to the study of the 
role of labels in categoiy lean ing  is this. Firstly, if meaningless as well as meaningful 
labels aid shape recognition, it follow s that category labels, which start life as meaningless, 
might aid the recognition of exemplars in category leaning. If, on the other hand, only 
meaningful labels help shape recognition, as the literature suggests, then the possibility that 
new, meaningless category labels m ight help ieancrs remember exemplars as “seen before 
may be discounted.
Secondly, the acquired distinctiveness and acquired equivalence of cues hypotheses are 
similar to the early behaviourists’ verbal mediating responses explanation of category 
leaning: two things are equivalent because they have the same verbal response associated 
with them. The diverse hypotheses described so far as conceptual coherence attributable to 
category labels, extreme nominalism, acquired equivalence of cues, and verbal mediating 
responses, all look like different nam es for the same idea.
Repotted effects of labels in category leaning.
Labelling has been widely used  as a measure of category learning, but has rarely been 
investigated as a possible influence on category leaning. Where labels have been examined 
as an independent variable in category leaning experiments, this has generally been in the 
specialised context of studies of children’s conceptual development, and studies of the effect 
of feedback in adult category team ing. These two topics as dealt with in detail in Chapters 3
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and S of this thesis.
As an exception to this pattern, two experiments reported by Brown (1956, pp 292-294) 
examined whether a difference in phoneme length in category names was a sufficienUy 
distinctive cue to guide the placing of category boundaries.
English and monolingual Navaho speakers heard a  set of eight colour chips labelled 
respectively “ma”, “ma”, "maa” (i.e. longer vowel), “m aa”, "mo”, “mo", “moh” (i.e. longer 
vowel), “moh". English speakers reacted by categorising the eight stimuli into two sets of 
four, ignoring the vowel length cue. which many noticed but took to be accidental on the 
experimenter’s part. Navaho speakers, in whose native language, accoiding to Brown, 
vowel length is always a relevant cue, categorised the  eight chips into four sets of two. 
When the colour difference at the vowel length boundary was increased fourfold, a large 
proportion of the EngUsh speakers sdll ignored the vowel length difference in the category 
names. The Navahos and English speakers differed significandy on the original task, and 
the two groups of English speakers differed significantly on the two tasks. Brown noted 
from this the bidirectional nature of the relationship between labels and categories - physical 
differences either in categoty labels or in the stimuli to  be categorised can each affect the 
category structure imposed by subjects on the other.
The influence of individual names, as opposed to  category names, on category learning 
has been looked at in a few studies, such as those o f  Reed (1978) and Medin et al. (1983) 
(mentioned in Section IV above) and a study by Esses (1986). In this latter study, the 
pairing of unique, individual names with exemplars aided the recognition and classification 
o f the name-exemplar compounds when seen again, but only over very short intervals. In 
any case, as Medin (1986) noted, these Umited effects could have been entirely due to the 
recognition of the labels rather than the interaction between labels and exemplars.
The pre-existing meaning of words used as category names may affect category leaimng. 
For example, Wright and Murphy (1984) noted that relevant category Übels could aid 
subjects in accurately estimating correlations in nutnencal data (and, surprisingly, that 
misleading caKgory names may be better than no  names at all). Similarly, Medm and 
Wattenmaker (1987) noted that in experiments in which the task was to find a classification 
rule to divide schematic pictures of trains writh various loads, when the task was introduced 
as a matter of finding a rule to pick out the ttains u ied  by “smugglers”, subjects were more 
inclined to mention irrelevant, diamond shaped loads in the classificatioo roles they 
formulated.
Where labels have a pre-existing meaning, their influence on category learning can be
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expected to be potentially boundless. This kind of effect of labels is completely outside the 
scope o f the present investigation. Wheie the influence of category labels is discussed, this 
will at all times be confined to the possible influence on category learning o f  labels which are 
a t nearly devoid o f  pre-existing meaning at possible at the outset o f the category learning 
process.
VI. Empirical questions and overview of experimental chapters.
Little is Imown about the interaction between categories and their names. How, for 
example, might category names affect the interpretation or perception o f  exemplars? How 
are category names themselves interpreted? Chapters 2 and 3 provide relatively stand-akxte 
treatments of these two issues concerning the relationship between categories and their 
labels.
Chapter 2 investigates the hypothesis that category labels may account for the effects 
known as “categorical perception“, where discrimination of stimuli within a category is 
depressed relative to  the discriminability of stimuli belonging to different categories. To test 
this hypothesis, a  minimal category learning usk is devised, using sinq>le, one dimensional 
stimuli, and requiring subjects to make quantitative judgements about the stimuli.
In Chapter 3. the issue of how people interpret category labels in investigated. Given no 
other cues, what are people’s default assumptions about the extension o f  a new label in a 
novel domain of newly learned categories?
At the beginning of the last section, two possible roles for category names in category 
learning were distinguished. One is the function ascribed to labels by contemporary, 
similarity-based accounts of category learning: labels tell learners where to look for 
similarity. The second function is a modem resuiement of the nominalist /  behaviourist 
hypothesis: verbal labels may themselves provide conceptual cohererK:e, the glue that binds 
different exemplars together to form a sensible ensemble, a concept.
These two functions of category labels are investigated in the studies which form the bulk 
of this thesis.
The aim of these studies is to examine die cirxninvtanoet under which labels are important 
in category learning, and to compare the effects of different types o f label. Additionally, if 
possible, the studies aim to invesdsaie the relative contribution o f  the two theoretical 
functions of labels which have been contrasted.
Two strategics are used to these ends. One strategy is the comparison o f  the provision of
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vertMl l«belJ u  categoiy mines with the ptoviskm of categocy labels that are not wcaxls, and 
the provision of no category labels at all (Chapters 4 and 6).
The aim here is to separate out the general effects of labelling exemplars during category 
learning from the effects specific to the provision of a veibal name for a category. 
Differences between learning with labelled and unlabelled exemplars may be attributed to the 
generel effects of labelling, which will include the role of labels in direcong subjeca’ 
attention to w hen  to look for simUarity between exemplars. If any difference it found 
between learning with exemplars labelled by verbal and non-verbal labels, one poasiUe 
intetpretatioo of thU is that it represents the different extent to which verbal and other 
category labels provide coherence between exemplars. An alternative explanation which 
must be considered, however, is that it represents a difference between category names and 
other category labels in the efficiency with which they convey the category membership 
infotmatioo which guides the search for coherence-giving similarities between members of 
the same category.
In Chapter 5, the extent to which supplying category names for exemplars proamtes 
category learning over and above unaided learning or learning with feedback which does not 
label exemplars for category membership is assessed. Subjects’ performance in a schema 
learning uuk is compared in four conditions: learning with labelled exemplars, learning with 
right-wrong feedback, learning with neither labels nor simple feedback, and learning with 
both labels and right-wrong feedback.
The other strategy employed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6 is the companson of category 
learning using similarity-based, coherent categories (Chapters 5 and 6) with the learning of 
other highly atliricial, incoherent categories consisting of arbittary collections of exemplars 
(O ap ter 4).
The comparative study of the effecB of labels in learning arbitrary coUections and 
prototypically structured categories allows the interactkm between coherence and labelling 
effects uj be examined. In categories which have high similarity-based coherence, the 
iitponance of verbal labels in learning, either as a source of category membetahip 
information or a as a source of name-based coherence, should be less than when subjects 
leam categories which do not have similarity-baaed coherence. Thus the arbiiraty collection
learning task might provide a practical means of studying the importance of different types of




Category names and judgements about exemplars.
Summary
In this chapter, theories of learned categc^ical perception and of social differentiation are 
discussed. One theory of categorical perception is that it arises as a consequence of learning 
to classes of stimuli with class labels. In an experiment where subjects learned to
classify lines into groups according to their length, then made quantitative judgements within 
and across class boundaries, no evidence for learned categorical perception was found. In a 
second experiment, it was found that judgement biasses similar to those predicted by learned 
categorical perception can be induced if. after subjects have learned class labels, the class 
labels are presented with the stimuli when the quantitative judgements were made. Such 
effects arc similar to those reported in the field of social differentiation where quantiutivc 
differences are exaggerated at a labelled boundary between two classes: the experiments 
reported here used four classes, and found that prior learning of the classes was necessary 
for exaggeration of class boundary differences to take place.
Categorical perception, involving a relatively depressed ability to discriminate between 
stimuli judged to belong to the same class, is a documented feature of certain stimulus 
domains and may be common to many more. The extent to which the phenomenon is a 
consequence of learning to put stimuli into discrete classes, rather than being due to innate 
discontinuities in discrimination ability, is uncertain (Hamad, 1987). It would be pemnent 
to this thesis lo ask. if learned categorical perception effects can be shown to exist, what role 
verbal category labels play in the development of these effects. The aim of this chapter is 
first to  review the evidence for categorical perception and theories proposed to explain it, 
then to describe two experiments which attempted to test the hypothesis that categorical 
perce ption is a consequence of category learning.
Another way of describing the effect known as categorical perception is to say that a
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perceptual domain is perceived in a markedly discontinuous way: as some physical quantity 
is smoothly varied, the psychological experience of these stimuli varies not continuously but 
in discrete steps. This effect has been clearly demonstrated in the domain o f speech 
perception: Liberman, Harris, Hoffman, and Griffith (1957) showed that for consonants 
(ta/d/f) presented in a vowel ccmtext, discrimination of the consonant-vowel compounds 
peaked at points on the stimulus continuum where a sharp perceptual boundary appeared to 
exist between one consonant and the next.
The donuin colour is also divided into a small number o f discrete categories, with 
discrimination decisions between categories being apparently faster and more accurate than 
discrimirution decisions for stimuli taken from the same category (Bomstein 1987 for a 
review). This pattern of discontinuous categories for colour has been found in young 
human infants, non human primates, and non primates such as pigeons and bees.
Categorical perception effects of a similar nature to those found in humans for speech 
sounds have been documented for ultra sound perception in house mice (Ehret 1987 for a 
review of animal categtMical perception findings). For human speech sounds, not only 
human infants but also prim ates and chinchillas appear to display strikingly similar 
categorical effects to those found in human adults (Rosen and Howell 1987).
Findings of similar categorical perception effects in adults and infants and between 
species suggest that the phenomenon may arise from innate discontinuities in perceptual 
sensitivities. However, the innateness of all or any categorical perception effects remains to 
be proven, and there is some evidence to suggest that learning or experience may at least 
play a part in categorical perception effects. Practice with the judgement task and the stimuli 
can reduce the categorical perception effect for speech stimuli considerably (Pastore 1987), 
and category boundaries appear to be placed differently fcN* speakers of different languages 
(Rosen and Howell 1987).
The theory that categtxical perception effects arise due to subjects having learned to put 
stimuli into categories was first described by Liberman and co-workers (Liberman et al. 
1937, Liberman, Harris. Kinney, and Lane 1961). Subsequently, however, Liberman and 
his colleagues proposed a mechanism for speech perception • the "motor theory" - which 
they argued was responsible for categorical perceptiwi effects. According to the motor 
theory (Liberman 1957, Liberman, Cooper, Schankweiler, and Studdert-Kennedy 1S167) 
speech is recognised by reference to the articulatcMy movements used to generate different 
phonemes. These motor patterns, themselves discrete in nature, mediate somehow in 
subjects' identincation and discrimination judgements of speech sounds, causing these
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judgemenu also to appear to be discrete, i.e. causing categcmcal perception effects.
The learned categories theory of categorical perception did not disappear: it was 
championed by Lane (196S) who attempted to undermine the motor theory of speech 
perception by showing that categorical perception could arise simply from learning to put 
stimuli taken from an artificial continuum into classes. Lane referred to two experiments 
where, he claimed, categorical perception had been experimentally induced by teaching 
subjects a categorisation task.
The first of these studies was conducted by Lane and Schneider (1S163, unpublished, 
described in Lane 1S>65) using non-speech auditory stimuli created by inverting the 
spectrograms of artificial speech sounds from a continuum perceived as ranging from "do** 
to "to”. These stimuli had previously been used in a control task by Liberman et al. 1961, 
who failed to find evidence of category boundary effects in subjects' perception of these 
non-speech stimuli, despite categorical perception effects being evident in subjects' 
discrimination of the do-to continuum. An ABX ' procedure was used to test subjects' 
discrimination performance with the sounds, which Lane repents to have been initially at 
chance, but to have peaked at the identification boundary after the three subjects had been 
trained with labels for the two extreme stimuli in the range. Lane reports that subjects 
discriminated significantly more accurately when stimuli were drawn horn opposite sides of 
the identification boundary than when both stimuli were drawn from the same perceived 
category.
This experiment cannot be regarded as a demonstration of learned categorical perception 
in the strict sense, since the subjects were not taught to classify the stimuli using a category 
boundary fixed by the experim en t. Instead, the dividing point between the two cattgories 
was left to each individual subject to decide on, thus the category boundary fell wherever 
there was a perceived category boundary for each subject - the position the boundary was 
not learned. Although the stimuli were artificial, the categemsation of them was not. This 
experiment served Lane's purpose in arguing against the motor theory o f  speech perception, 
since evidence o f a category boundary effect with non-speech stimuli would not have been 
predicted by Libenmn et al.'s theory and weakened the argument that speech perception was 
in some way unique.
The second study adduced by Lane (1965) as evidence of learned categorical perception 
w u  an experiment performed by Cross, Lane, and Sheppard (1965, experiment 2) using
' Hw ABX tadi involves presenting three stimuli in succession on each trial. The third stimulus 
(X) Is Mentlcal lo one of the Hrst two (i.e. A or B;. The subject's task is to say which of the first two 
stimuli the third stimulus matches.
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visual rather than auditory stimuli. The stimuli were four circles with a  sector of varying 
size (42,46, SO, and 54 degrees of arc) blanked out. Four subjects were uught to label the 
two circles that had the smaller missing sectors with the verbal label **bub”, and the other 
two stimuli with the verbal label “gug", to a criterion of SO consecutive correct trials. An 
identification test followed, then an ABX discrimination test with each  pair of adjacent 
stimuli presented 144 times in a random order.
The subjects' responses on the discrimination task showed a very clear category 
boundary effect: discrimination was correct on around 80% o f trials when the two stimuli 
were from different learned categories, compared with correct responses on only around 
50% of trials for stimuli from the same category. (Cross et al. presented graphs showing 
each subject's discrimination performance peaking at the learned cattgory boundary, but did 
not report any statistical tests of the category boundary effect.)
As evidence for learned categorical perception, the Cross et al. study appears fairly 
compelling. Its defects - a small number of subjects, no statistics reported, the absence of a 
discrimination test befcm the category learning task (to ensure that any category boundary 
efrects were indeed due to the category learning), and an unusually long inter-stimulus 
interval on the ABX trials (Cross et al. used S seconds between stimuli, whereas auditory 
perception studies had used much shorter intervals between members o f  each ABX triad e.g. 
1 second in Liberman et al. 1957, 0.5 seconds in Liberman et al. 1961) - seem somewhat 
niggling in the face of the startling clarity of the category boundary effects described. The 
biggest defect in Cross et al.’s study, however, is that several attempted replications have 
failed.
A replication of Cross et al.’s procedure with three subjects reported by Parks, Wall, and 
Bastian (1969) failed to find any evidence of a categorical perception effect. Parks et al. 
tested the subjects' ABX discrimination performance with three inter-stimulus intervals 
interleaved (5 seconds. 1 second and 0.2 seconds) but found no category boundary efrects 
in discrimination with any form of the ABX test. In a second experiment, again with three 
subjects. Parks et al. increased the identification training way beyond the 50 consecutive 
correct trials criterion employed by Cross et al.. but still found no categorical perception 
effect. Another anempted replication of the Cross et al. experiment was mentioned by 
Studdert-Kennedy et al. (Studdert-Kennedy, Liberman, Harris, and Cooper 1970) in a 
reply to Lane's critical 1965 paper. This replication (an unpublished technical report 
from their laboratory, described only briefly in the 1970 paper) was no more successful than 
Parks et al. in finding evidence for Lane's claim of learned categorical perception effecu.
Studdert-Kennedy et al. also presented a detailed criticism of Lane and Schneider's 
experiment. They were not happy with Lane's claims here either, describing the data as "an 
inconclusive tissue of variability and anomaly" (page 247).
After citing Lane’s (1965) results (apparently unaware o f the defects just described), 
Rosen and Howell (1987) reviewing the learned labels theory of categorical perception 
describe the results of Bums and Ward (1978) as the most convincing evidence for learned 
categorical perception. Bums and Ward found very clear evidence of categorical perception 
in musicians' judgements of musical intervals (the ratio of the frequencies of a pair of tones), 
but no such effect in the judgements of subjects who were not musically trained. Although 
suggestive o f it, these results are not necessarily evidence for learned categorical perception. 
The difference between musicians' and non-musicians judgement of intervals may reflect the 
operation o f a  bias in selecting subjects rather than the e je c ts  musical training. It is 
possible that there is some sort o f innate difference in identification and discrimination ability 
for musical intervals between people who tend to become musicians and those who tend to 
choose a different career.
More modem versions of the learned labels theory of categorical perception exist, 
according to Rosen and Howell (1987), in two-process models o f speech categorical 
perception such as those of Fujisaki and Kuwashima (1971, described in Rosen and Howell) 
and Ades (1977). These models assume that there is a quickly decaying literal sensory store 
and a nxxe durable memory for the applied labels. These two-process models have the 
advantage o f accommodating differences in categorical perception effects within a continuum 
dependent on task variables such as imer-stimulus intervals and presentation paradigm (e.g. 
Pisoni, 1973).
Category-boundary eflects of a similar nature to those found in categorical perception 
experiments are the basis of a different phenomenon, termed the "accentuation effect" (for a 
review, see McOarty and Penny, 1988), which has received some attention from researchers 
interested in social psychology. Like categorical perception, this effect also inverfves a 
discontinuity in subjects' judgements at a categcMy boundary; unlike categorical perception, 
the category boundary is not necessarily a learned one, since the category members are 
labelled to show which category each belongs to.
The paradigm experiment demonstrating the accentuation effect was reported by Ti^jfel 
and Wilkes (1963) in a task involving subjects' length judgements for a set of eight lines. 
The lines were presented one at a time for subjects to estimate their length in centimeters. 
The four shorter lines were labelled "A" and the four longer lines labelled "B" when they
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w«re preienied. Each line in the series of eight was five per cent longer than the last, so diat 
the difference in length between the longest line labelled A and the shortest line labelled B 
was. as for any other adjacent pair of lines, five per cent. In their length judgements, 
however, 'Dyfel and Fraser's subjects markedly exaggerated the difference in length between 
the longest A and the shortest B. Subjects in two control conditions (where the lines were 
not labelled o r the labels A and B were allocated to  the lines randomly) showed no such 
accentuation o f the difference in length between the two classes.
This effect has been replicated using the same and other simple perceptual stimuli. 
Marchand (1970, described in Eiser and Stroeb, 1972) required subjects to judge the length 
o f the base line o f a set of eight squares, and found a similar accentuation effect to that 
reported by Tajfel and Wilkes. Lilli (1970, also described in Eiser and Stroeb, 1972) found 
class boundary effects in subjects’ judgements using Thjfel and Wilkes* line stimuli and 
schematic face drawings for which subjects had to judge the height of the forehead.
Other studies have investigated the accentuation effect with judgm ents o i  a more overtly 
’’social” nature, such as judging the ideological orientation of political statements (McCarty 
and Penny. 1988). The finding that category labels can bias simple perceptual judgements 
has influenced theories of social categorisations such as racial stereotypes (e.g. Ihjfel, 
1978).
Although both categorical perception und the accentuation effect can be described as 
category boundary effects, there are numerous differences between the two phenomena as 
they have been studied to date;
i) Categorical perception may (or may not - us described above the picture is as yet unclear) 
be due to innate discontinuities in our perceptual abilities, and as such may owe nothing at 
all to learning. Accentuation, on the other hand, relies entirely on a learned association 
between the class labels and the two ends of the continuum from which the class members 
are drawn (e.g. knowing that ”A”s are short. ”B”s are long).
ii) Categorical perception effects have usually been demonstrated using identiñeation tests 
and discrimination tests such as same-different judgement tasks and, especially, the ABX 
discrimination task. Accentuation effects have been demonstrated using subjects* 
judgements o f  the stimuli along some dimension, such as height, length, or left-right 
political leanings.
iii) Categorical perception effects do not rely on the stimuli being supplied with class labels 
by the experimenter when subjects make judgements about them. Accentuation, on the other 
hand, does rely on the stimuli being labelled by the experimenter when subjects make their
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judgements.
Despite these differences, there are circumstances where the two effects would come 
together. If categorical perception relies on the subjects labelling stimuli with learned 
category lid>els when they make discrimination judgements, for example, this could be 
viewed as some sort o f  self-induced accentuation effect. Although, historically, categorical 
perception and accentuation have been studied separately using different procedures, it is 
possible to investigate the two effects using a similar methodology, and this is accomplished 
in the experimente reported here. The first experiment attempts to investigate learned 
categorical perception per se; the second experiment uses the same methodc^ogy to attempt 
to induce an accentuation effect
Experiment la
This experiment investigates whether a categorical perception effect can be induced as a 
result of subjects learning to classify line stimuli into a number of separate categories.
At the discrimination test stage of the experiment, a modified same-different judgement 
task is employed. Subjects are shown pairs of lines one after the other and are required to 
judge whether the second line is the same length, or longer or shorter than the first line, in 
which case the subject is required to attempt to reproduce the exact difference in length on a 
scale using the mouse. As such, this task is not a simple discrimination test, but a 
discrimination test w ith the requirement that subjects estimate, for each pair of lines, how 
difficult they were to discriminate (i.e. how much they differed in length).
Categorical perception requires that stimuli belonging to the same category are harder to 
discriminate than stimuli divided by the same physical difference belonging to different 
categories. If a categorical perception effect follows from learning to put the lines into 
categories, then lines from different learned categemes should be judged to be more different 
in length dum lines from the same learned category.
Med»d
Subjects
The subjects were first-year undergraduate students taking part in the experiment in order 
te fulfil a requirement of their introductory psychology course. For the experinnental group, 
27 subjects attempted the learning task, although only nine reached the learning criterion. 
Ibn other subjects formed the control group - none o f these had attempted the learning task
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perforated by dte experimental group.
Apparatus
An Acorn Archimedes 310 microcomputer was used to generate the stimuli and control 
the experiment. The stimuli were presented on a normal RGB con^uter moniior.
Stimuli
The stimuli were a  set of eight white lines presented Individually on a Mack background 
on  the nxMiitor screen. The lines were o f lengths 16.0. 20.0, 25.0, 31.3, 39.1, 48.8, 61.0 
and 76.3 mm, each line in this series being 25 per cent longer than the previous one. Such a 
set o f lines is shown in Figure 2.1.
Figure 2.1. The set of lines (actual size) used as stimuli in Experintem la.
The smallest reliably discriminable difference in the length of two lines presented 
successively under the same conditions as those employed in the experiment was verified as 
being approximately 5 per cent *. Thus the dilTerence in length of adjacem lines in the series 
w as very easily discriminable, being roughly five times greater than the just noticeaMe 
difference.
* The Adaptive Probit Estimation procedure (Wsu and Andrews, 1981) was used to determine the 
smallest proportional difference in length which could be reliably detected for pairs of lines presented 
successively under the corulitions ueed in the experiment.
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Procedure
In the first suge o f  the experiment, subjects learned to classify the eight lines into four 
categories, each category consisting of a pair o f lines taken fiotn the set described above. In 
the second part of the experiment, subjects were shown pairs o f  lines and were required to 
estimate tf»e difference in  length between the two lines. The control subjects performed only 
the second stage of the experiment. All the subjects were given practice with the length 
difference estimating task before the start of the experiment.
The eight lines were divided into four pairs. If the eight lines are referred to, in order of 
increasing length, as lines A,B,C...H. then the pairings were as follows: A+B. C+D. E+F, 
G+H.
At the start of the experiment, the four pairs of lines were randomly allocated the names 
"sheep”, "dog”, "goat", and "cow". Subjects were required to learn to identify the name of 
the pair which each line belonged to.
The procedure for this stage of the experiment was as follows. On each trial, one of the 
eight lines was presented on the monitor screen for one second, then erased. Following 
this, the four category names were presented, for the subject to choose the name of the 
category which s/he thought the line belonged to. The category names were presented in a 
random order in four response boxes. The subject chose a  response box by moving the 
mouse pointer into a box then pressing a mouse button. When the subject had responded, 
the response boxes were erased and replaced by a message which informed the subject "Yes, 
that line was a member o f the set xxxx (correct set name)" or "No, that line was a member of 
the set xxxx (correct set name)" as appropriate.
Also shown on the screen at this stage of the trial was a graphical display showing the 
subject how many consecutive trials they had responded correctly on, and showing the 
highest number of consecutively correct trials s/he had so far achieved. This display 
remained on the monitor screen until the subject pressed a mouse button to initiate the next 
trial.
Each line in the set o f  eight was presented once in each block of eight trials, the order of 
presentation within each  block being randomised. The lines were displayed at a position 
randomly offset from the centre of the monitor screen by up to 49 mm in the horizontal 
direction and 41 mm in  the vertical.
The criterion w hich subjects had to meet at this name learning task was to respond 
correctly on 20 consecutive trials. If a subject reached this criterion, this stage of the
experiment w u  immedixtely terminated, w ith the message "Well done! You have reached 
the target." The maximum number of learning trials available to each subject was 200 *. 
After every 10 trials, a message appeared on the monitcM' screen telling the subject how many 
of dte 200 trials they had so far completed.
The second stage o f the experiment involved judging the difference in length between 
pairs of lines taken from the set of eight. The pairs to be judged were always adjacent lines 
from the series. Since there were eight lines in total, there were six lines (B,C,D,E,F.O) 
which could be compared both with an adjacent, longer line and an adjacent, shorter line. 
These six lines formed the basis of the comparisons, each of the six being presented once 
followed by its shorter neighbour and once followed by its longer neighbour. Thus there 
were 12 possible comparisons, and these were presented in a random order. The full set of 
comparisons was presented three times to  each subject, making a total o f 36 length 
difference estimating trials.
The pairs of lines were presented as follows. The first line of the pair was presented for 
one second at a randomly varied (as for the presentation of lines in the first part of the 
experiment) position on the monitor screen. The line was then erased, and after an interval 
of one second the second line was presented at another random position on the screen. After 
one second, the second line was erased, and a response scale was presented to the subject. 
This scale is shown in Figure 2.2.
The subject estimated the amount by which the second line was longer or shorter than the 
first line by moving the mouse pointer along one of two lines on the scale. The subject was 
instructed to attempt to mark off exactly the same length on the scale line as the pair of lines 
just presented had differed in length. If the second line was shorter, the side o f the scale 
marked "shorter" was to be used, and if the second line seemed longer, the side o f the scale 
marked "longer" was to be used. If the subject thought the two lines had been the same 
length, they were instructed to move the m ouse pointer to the small box between the two 
sides of the answering scale, marked "same". Each side of the answering scale had its 
origin near the "same" box.
* Dim to a mistaka, one subject in the experimental group was allowed to exceed this limit, taking 
234 identliication trials lo reach the criterion.
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shorter longer
Fifure 2.2. The leiponse seek used in the judgement task in Experiment In.
Written instructions explaining the procedure were presented on  the monitor screen at the 
start of each stage of the experiment. The first stage of the experiment, invtriving teaming 
the names of the four pairs of lines, was omitted for the control group. All subjects were 
given some practice at using the length difference estimating scale before the start of the 
experiment. Subjects performed a number of length difference estimating fMactice trials 
(generally 10 to 20 practice trials) until they were comfortable with the task, and the 
experimenter was confident that the subject understood the correct procedure for using the 
scale. The pairs of lines judged in this practice stage were randomly generated and thus 
were not the same lines that were to be used subsequently in the experiment.
Results
The results presented are for the nine subjects in the experimental group who reached the 
learning criterion, and for the control group who had not attempted to learn to categorise the 
eight lines into four named pairs.
Subjects in the experimental group who reached the learning criterion took an average of 
133 trials (sd>68) to achieve this.
The data of interest are the estimated length differences of the pairs of lines presented in 
part two o f the experiment. The prediction of the learned categorical perception hypothesis 
is dwt the difference in length of lines from the same learned group should be systematically 
underestimated, and/or the dinerence in length of lines frotn different teamed groups should 
be systematically overestimated. If either or both of these effec ts  occur, then between 
category difference estimates should tend to be greater than w ithin category difference 
estimates.
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first line in pair
FifVfe 2.3a (lop) • Figure 2.3c (bottom). These graphs show the data for one subject (aS) only for the 
jinlpmuati where the second line was longer than the first. Each point is the sum of three trials.
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Before being statistically analysed the raw difference judgement data was transformed in 
two ways. The raw data from one subject in the experimental group is depicted in Figure 
2.3a. This graph illustrates the necessity for the transformations, if the categorical 
perception effect is to be tested for by comparing the absolute size <rf within-category 
judgemems with the absolute size of their neighbouring between-category judgements.
Shown in Figure 2.3a are the subject's difference judgements along with the actual 
differences in length. The actual dinerences in length increase non>linear1y, i.e. the line is 
curved rather than straight, so there would be a tendency for the ideal observer's data also to 
be non-linear. This non-linearity can be corrected by logarithmically transforming the data, * 
the effect of which is shown on both the subject's data and the actual differences in Figure 
2.3b.
The second property of the data which it was desirable to correct so that a simple 
statistical test of the categorical perception hypothesis could be conducted was the (now 
linear) increase in the size of the difference in length of pairs of lines as one moves through 
the set o f eight lines. As can be seen from Figure 2.3b, both the actual difference in length 
and the subject's estimates become larger as one moves from left to right along the horizontal 
axis. The actual and estimated differences lines on the graphs are sloping rather than 
horizontal. This slope was removed from the data by fitting a regression line to the subject's 
estimates, then transfemning the scores so that the slope (the b term in the equation y*bx+a) 
was removed. Graphically, this has the effect of rotating the line plotting the subject's 
estimates until the regression line of the estimates lies parallel with the x axis. Such a 
transformation is illustrated in Figure 2.3c. This transformation was carried out for each 
subject's separately, calculating a separate regression line for the two sets of judgements 
(one set being when the second line was actually shorter, the other set being when the 
second line was actually longer, as shown in Figures 2.3a-c).
The mean difference estimates for the nine subjects in the experimental group, 
transformed as described above, arc plotted in Figure 2.4. The learned categorical 
perception hypothesis would predict that bctween-category difference judgements would be 
greater than within-category judgements. It can be seen that the mean judgements follow no 
such pattern. The d a u  for the control group subjects are plotted in Figure 2.5.
The statistical analysis of the data was performed by comparing die difference judgements
* It was possible for the sum of a subject's three judgements for a compartson lo be less than one. 
since difference judgements in the wrong direction were scored as negative numbers. Wben this 
occurred, in order to logarithmicelly transform the data, a constant was added lo the date of  that 
suMecc Pbur experimental grotq) subjects’ d au  required smell constants of I or l.S. Two control group 
subjects* dnia also requked added constents. of 11.3 in one case and 26.S in another caae.
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for overlapping pairs of lines. Since there are only two lines in each learned category, 
comparisons of pairs of lines (e.g. B followed by C. C followed by D, D followed by E and 
so on) will alternately fall within a learned category and across a  learned category boundary 
as one moves through the set. For statistical purposes, neighbouring pairs o f difference 
judgements (i.e. adjacent points on the lines plotted in Figures 2 .4  and 2.5) were compared. 
Six comparisons were taken from each subject's data. For dte judgements where the second 
line was longer, the learned categorical perception hypothesis predicts difference B would be 
judged greater than difference C, D greater than E, and F  greater than O. For the 
judgements where the second line was shorter, the learned categorical perception hypothesis 
predicts difference C would be greater than difference B, difference E greater than difference 
D, and difference O greater than difference F. If more than six  comparisons were taken 
from each subject's d au  (for example, for shorter judgem ents, difference C would be 
piedicttd to be greater than difference D as well as difference B) then each difference could 
not appear in an equal number of comparisons and thus would not be given an equal weight 
in the analysis.
Figure 2.4. Mean difference judgements for the experimental group (n«9). For bo^  if a
category boundary effect is present, the betwccn-cstegory different judgements (marked shouM 
be grrairr than thie within-category difference judgemenu (marked “w**).
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Thus for the statistical analysis, twelve mean difference judgements (averaged across the 
three times each subject judged each difference) were used from each subject's data. These 
twelve judgements formed six comparisons, as described above, where the learned 
categorical perception hypothesis would predict that one difference judgement should be 
greater than its neighbour. The mean difference Judgements were subjected to an analysis of 
variance with 12 observations per subject and one within subjects factor, the type of 
comparison (within or between learned categories).
For the experimental group, the F value fcM’ the type of comparison was 0.76 (1,98 dO 
p*0.39. A similar analysis was performed for the subjects in the control group. FtM* the 
control group, the F value was also 0.76 (1,109 dO p«K).38. Thus there was no significant 
category boundary effect for either group.
There was no apparent effect o f learned categorical perception in this experiment. The 
learned categorical percq>tion hypothesis predicts that differences between exemplars which 
span a learned category boundary will seem larger than equivalent differences which fall 
within a learned category. This effect was not observed in this experiment, where there was
no sifnificant difTerence between subjects' within category and between category 
judgements.*
In finding no evidence for learned categorical perception, this experiment concurs with 
the findings of Parks et al. (1969) and Studdert-Kennedy et al. (1970) who failed to replicate 
the effect leponed by Lane (1965). This experiment has used different stimuli and a 
different discrimination t««k, and has generalised the no learned categorical perception result 
to  a new set of circumstances.
The use o f a novel methodology is not necessarily an advantage, on the other hand, since 
being novel the method is necessarily unproven. Would this method have detected category 
boundary effects had they been present due to learned categorical perception? This question 
is addressed  in the next experiment.where the same stimuli, discrimination lest and method 
o f  statistical analysis are used to investigate another category boundary effect - accentuation.
Experiment lb
Learned categorical perception means that previously learned category boundaries affect 
judgements about members of those categories. At the time of the Judgements, the only 
5CTircfi of information concerning category membership is the observer s previous learning - 
the items are not externally labelled for category membership.
Where items are labelled for category membership at the time judgements are made about 
them, subjects have been found to exaggerate the difference between items bordering 
category boundaries (e.g. Tajfel and Wilkes 1963). This effect has been observed with two 
labelled categories, and one aim of the following experiment was to see if such an effect 
would be observed when items fall into a larger number of labelled categories.
The main aim of the present experiment, however, was to see whether, in the procedure 
used 10  test for learned categorical perception described above, the introduction of category 
labels at the time of the subjects' judgements would be sufficient to induce subjects to show 
detecuble category boundary effecu.
* Tfce esrwitwwnal tuhjact«. since they had to reach a stringem learning criterion (9 out of
27 Mbiecu succeeded), were heavily selected and were not strkUy comparable with the control 
Had a ^ g o r y  boundary effect been found, this would have left the experiment open to the criticisa» 
levelled ewlier at Bums and WwtTs (197S) study • innaie differences between c o m l
subjacu could have explained the difference la their performance. In this case, an ^ y s i s  of ^ 1 of ^  
27 experimental group subjects would have been appropriate. Since no effect was found, —~  .
c r i t e ^  for subject selection were direedy in line with the learned categorical pemption hypothe^ 
uiid* left, the ..IwiitM o f  expertmeetel group iub)ecu tloei not wMken the coocluiiooi tiiM uiay m  
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Method
Subjects
The subjects were drawn from the same population as those of Experiment la. None of 
th e  subjects had taken part in the previous experiment Fifteen subjects attempted to learn to 
categorise the stimuli into four categories. O f these, seven subjects reached the learning 
criterion. These subjects made up the experimental group. Another seven subjects were 
used for the control group.
Apparatus and Stimuli
These were exactly as described for Experiment la.
Procedure
The procedure was exactly as described for Experiment la. but for one alteration. In part 
2 o f  the experiment, when subjects were estimating the difference in length of pairs of lines, 
the  name of the pair which each line belonged to was displayed alongside the line.
While each line was presented during this stage of the experiment, the name of the pair it 
belonged to was displayed in white on the monitor screen 8 mm from the right hand end of 
the line, at the same horizonul level as the line.
As in Experiment la , subjects in the control group did only the second part of the 
experiment. Control subjects were warned that words would appear on the screen but were 
n o t told their significance. Subjects in both the cxperimenul and the control group were 
given some practice using the difference estimating scale before the start of the experiment.
R)r the seven criterial subjects in the experimental group, the mean number of learning 
trials was 98.4 (sd»40.9).
The judgement data were transformed in the same way as those o f Experiment la.* The 
nsean difference judgements for the seven subjects in the experimental group are shown in 
Figure 2.6. As can be seen from this graph, for each of the six pairs of adjacent difference 
judgements which are used in the statistical analysis, the mean between-category difference 
estimates are greater than the mean within-category estimates. The mean difference
• As la Experiment la , consuuMs were added where required for the tog tranddrm. No s u l^ t 't  
In the experimental group required a cunsuint. In the control ffoup, one subject required a 
coneteni of 67.S, one of l.S, and a third of 1.0.
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judgements of the control group subjects are plotted in Figure 2.7.
first line in pair
Figure 2.6. Mean difference judgements for the experimental group (na?) subjects. As above, within 
category judgements are marked “w" and between category judgements marked
first line in pair
Figure 2.7. Meat judgements for the control group (na?) subjects.
The data were analysed using a one factcM*. within-subjects analysis of variance as in 
Experiment la. For the  experimental group, the analysis yielded a significant category 
boundary effect (F -7 .1 9 .1,76 df, p<0.01). For the control group, there was no significant
category boundary effect (F ^ .9 1 , 1,76 df, p ^ .3 4 ) .
Subjects in the experimental group showed a clear category boundary effect - lines 
belonging u> different categories were judged to be more dissimilar than items belonging to 
the same category. Subjects in the control group did not exhibit this category boundary 
effect in their judgements.
The control group saw the category labels of the lines when they judged the length 
differences, but unlike the experimental group d id not (at least initially) know that the names 
on the screen denoted adjacent pairs of lines in the set of eight. These results suggest that 
for an accentuation effect to occur in length judgements under these conditions, prior 
learning of the category names is necessary.
General Discussion
In Older for category boundary effects to occur in the length judgement task used here, it 
was necessary for subjects to learn category labels prior to the judgement task, and for the 
stimuli to be accompanied by their category labels when the judgements were made. Neither 
of these conditions alone was sufficient to produce a categtxy boundary effect on subjects 
judgements.
If a category boundary effect had occurred as a result of just learning the category labels, 
this would have provided evidence in support o f  the hypothesis that categorical perception 
effects may be a consequence of category learning. Experiment la  found no evidence for 
learned categorical perception. This leaves the learned categorical perception hypothesis (as 
described by Rosen and Howell 1987) still without any direct experimental support, other 
than the report by Lane (1965) which has not been successfully replicated (Parks cl al. 1969, 
Studdert-Kennedy et al. 1970).
Lane (1963) argued that categorical perception could be, and indeed had been, caused by 
learning to put stimuli into categories. It now seems clear that if categorical perception can 
be induced through category learning, this cannot be done as easily as Lane claimed. It is 
still not established, though, that categorical perception must be explained by some other 
mechanism than category learning. The experiments which have attempted to induce learned 
categorical perception have used visual stimuli and learning over a relatively short period.
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whereas categorical perception is most closely associated with speech sounds - auditory 
stimuli whose categorisation, if learned, must be thoroughly overleamed in adults.
In Experiment 1 b. a clear category boundary effect was found when category labels were 
supplied with the stimuli when subjects judged them - the accentuation paradigm. Previous 
published experimenu in which the accentuation effect has been found have divided the 
stimuli into only two categories rather than four as in the present case.
The accentuation effect was shown only by subjects who had previously learned to 
categorise each o f  the eight stimuli with their category labels. Control subjeett who 
performed the sam e judgement u sk  but without having previously learned the meaning of 
the labels showed no accentuation effect. This shows that prior experience with the category 
labels is necessary for the accentuation effect to occur on this particular task, but it leaves 
open the question of exactly what kind of prior experience is necessary. In Tkjfel and 
Fraser’s (1963) experiment, subjects were "pre-exposed” to the stimuli and category labels 
together (the whole set of eight lines was shown with each line labelled) but did not learn to 
categorise the lines as subjects were required to do in the present experiment. It is possible 
that merely learning the orderly relationship between the four labels and increasing size 
would have been sufficient prior experience in the present experim ent to lead to the 
accentuation effec t
In the Introduction, the possibility was suggested that learned categorical perception may 
be equivalent to some son of “self-induced accentuation effect - that is, on seeing a stimulus 
a subject might automatically label it with u learned label and consequently behave as if the 
category label had been externally supplied. This has been shown not to  be the case.
In the present experiments subjects who had learned to categorise the lines showed a 
category boundary effect in their judgements only if the category labels were supplied 
externally. These subjects were quite capable of supplying the category labels themselves, 
having previously learned them m an exacting criterion. On seeing a stimulus belonging to a 
learned category, it is possible to conclude that either subjects did not automatically label it, 
or if they did label it their judgement behaviour was not the same as if  the label had been 
supplied externally.
In summary, the experiments in this chapter have shown that if  learned categorical 
perception exists, it is an elusive phenomenon, and that the effect known as accentuation 
genuinely relies on external labelling to induce category boundary biasaes on judgements.
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Chapters
Adulu' use of the mutual exclusivity principle.
Summary
In this chapter, adults' beliefs about the relationship between categories and category 
labels am examined. A default assumption that each category has only one name, the so 
called “mutual exclurivity principle”, has been attributed to children to explain their word 
learning and category learning performance. Another assumption attribured to children is the 
belief that no word has more than one meaning - the “contrast principle”. In experiments 
with adult Icamers reported here, it is found that in the absence of other cues, adults foUow 
the mutual exclusivity principle and its associated assumptions, rather than the contrast 
principle. While there is an unnamed category available, adults assume that a new name 
denotes this rather than a previously named category. When there is no unnamed categexy. 
however, adult learners show a marked tendency to assume, in violation of the contrast 
principle, that a novel name applied to an exemplar of an already named category is a 
synonym for the already encountered name, rather than a new superordinate or subordinate 
category name.
How many names do people expect a category to have? On encountenng a new name, 
what hypotheses do people form about its meaning? These questions about default 
assumptions learners may make about the relationship between categories and category 
names have been extensively studied in the context o f children's language acquisition, but 
not in the context of category learning by adults, where similar problems have to be faced.
The classic description of the problem was given by Quine (I960), who explained how 
there are always an indefinite num ber of logically tenable hypotheses concerning the 
meaning of a word which is ostensively defined (i.e. defined by pointing to something that 
can have that word applied to it). Thus, if your guide on a trip to New Guinea points to a 
rabbit and exclaims "Oavagai" (to use (f in e 's  famous example), the term Oavagai could
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refer to the rabbit, some aspect of the rabbit's cm* the speaker's disposition, a part of the 
rabbit, an attribute of part of the ndibit, a conjunction of the rabbit and some aspect of its 
setting .... logically, you have no  way of knowing.
Children learn dte meaning o f words by cutting down the infinite monber of possibilities 
by the use of heuristics, according to some current theories o f  language acquisition. It has 
been proposed, for example, that young children have a predi^x>sition to assume a new 
noun refers to a basic level category for which they don't already know a name. Markman 
(1989) has suggested that using this heuristic, children rapidly esublish a vocabulary of 
basic level category names. Subordinate and superordinate category names vk^ate the 
assumption (termed "mutual exclusivity") that each thing only belongs to one cattgory, 
which is ^ y  children have difficulty learning hierarchical category names, she argues. The 
mutual exclusivity assumption must be overcome in order to learn non basic level category 
naiTWS, and so cannot be rigidly applied by the child, but mutual exclusivity may persist into 
adulthood as a default assumption, Markman has speculated.
There are other thecxies o f  how children's word learning is guided by biases, rules or 
assumptions used to constrain possible hypotheses. The Contrast Principle, proposed by 
Clark (1983, 1987), has been particularly influential. The principle states that there are no 
synonyms, or, "every two form s contrast in meaning," (Clark, 1987). Apparent synonyms 
are always different in some way, such as in dialect, register (conversaticmal style), or 
connotation, argues Clark. ITiis principle of language is used by children to facilitate their 
acquisition of it: children assume that no two wcxds can have exactly the same meaning, so 
they assign novel wcxds they hear to categories which they have no existing labels for. One 
of the assumptions of the contrast principle is that an established category label cannot be 
dislodged by a new word - new labels "give way" to old ones.
The two theories just described are similar but not identical. Both Markman and Qark 
are happy to describe the mutual exclusivity principle as a  special case o f the contrast 
principle (Oark 1987, Markman 1989). Mutual exclusivity requires that two words denote 
contrasting categories, but many categories that contrast are not mutually exclusive - e.g. 
"dog" and "animal".
Markman has criticised the contrast principle on several grounds, and claims some 
evidence addttcfd by Clark actually supports mutual exclusivity more strongly than it does 
the contrast principle (Markman 1989, Markman and Wachtel 1988).
Clark's definition of contrast as a principle of language may not be psychologically 
realistic (Markman 1989). At the level of the individual speaker, two words (e.g. "pail" and
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"bucket*') may be used interchangeably and w ith exactly the same meaning, despite 
differences in the meaning existing across the language community. Also, Clark's definition 
of contrast which counts differences in dialect and register as differences in meaning, may be 
too wide: a young child would not be helped much by the contrast principle in the task of 
narrowing down the possible meanings of a new wcMd if she had to allow the possibility of 
there being subtle differences in dialect or style between the new word and an existing one.
Markman contends that Qark's interpreution o f  children's overgeneralisation erro rs and 
their rejection of multiple labels support the operation of a mutual exclusivity corutraint 
rather than the contrast principle: the contrast principle does not explain why a child ceases to 
overexteiKl an word (e.g. "dog"), which she still overextends to several other categories, 
to a category which she has learned a new name for (e.g. "cat"), since the contrast principle 
should allow the name "dog" to remain as a superordinate term including cats. Similarly, 
children would not be constrained by the contrast fxinciple to reject multiple labels for an 
object, which they have frequently been observed to do, since a second label would not 
violate contrast if it were accepted as a superordinate term.
A fundamental difference between Markman's and Clark's theories is that the contrast 
principle is proposed as a general principle of language, extending beyond learning category 
names to learning other linguistic constructs such as verb forms. The mutual exclusivity 
principle, on the other hand, is proposed solely to  account for category name learning in 
children. Whether the mutual exclusivity principle is an assun^km  about the properties of 
words (words do not refer to more than one category) or about categories (things do  not 
belong to more than one category) has been leff open by Markman (Markman artd Wachttl 
1988). The fact that mutual exclusivity may be a generalisation projected by children onto 
the category domain rather than the linguistic domain also sets it apart from the contrast 
principle, which is essentially linguistic rather than semantic.
As far as adult category name learning is concerned, since Clark describes the contrast 
principle as a property of language, not merely as heuristic device employed by learners, 
there is no reason to suppose that adults should not follow the contrast principle in their 
assumptions about the relationships between categories and category names: dtey should 
reject synonymy to an existing word as a possible meaning for a new caiegoiy label, but 
should not reject the hypothesis that a new term could be a label for a superordinate or 
subordinate category.
There is scant evidence to show whether adults do indeed follow any default assumptions 
concerning the meaning of category labels. The aim of the experiments reported in  this
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chi^Ncr of the thesis is to attempt to deiennine whether adults' assumptions concerning the 
meaning of category labels are similar to those attributed to children by Marionan's mutual 
exclusivity principle, or to the slightly different pattern of behaviour which would be 
predicted by adults' adherence to Clark's contrast principle. Before th is aim is fulfilled, the 
experimental evidence for children's use of the mutual exclusivity assumption, and the little 
evidence there is for the use of this assumption by adults, will first be described.
As mentioned above, Markman's mutual exclusivity principle predicts that a child will 
attribute a novel category name to an unnamed basic level category. T h is prediction relies on 
another related assumption which Markman attributes to children • the  assunption that a 
novel word refers to a category of objectt (the categmy is necessarily basic since hierarchical 
categories violate mutual exclusivity). This assumption, which Markman terms the 
Taxonomic Assumption, is supported by evidence reported by Markman and Hutchinson 
(1984) from experiments where children were required to perform match-to*sanple tasks.
Young children typically show a bias for grouping items tt>gether which are thematically 
rather than cattgorically related. Thus if 2.5 year c^d children are shown a picture of an 
object, e.g. a poodle, then asked to "find another one that is the same as this", they tend to 
select a thematically related picture such as a bowl of dog food, rather than a taxonomically 
related picture such as another picture of a dog.
If a novel word is introduced into the task, however, young children show a clear change 
in their matching preferences. Thus, when Markman and Hutchinson gave the target picture 
an unfamiliar name in their experiments, then used the same name in  the instructions for 
selecting another picture to go with the first, ("See this dax. Can you find another dax7") 
children switched to choosing the taxonomically related picture in  preference to the 
thematically related one.‘
With older children, aged 4.5 years, Markman and Hutchinson showed that the 
assumption that a novel word refers to a category persisted even with pictures of invented 
objects whose relationship to one another (thematic or taxonomic) had been demonstrated to 
the children btforehand. This effect is not confined to basic level categories. With 4  year 
old children, Markman and Hutchinson found that when no novel w ord was introduced, 
children shown a picture of, for example, a cow, then asked "And another one", would 
choose milk (thematically related) rather than a pig (which is a m em ber of the same 
superordinate category as the cow). When the instructions were changed lo include the 
osiensive definition of a novel word, children shifted to choosing the taxonomically related
' PiMaack (I9t9) hai claimed that the tame shift in behaviour appears to  result from laaguage 
traiaiag with chlmpansees.
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pictures.
There is also an in^nessive body o f empirical support for children's use the mutual 
exclusivity assumption. Markman and Wachtel (1988) presented 3-year-olds with pairs o f  
objects in which one object was familiar and had a known label (e.g. a plate), and one object 
was unfamiliar and did not have, for the children, a known label (e.g. a radish rosette 
maker). For each pair, the child was asked "Show me the dax", where dax was a nonsense 
name. Children selected the unfamiliar object significantly nxxe erften than the fam iliar 
object Gonparison with a contn^ conditicxi where children were not introduced lo a novel 
name showed that the effect was not simply due to children preferring lo select rnyvel objects 
per se.
In the experiment just described, children could apply the taxonomic assumption (a new 
name refers to a  category of things) and the mutual exclusivity assurr^on (each thing i t  
only in one category) without conflict between the two. Markman and Wachtel a lso  
investigated the situation whether the two principles were incompatible - so that in order to  
apply the mutual exclusivity assumption children had to violate the taxonomic a s s u n ^ o n . 
A rKJvel word was used to label either a familiar object or an unfamiliar object for 3 and 4  
year old children. All the objects, familiar and unfamiliar, had a prominent part The novel 
labels introduced were the (all unfamiliar to the children) adult names for the objects' 
prominent features. For example, the experimen^r told the child she was about to see a 
"dorsal fin" and then showed the child a fish (familiar object condition), or told the child she 
was going to see a "platform" then showed them a microscope (unfamiliar ofcjea conditkMi. 
The children were asked whether the label refeired to the whole object, or just to the 
prominent part o f  it. When the object was familiar, children interpreted the novel name as a 
name for the prominent part, whereas when the object was unfamiliar, they interpreted the 
name as a name for the object as a whole.
In a further experiment. Markman and Wachtel found that with objects made of a novel 
substance, similar aged children would interpret a novel name applied to a known object 
(e.g. a pewter cup) as a name fcM* the substance the object was made o f (i.e. pewter), 
whereas widi an unfvniliar object (e.g. tongs) the name was interpreted as a name for the 
object as a whole. This effect was strong enough to override grammatical cues • the new 
term was introduced as "See this, it is pewter," rather than "See this, it is a pewter", the 
usual way of describing a count noun and a distinction which even young children use in 
word learning (Katz. Baker, and Macnamara 1974).
Other evidence for children's use of the mutual exclusivity assumption comes from
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studies by Dockiell (1981). Kuczaj, Borys, and Jones (1989). and Memman and Bowman 
(1989). Oockrell found it was harder to establish a nonsense synonym for a known word 
than for an unknown word for 5 year old children. Kuczaj et al. found that in a labelling 
task with five-year-olds, after hearing one exemplar from each of three categories* laM ipd, 
children correctly labelled up to three quarters of the full set of twelve exenq)lars. When 
chikken invented their own labels for the objects, roughly half of the names diey invented 
were used to label more than one member of one category, and no members of contrasting 
categories. Merriman and Bowman determined that the age o f onset for the mutual 
exclusivity bias must be around 2.5 years of age. since children below that age do not 
exhibit what Merriman and Bowman termed the "disambiguation effect", where a novel 
object is chosen as a referent of a novel name in preference to an object belonging to a 
known class.
Merriman and Bowman defined two other kinds of effect which could result from the 
application o f the mutual exclusivity principle. The "restriction effect" describes the 
behaviour of a child in choosing referents of two category names - the sets of items chosen 
for each name should not overlap. The other effect, termed the "immediate correction 
effect", is interesting since it would not be predicted by O ark’s contrast principle. The 
immediate correction effect describes a situation where, when a new word is applied to a 
known category, the child subsequently drops the previously used category label in favour 
of the new one. Clark's contrast principle states that old words are given priority over new 
words.
Meiriman and Bowman found that the tendency to show the immediate correction effect 
was dependent on the typicality of the item labelled with the new name. When an atypical 
category member (a drawing of an object supposed to be a cross between two categories, 
e.g. a truck-like car) was given the novel label, children showed a tendency to cease to apply 
previously used labels (e.g. "truck" or "car") to it. When a typical object was labelled with a 
novel label, children did not exhibit this immediate ccnrection effect, e.g. did not stop calling 
a car a "car" after it had been labelled a "have" by the experipienter.
Up to this point, evidence for the application o f the mutual exclusivity principle by 
children has been discussed at some length. What of the question which concerns this 
chapter, the use o f mutual exclusivity or other Mases by adult learners?
At the time when the experiments reported in this chapter were conceived of and
Dacalls of lha stimalas SMierials are not reported by Kuczal at al.. beyond saying M*at they were 
twelve novel objecu, constructed such that adulu agreed that the objecu could be <»-Wfgofittd into 
I three groups of four objects each.
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conducted (1989 • eaily 1991), the only published evidence for the use of the mutual 
exclusivity principle by adult learners came from a study by Merriman and Bowman (1989, 
experiment 3). The experiment used four groups o f 24 subjcctt, whose ages were 2 years, 
6 yevs, 11 years and 19 years. The procedure of the experiment involved applying a novel 
n«ne lo either a  typical exemplar of a familiar category or an exemplar which was a cross 
between two familiar categories, then attempting to investigate the denotation placed on the 
new term by the subjects.
Four sets of six pictures were seen by each subject. Each set consisted of two pictures of 
members of one famiUar category (c.g. spoon), two pictures of obiccts from anodier familiar 
category (e.g. forlc), and a picture of an invented object which was supposed to be a hybrid 
between the two categories (e.g. a spoon with immgs like a fork). The sixth picture was an 
unrelated object (e.g. a fish) included as a control against random responding. A novel 
name ("bave’*,”danker",''hust”, or "pilson”) was introduced for one picture in each set. For 
half the subjects, the named picture was the hybrid in each set, and for the other half c€ the 
subjects the named picture was one of the four typical exemplars. The subjects were then 
asked which pictures belonged to each of the familiar categories. Finally, the subjects were 
asked ”What is an X7" where X was the novel name, then "Is an X a kind of Y?" and "Is an 
X a kind of Z?" where Y and Z were the two known categories represented in each set. This 
procedure was repeated for each of the four sets seen by each subject.
Merriman and Bosvman found evidence of the immediate oorrectioo effect in the 19-year- 
old as well as the 6  and 11-year-old subjects, but only when the new name was applied to a 
hybrid rather than a typical object. After a hybrid picture had been labelled with a nonsense 
name, it was chosen by the 19-ycar-old subjects as a referent o f  at least one of the known 
category names on only 50% of trials, compared with 94% of trials when one of the typical 
exemplars had been given the new nonsense label.
Like the 6 and 11-year-old subjects, the 19-year-olds tended not to supply overlapping 
sets of referents when asked to say which pictures belonged to each of the known categories 
• only 5% <rf trials produced overlapping sets for this age group. The main point of this 
obaervation is that the subjects rarely put the hybrid picture into both categories (since we 
can assume the adult subjects had little difficulty recognising the typical trucks, cars etc.).
The final type of dau  Merriman and Bowman's study provides concerning adulu’ 
cat^ory name assumptions is the definitions o f  the novel words the subjects gave, and their 
answers to the two questions about subordination (the data here relate only to the subjects 
for whom the hybrid was given the novel Ubel). The adults’ definitions did not appear to
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retpect mutual exclusivity - 22 of the 48 definitions described the novel term as a synonym 
for one o f the known category labels and a further 12 described the novel term as a 
superordinate term covering both the familiar categories. Similarly, the answers to the 
questions "Is an X a type o t  Y/Z?" v k^ ted  dte mutual exclusivity p rinc i|^  by putting the 
novel label subordinate to one or both of the known categories on 46 out of 48 trials. The 
responses o f  the 19-year>olds to these questions were similar to those of the 6>year-old 
subjects (and lo a lesser extent the 1 l*3rear-old subjects, although the experiment as a whole 
did not show any interpretable trend with age for the 6,11 and 19-year<okl subjects since on 
all measures the 6 and 19-year-olds’ responses were similar but the 11-year-okls' responses 
appeared anomalous).
The data provided by Merriman and Bowman, then, tell us a little about the category label 
assumptions made by adults, but not a great deal. When a picture of an unusual hybrid 
object is given a novel name, adults appear willing to use that name in preference to a known 
category name, but only on S0% of trials. Also, the adult subjects refrained from calling the 
hybrid objects by both familiar category names. This result, as evidence for use o f the 
mutual exclusivity assumption, is rather weak, since there is no reason to suppose that the 
four hybrid pictures used in the study (a sock/shoe, a biscui^cracker, a truck/car, aiKl a 
fork^poon) each appeared to be equally a member of both categories they were created 
from. Subjects' definitions of the novel terms and their answers to the other questions 
tended to violate mutual exclusivity.
Very recently, data from another study where adults were used as a comparison group in 
an experiment on young children’s name learning have also shown some evidence o f the use 
erf the mutual exclusivity assumption by adults. Merriman, Schuster, and Hager (September 
1991) showed children and adults sets of eight stuffed toy animals, then named one of the 
animals as a  **jegger”, and asked the subjects to choose which of two other animals in the set 
was also a jegger. The eight animals varied on several dimensions, such as size, number of 
legs, colour, size of ears and so on, but could be split into two subsets erf four, characterised 
by constant values on two dimensions. For example, in one set of stimuli, four ammals all 
had legs and were small, and the other four all had no legs and were large. The results of 
the naming tests showed that three-year-olds and adults alike spontaneously categorised the 
animals into subsets based on the conjunctions of features, tending to choose an animal 
belonging to  the same subset as the target when asked to select another referent of the name 
jegger.
This pattern of responding, although above chance, was not overwhelmingly clear. In a
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forced choice between two alternatives, 69 per cent of adults and 65 per cent of three-year- 
olds chose the same-category exemplar. These relatively low percentages o f subjects 
exhibiting a mutual exclusivity assumption might be due to the subjects having to 
qMMitaneously divide the exemplars into subsets based on the conjunction of features, rather 
than being taught this categorisation o f  the stimuli.
The aim of the experiments reported in this chapter is to investigate adults' category name 
assumptions in greater depth. The experiments involve learning about entirely novel 
categories for which subjects have no pre-existing names. The experiments attempt to see 
whether, in the absence of any other cues, adults use the taxonomic and mutual exclusivity 
assumptions described by Markman, whether diey appear to use the contrast principle put 
forward by Clark, and how they resolve violations of the contrast and mutual exclusivity 
principles.
Experiment 2a
In experiment 2a, adults learned to recognise three novel categories of shape and were 
then introduced to category nam es under ambiguous conditions. As each name was 
introduced, the subjects were required to guess at its denotation by indicating which of an 
array of exemplars they thought the name probably applied to.
Unless subjects make use o f  some kind of default assumptions they should rate 
exemplars from the three categories as equally likely to be denoted by the names. After this 
stage of the experiment, the subjects were asked some questions aimed at assessing their 




The 24 s u t^ t s  were a mixture o f  staH*, post-graduate and undergraduate students of the 
University of Stirling.
Apparatus
An Acorn Archimedes 310 microcon^uter was used to  control the experiment. The 
stimuli were presented on a high resolution colour monitor.
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Stimuli
Th« stimuli wcrt irregular 12-pointed polygons. The exemplars which subjects saw were 
distortions o f prototype shapes. Each subject saw exemplars generated as random 
distortions three prototype shapes. There were 12 sets of three prototypes used in the 
experiment. Each set of prototypes was randomly assigned to two of the 24 subjects.
Each prototype shape was itself created by distorting an original starting shape. This 
shi^>e. the 'grandparent' o f the exemplars used in the experiment, is shown in the upper part 
o f  Hgure 3.1. The grandparent shape consists c€ 12 points arranged at regular intervals 
around the perimeter of a  square (IS mm x IS mm), with neighbouring points joined by 
lines to form a closed figure. Each prototype shape was then created by moving each of the 
12 points o f the gran<^>arent shape a random distance (up to a maximum of 3 mm) in a 
rarxlom direction. Three prototype shapes generated in this way are shown in the middle 
part of figure 3.1.
The exemplars were generated fiom the prototype shapes in the same manner. To 
generate an exemplar from a prototype, each o f  the 12 points of the prototype was moved a 
random distance, up to a maximum of 1.6 mm, in a random direction. In the lower part of 
Figure 3.1 are shown three exemplars generated in this way foom each of the three 
prototypes above.
Procedure
The first part of the experiment involved the subjects attempting to learn to recognise 
three categories of shape. Subjects saw exemplars which were generated from three 
prototypes, and were required to sort the exemplars into three response boxes. Feedback 
was supplied on each trial, and subjects aimed to reach a criterion of ten consecutive error 
free sorting trials.




Fifure 3.1. Examples of exemplars (bottom row) generated as distortions of three prototypes (middle 
row), which were themselves generated as distortions of 12 points arranged at equal intervals around 
the perimeter of a square (top).
In the second pan of the experiment, the subjects were introduced tt> names for the shape 
prototypes, and were required to indicate which exemplars they thought the names most 
likely to apply to. Subjects performed a task where they rated the likelihood of a particular 
name being appropriate for each of 12 exemplars (four from each o f  the three categories). 
They performed this task three times, firstly for a name that had been used to label one of the 
prototypes, secondly for a name which had been given no denoution by the experimenter, 
and thirdly for a  new name when two of the three categories had already been labelled by the 
experimenter.
At the beginning of the experiment, subjects received written instructions explaining the 
procedure for the first part of the experiment*. These instructions were as follows;
T h is  experiment involves learning to recognise shapes. There are three varieties of 
sh^ie which I would like you to learn to tell apart.
"You will be shown the shapes one at a dme. Every shape you see will belong to one of 
the three varieties. On each trial you will be shown one shape. After you have been shown 
the shape, three grey collecting boxes will appear on the right hand side o f the screen, one at 
the top, one in the middle, and one at the bottom. Each variety belongs in one of the three
* Subjectt a l io  wed tostfuc tloiii which explained the use of two answ ering scale which, it was 
explained, would be employed in a later stage o f the experiment. These instructions were repeated 
dtaring the second stage o f the experiment; details o f the instructions and scn ies are given below in the 
description o f  the procedure for the second part o f  the experiment.
C/U^fof d 65
boxei • one in the top box, one kind in the middle box, and one in the bottom box.
"Your job i t  to work oin which variety belongs in which box. After you have chosen a 
box by pointing and clicking on it with the mouse, you will be told whether you w oe right 
or wrong.
"When you have been cdnect ten times in a row, this stage of the experiment will end and 
the whole experiment will be very nearly over. If you don't score ten correct answers in a 
row, this stage of the experiment will end anyway after 108 trials.
"At first it will be quite difficult to recognise the different types of shape, and you will 
have to guess when you make your answers. With practice, however, it should become 
easier to recognise the three varieties."
The details o i  the procedure on each learning trial were as follows. The trial started with 
the exemplar being drawn more or less centred on the monitor screen (the position varied 
randomly by up to 10 mm in the horizontal axis and up to 40 mm in the vertical). All the 
shapes were drawn in yellow on a Mack background. After l.S seconds three plain grey 
reqxMise boxes also appeared along the right hand side cK the screen, one at the top, one in 
the middle, and one at the bottom o f the screen.
The subject was required to move the mouse pointer to the box which s/he thought the 
shape belonged in, then register their choice by pressing a mouse button. Feedback for the 
choice was then given. An icon of a  "tick" appeared next to the correct response box, and 
"cross" icons next to the two incorrect boxes. If the subject had responded ctxrectly, then 
an icon of a smiling face appeared at the left hand comer o f the screen. If the responsp 
was incorrect, an icon of a frowning face appeared there instead. The feedback was 
presented for 3 seconds, then the screen was cleared. A scale was then displayed showing 
the number o f  consecutively correct trials the subject had currently achieved, and their best 
score so far. On every fifteenth trial, the subject was also infmmed how many trials diey 
had compleied out of the total availaUe. The next trial began when the subject pressed a 
mouse button to signal readiness.
The category which die exemplar shape belonged to on each trial was the result of a semi- 
random selection from the three categories, subject to the constraint that within blocks of 12 
trials each category was represented an equal number of times.
When the subject had sorted the exemplar shape into the correct box on ten consecutive 
trials, the next stage of the experiment began. If the subject did not reach this criterion, die 
next stage began after the completion of 108 learning trials.
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In the second tuge  of the experiment, three names were randomly allocated to the three 
categories, the names being drawn from the list of 27 pronounceable non-words presented in 
Appendix 3a.
For the purposes o i  the following explanation, the three categories will be referred to as 
categories 1 ,2 , and 3, and the three names as names A, B, and C.
Before beginning the second part o f the experiment, subjects read the following 
instructions:
"In the next part of the experiment, you will be introduced to some names for die sh^ies. 
You will be asked some questions. You may feel that you have not been told en o u ^  to be 
able to answer the questions. What I want you to do is to make the best guesses you can 
with the information you have."
They also read an expluiation of the scale, illustrated in Figure 3.2a, that they would be 
required to use when giving their answers. Subjects were told that, when giving their 
answers, they could use the mouse to point and click anywhere along the scale. The five 
labels on the scale were explained as: 
yes! »  "yes, and Tm sure" 
yes? ■ "yes, although I'm not certain"
?7? “  "I have no idea whatsoever" 
no? ■ "no, but I'm not sure" 
no! «  "no, and Fm certain"
There then followed a set of three questions. For each question, subjects were shown a 
set 12 exemplars, four from each of the three categemes, displayed together in a random 
order on the monitor screen. They were asked to guess whether a name applied to each 
exen^lar, by rating the likelihood of this name being applicable to each exemplar in turn 
using the answering scale described above.
Question 1. At the top of the screen, subjects were shown the prototype for category 1. 
Beneath this stuq>e were die words "This is an <A>" (the name allocated to category 1 is 
represented here as <A>, the name allocated to category 2 as <B>, and the third category's 
name as <C>). Twelve exemplars were then displayed on the screen, and beneath them was 
w r i t^  "How likely do you think it is that each of these is an <A>?" The mouse pointer was 
petitioned over the first exemplar. At the subject answered for each exemplar, the mouse
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pointer end scale moved on lo dte next exemplar until the subject had answeied for all 12.
Question 2. At the top o f the screen, subjects were still only shown the prototype for 
category 1 labelled with label <A>. They were shown 12 new exemplars, and asked the 
question *l>o you think that each of these is a <B>?” Again, subjects rated each o f  the 12 
exen^rfars in turn.
Question 3. At the top of the screen, in addition to prototype 1 labelled <A>, subjects 
were now shown prototype 2 labelled T h is  is a <B>”. Subjects were shown 12 new 
exemplars, and asked to answer for each in turn ”How probable do you think it is that each 
o i  these is a  <C>7" After they had rared all 12, prototype 3 was then added to the display at 
the top o f  the screen, labelled T h is  is a <C>**.
Next there followed a further set of questions taking a new format. A fourth name, 
referred to  here as <D>, was drawn at random from the 24 unused names remaining in the 
poc^ o f 27. Subjects read the following instructions:
"You are about to be introduced to a new name, <D>. I am ixM going to tell you what 
<D> means, but I will ask you to make some guesses about its meaning."
Subjects were also introduced to a new scale which they would use in giving their 
answers. This scale, illustrated in Figure 3.2b, was described as follows:
! ! ■ "very sure"
1 ■ "sure"
7 ■ ''unsure"
77 «  "very unsure".
Again, in using the scale, subjects were instructed to point and click with the mouse at 
any point along the line. This confidence rating scale was used in conjunction with a 
response box labelled "yes" and "no". The questions were answered as forced choices 
between "yes" and "no", followed by a confidence rating for that choice using the 
confidence scale just described.
For the next set o f questions, the three category prototypes labelled T h is  is an <A>" 
T h is  is a  <B>" and "This is a <C>" were again displayed at the top of the monitor screen, 
exactly as this part of the screen had been after the completion of Question 3. Hve forced- 
c h c ^  questions followed:
Question 4. Subjects were asked "Can a <B> be a <D>7". They answered the question 
by first chotteing one o f the yei/no response boxes, then giving a confidence rating for this 
choice. When they had answered, a category 2 exen^lar was displayed on the screen with
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the mettage "This <B> it  a <D>.** written beneath it.
Question 5. Subjects were asked "Can an <A> be a <D>7". and were again required to 
make a forced choice followed by a confidence rating. Following the answer, the message 
T h e  conect answer is no** was displayed next to the questirm.
Question 6. Subjects were asked "Can a <C> be a <£>>?". After the forced choice and 
confidence rating, the message "The correct answer is no” was displayed next to the 
question.
Question 7. A category 2 exemplar was displayed, with the question "Is this <B> a 
<D>7". Subjects were required to make a forced choice then a confidence rating.
Question 8. Subjeett were asked "Are all <B>s <D>s7", to which they were required to 
make a forced yesAio choice followed by a confidence rating.
As questions S to  8 were asked, the three labelled prototypes remained at the top of the 
screen throughout, and previous questions and feedback were not erased from the screen 
before the next question was printed. It was thus possible for subjects to refer back to 
previous questions and correct answers (when supplied) if they wished.
Results
Learning stage.
Of the 24 subjects, 16 reached the learning c r i^ o n  of scMting the shape into the correct 
box on ten consecutive trials. The mean number of learning trials to criterion for these 
subjecu was 42.6 (sd 28.4). In the following sections, only the results of the 16 subjecu 
who reached the learning criterion will be presented.
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First set of questions.
Question 1. For this question, subjects were shown the category 1 {mxotype labelled 
'This is an <A>”, and were asked to rate exemplars from all three categories for their 
likelihood of "being an <A>". If subjects assume the name <A> to refer lo all category 1 
exemplars, i.e. assume the name to be a  basic level category name, the mutual exclusivity 
princq>le would predict that the four exemplars from category 1 would be rated as definitely 
<A>s and the eight exemplars from categories 2 and 3 as definitely not <A>s.
Subjects' ratings were transformed to  numerical values for statistical analysis by treating 
the answering scale as a linear sca le  between 0  (corresponding to no!) and 100 
(corresponding to yes!). An answer o f  "?7" on the scale would thus be represented as 30. 
The mean answers for (Question 1 for the 16 criterial subjects are plotted in Figure 3.3a alcxtg 
with the mutual exclusivity principle's predictions. In the histograms. 93 per cent 
confidence intervals for the means are shown by bars.
As can be seen from Figure 3.3a. subjects* answers correspond closely to the predicted 
values. SitKe the exemplars to be rated are random distortions o f the prototype, some will 
necessarily appear to the subjects as m ore prototypical than others and this would be 
expected to affect subjects' confidence in identifying the exemplars as members the 
learned categories. Thus, even if the mutual exclusivity principle were being adhered to, 
subjects' responses would not be expected to be definite (yes! and no! on the answering 
scale) but would be prone to some noise reflecting the non discrete nature o f category 
membership for probabilistic categories such as these. All category 1 exemplars were rated 
significantly more likely to be <A>s than were any category 2 or 3 exemplars.
Question 2. For this question, subjects were asked to rate the likelihood of 12 exemplars 
each "being a <B>". No extra information was provided over that which had been presented 
in (Question 1.
If subjects' assumptions are guided by the mutual exclusivity principle, they would be 
predicted to rate all four caiegcxy 1 exemplars as very unlikely to be a <B>, since these 
already have the category name <A> artd the principle allows each category only one label.
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The eight exemplars from the as yet unnamed categories 2 and 3 would not be precluded 
by die mutual exclusivity principle from having the category name <B> applied to them. 
However, the principle dictates that only one category can be labelled <B>» and at this stage 
the subject does not know which of the two available categories this will be. Therefore, a 
subject following the mutual exclusivity principle would be predicted to rate all the category 
2 and 3 exemplars as equally likely to be <B>s. and the subject's rating for each should be a 
neutral "don't know", corresponding to a numerical rating of 50.
In Figure 3.3b, the mean responses for Question 2 are plotted for the 16 subjects. The 
observed ratings follow die predicted ratings closely. Three category 1 exemplars were nued 
as significantly less likely to be <B>s than any categcMy 2 or 3 exemplar, with the remaining 
category 1 exemplar rated significantly lower than six of the eight category 2 and 3 
exemplars.
Question 3. Subjects were now additionally shown the category 2 prototype labelled 
"This is a  <B>". They were asked to rate 12 exemplars' for their likelihood o f  each being a 
<C>. If the mutual exclusivity principle is followed, subjects should now be in a  position to 
rule out all cattgory 1 and category 2 exemplars as contenders for being <C>s, since these 
two categories are already labelled and cannot have another name. Subjects would therefore 
be predicted by the principle to rate all category 1 and 2 exemplars as extremely unlikely to 
be <C>s, and all category 3 exemplars as being extremely likely to be <C>s.
The observed and predicted ratings for the 16 subjects are plotted in Figure 3.3c. Again, 
subjects' actual ratings relate closely to those |xedicted by the mutual exclusivity principle. 
All category 3 exemplars were rated as signiflcantly more likely u> be a <C> than was any 
category 1 or 2 exemplar.
The Pearson correlation coefficient fcM* mean observed values and those predicted by the 
principle was calculated across all three questions together. The value of the correlation 
coefficient r  was 0.978, equivalent to a t (34 dO of 27.34*, p<0.(X)l.
Second set of questions.
Subjects' responses to the five questions posed at this stage of the experiment are 
summarised in Table 3.1.
'  The watlsuc ^ ^ f f ^ T TSstribulcd as t with N-2 df (Howell, 1987, page 237).
/T7»"
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Table 3.1. Subjects' responses to the second set of questions.
question feedback yes(conf) no(con0
Yes example 9 (25.1) 7 (25.6)
No 6  (38.0) 10 (55.7)
No 8  (36.7) 8  (51.9)
- 11 (51.1) 5 (71.6)
. 6  (58.1) 10(49.4)
4 can <B> be <D>7
5 can <A> he <D>7
6  can <C) be <D>7
7 this <B> a <D>7
8  all <B>s <D>s7
For no question did the subjects respond unanimously or near unanimously either "yes” 
or "no” in the forced choice. With 16 subjects, a significantly non random split between 
0fid "no" on any question would, according to the binomial distribution, require at 
least 13 subjects to opt for one answer (for prfl.OS).
Subjects responses on the confidence rating scale were scored as a linear scale between 0 
(cofiesponding to "7 7 " meaning very unsure" to 1 0 0  (corresponding to a response of !l 
meaning very sure). As can be seen from Table 3.1, subjects' mean confidence ratings on 
most questions, whether they answered yes or no, were around 50. They were apparently 
neither very sure nor very unsure about their answers, except on the first question in this 
sequence where the subjects' mean rating was 25 (fairly unsure). In view of the lack of 
clear results from the forced choice answers, no statistical analysis was done on the 
confidence ratings.
When names were introduced for the learned but unnamed categories, subjects 
assunqnions concerning the denoution of the names were very clear. While there were still 
unnamed categories available, subjects assumed that a name applied to a category was a 
basic level name for that category, rather than a name for just some exemplars in that 
category or a name for exemplars in mote than one category. Subjects' answers to the first 
set o f  questions followed the predictions of the taxonomic assumption and the mutual 
exclusivity principle (Markman 1989) very closely. Subjects assumed that each calegoty 
had only one name, and that each name referred to only one category.
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In the second set of questions, s fourth name was introduced and was applied lo an 
e x e m i^  of an already named category, thereby vkriating the mutual exclusivity princ^le. 
Subjects* assumptions concerning this fourth name were not clear cut. When asked 
(Question 5) to guess whether the fourth name could apply to an exemplar of an already 
named category, roughly half the subjects said that it could. Such a response implies that die 
mutual exclusivity principle does not have the status of an inviolable rule for the subjects, 
but this is hardly surprising since the rule is breached by synonyms (if these exist • Clark 
1987 argues they do not) and by superordinate and subordinate category names.
How subjects would interpret a breach o f the mutual exclusivity principle was 
investigated by Question 6 and subsequent questions. The aim o f  these questions was to 
find out whedier there was a default interpieutíon of a breach of the principle, such as that 
the new name was most likely in the absence of other cues to be a superordinate category 
name, a subordinate category name, or a synonym.
There was reason to (nedict that the contrast principle, if followed, should bias subjects 
towards interpreting the new name as a supercMdinate or subcMdinate term rather than a 
synonym. The more or less equal division of subjects’ answers between the two alternatives 
to all the questions in the second set meant that the experiment provided no interpretable 
evidence regarding this matter. If the issue is to be effectively addressed, it is clear from this 
failure that a different procedure must be employed.
Experiment 2b
In this experiment, once subjects had learned to recognise three categories of shape, they 
were introduced to category names for each, then were presented with a violation of the 
mutual exclusivity principle: a fourth name was used to label an exemplar from one of the 
three categcxies.
The aim o f  the experiment was to see how subjects would react to this violation o f the 
mutual exclusivity principle. Subjects were shown arrays of exemplars foom the three 
categories, and were asked lo indicate for each exemplar how likely it was that the fourth 
name could be used to label it. Thus the procedure used to test subjects* assumptions 
concerning the denotation of the three original category names in Experiment 2a was used in 
Experiment 2b to investigate their hypotheses concerning the denotation of a fourth name 
which violated the mutual exclusivity principle.
Although the mutual exclusivity principle had been explicitly violated by the
74
experimenier, tubjeco could still, if they wished, preserve the oonirsst pfinciple by letting 
the fourth name denote a subordinate or superordinate category. In the former case, they 
would rate a subset of one category's exemplars as likely to be labelled with the fourth 
name, and in the latter case they would rate exemplars fiom  two or three categories as being 
likely to be so labelled Alternatively, if subiects do  not attempt to preserve contrast, they 
might treat the fourth luune as a synonym for an already known basic level category name.
After giving ratings for the likelihood of the fourth name applying to exemplars, sub)ects 
were also directly questioned about their beliefs concerning the denotation €Xf the fourth 
name. Finally, subjects rated a further set of exemplars, as a check on consistency and the 
possibly distorting effects of the direct questioning.
Method
Subjects
The 24 subjects were undergraduate students of the University of Stirling, participating in 
the experiment to fulIU a requirement of their introductory psychology course.
Stimuli
The stimuli used in the experiment were 12-pointed polygons similar to  those used in 
Experiment 2a. Twelve sets of three prototypes were used in the experiment. The 
prototypes were generated using the same procedure as that described for Experiment 2a.
The exemplars presented were random distortions of the three prototypes allocated to 
each subject The exemplars were generated from the prototypes using the same procedure 
as described for Experiment 2a, except that the maximum distance which any perint could be 
moved in the distortion process was reduced from 1.6 mm to 1.2 mm.
Category names were chosen from a new pool o f 27 pronounceable non-words, listed in 
Appendix 3b.
Procedure
The experiment involved a learning stage, where each subject learned to sort exemplars 
into three categories to a criterion, and a second phase where verbal labels were introduced 
for the categories arxl subjects were required to rate exemplars for the likelihood of a name 
iqrplying to them.
In the learning phase, subjects were required to sort the exemplars into three response 
boxes, following the same procedure as described for Experiment 2a. The cri^rion for the
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aofting task was the same as that in the pievious experiment, namely ten consecutive error 
free trials. The context in which the category learning task was introduced was changed. 
Rather than being told to  learn to recognise three types of shape, subjects were asked to 
imagine that they had travelled to another planet in space C*Zipto”). where they were to 
attempt to learn to recognise leaves horn three species of tree.
The subjects' experience of the categories prior to the sorting task was heterogeneous. 
This was because the subjects were being used concurrently for another experiment 
invtrfving the polygon shapes. The subjects were a subset of those who took part in 
Experiment 5c (described in Chapter 6 of this thesis), in which, prior to a  sorting task, 
subjects in one experimental group learned to nmtch exemplars for category membership to a 
criterion, subjects in a second experimental group learned to label exemplars with category 
names to a criterion, and subjects in a control group performed no task prior to  the sorting 
procedure. Of the 24 subjects used in the current experiment, eight were in the first 
experimental group, seven were in the second experimental group, and nine were in the 
conm^ group of Experiment 5c.
Although their experience of the categories befme the sorting task was varied, all 24 
subjects reached the learning criterion on the sorting task’ and thus can be considered as 
having reached a h i ^  and more or less equated level of competence at sorting the exemplars 
into the three categories from which they were drawn.
The second stage of the experiment was identical for all subjects.
Subjects were first introduced to the answering scale (see Figure 3.2a) using the same 
instructions as used in the previous experiment. Subjects were then shown the three 
category prototypes labelled with category (or species) names. The category 1 prototype 
was labelled T h is  is a <A>", the categtxy 2 prototype labelled 'This is a <B>” and the 
category 3 prototype labelled "This is a <C>”. These three prototypes were ranged along the 
top o f the screen. Just below them, a category 1 exemplar was shown. This exemplar was 
labelled "This is an <A>. It would also be correct to call it a <D>."
Three questions were asked, with the labelled exemplar and prototypes remaining at the 
top of the screen.
Question 1. Subjects were shown 12 exemplars, four fiom each category, arrayed on 
the acreen in a random order. They were asked to answer the question Tk>w probaMe do 
you think it is that each o f these can be called a <D>?" The answering scale moved lo each 
exemplar in turn, as in the previous experiment.
• The task was easier than the sorting task in Experiment 2a. because the upper lim it on  the amount 
o f  distortion introduced im o exemplars was lower.
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Question 2. This isked '’What do you think the name <D> it most likely to mean?” 
Subjects were asked to choose one of four answers: i ”<D> it an over-all term covering all 
three leaf q>ecie8 on Zipto.” ii "<D> is a term which covers 2 of the 3 q>ecies on Zipto.” iii 
**<D> is a synonym (means exactly the same) for the name <A>" iv ”<D> refers to just 
some o f the leaves of the species <A>”
Question 3. This was a repetition of Question 1. Subjects were shown 12 exemplars and 
asked Tinally, I would like you to again rate how likely you think it is that each of these can 
b ecalleda< D > r
Results
Subjects' ratings in Questkms 1 and 3 strongly suggest that they assumed the fourth 
name, <D>, was a synonym for the category name <A> that had already been applied to 
category 1. On Question 2, answer iii) (<D> is a synonym) was also the most f lu e n tly  
chosen option.
The mean ratings for all 24 subjects on Questions 1 and 3 are shown in Hgure 3.4. Also 
shown (black bars) are the responses that would be predicted if subjects took the name <D> 
to be synonymous with name <A>. If <D> was a basic level name for categcwy 1, all four 
category 1 exen^lars would be accepted as being likely to be called a <D>, while category 2 
and 3 exemplars would be considered to be extremely unlikely to be called a <D>.
pradictad if synonym 
question 1 
question 3
1 2 3 4  5 6 7 3  9 1 0 1 1 1 2
axamplar
Figure 3.4. Subjects' mean ratings and 95 per cent confidence intervals for the 12 shapes presented in 
Q uestion 1 (hatched colum ns) and Question 3 (grey  colum ns), with the ratings p ^ k t e d  (black 
columns) if  subjects supposed the new name lo be synonym for the known category name.
All category 1 exemplars were rated as significantly more likely to be called a 0 >  than
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any category 2 or 3 exemplar, on both Question 1 and Question 3.
The number of subjects choosing each answer in Question 2 is shown in TaMe 3.2. The 
minority of subjects chose either answer iii) or iv). The distribution of choices amongst the 
four alternatives differed significantly ftom chance (X^ «  14.33, 3 df, p<0.01).
Table 3.2
Distribution of answers to Question 2.
answer in^lication choices
i superordinate 2
ii partial superordinate »
iii synonym 12
iv sub category 9
Treating subjects who answered iii) and subjects who answered iv) as separate sub­
groups. it can be seen from Figures 3.Sa and 3.Sb that both groups* mean ratings for 
Questions 1 and 3 follow the pattern predicted by the synonym theory. Again, mean ratings 
for all category I exemplars were significantly higher than those for any category 2 or 3 
exemplar, across both sub-groups and both questions.
Mean ratings do not provide an adequate basis for assessing whether the rating behaviour 
of the two sub-groups was the same or different. The reason is that if subjects believed the 
fourth name <D> to be a subcategory name, then they would be expected tt> rate all category 
2 and 3 exemplars low, but rate some category 1 exemplars as m ore likely than others to be 
called <D>. Across subjecu. the mean ratings for category 1 exemplars would be uniformly 
higher than ratings for category 2 and 3 exemplars.
What it required in order lo assess whether the two sub-groups behaved differently is 
some measure of the variability within subjects of their category 1 ratings. One step towards 
this goal would be to perform a variance ratio test on the category 1 ratings o f the two 
subgroups, the means and variances for which are shown in TaU e 3.3.
Table 3.3. Mean ratings for the category 1 exemplars on Question 1 and Question 3.
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the f im  K t of ratings, and F-4.00 (35,47 df, p<0.01) for the second set of ratinfs. The 
standard variance ratio ^ t .  although widely used, has been criticised due to it being severely 
affected by non-normally distributed data (Howell, 1987, p. 176). The rating for 
category 1 exemplars contains a large proportion of ratings o f I(X) (i.e. **yes!!** on the scale), 
and are consequently somewhat negatively skewed rather than normally distributed. A more 
robust variance ratio test is that advocated by Levene (1960, described in Howell 1987) 
where each observation is replaced by its absolute difference ftom the group mean (or. 
alternatively, iu  squared deviation from the group mean) then the two sett of transformed 
observations are compared using a standard independent samples t test This procedure was 
employed for the category 1 rating data of the two sub-groups, yielding significant 
differences for the variances (t*7.07, 82 df. p<0.01 for the first set of ratings, and t-3.26, 
82 df, p<0.01 for the second set of ratings).
The variance ratio tests just reported do not exactly serve the requirements of this 
situation, since the variances of interest here are the within subjects variances, rather than the 
between subjects and within subjects variances combined. A lest of the difference in just 
within subjects variance in the two sub-groups’ category 1 ratings was contrived by 
modifying Lcvene’s test, so that each rating was replaced by the absolute difference between 
it and the mean category I rating for that subject (rather than from the overall group mean). 
Using this procedure, the within subjects variance for the two sub-groups differed 
significantly, yielding a t value of 3.07 ( 82 df. p<0.01) for the ffrst set of ratings, and 
t>2.31 (82 df, p<0.05) for the second set o f ratings.
The confidence ratings given by subjects in the two sub-groups for their answers to 
Question 2 were similar: the mean rating fcx* subjects who answered “iii” was 52.5 (sd 
34.3), compared with a mean rating of 62.7 (sd 24.8) for subjects who answered “iv”. The 
confidence ratings did not differ significantly (t>4).75,19 df, p ^ .46 ).
In this experiment, subjects were presented with a violation of the mutual exclusivity 
principle: having learned three basic level category names for three categories ,<A>, <B>, 
and <C>, they were shown an exemplar from one of the categories and introduced to a 
second category name ( ^ > )  that could be applied to it The aim o f the experiment was to 
see how they reacted to this violation of the principle - to see what assumptions subtjectt 
made about the meaning o f  the second category name.
ChápiorS
Although mutual exclufivity was vkrfaied, subjects were able to preserve the contrast 
princqirie if they assumed that the second category name <D> applied to a superordinaie or 
subordinate category. Roughly half the subjects behaved in this way. For the other 12 
subjects, once mutual exclusivity had been violated they did not attempt to preserve contrast: 
these 12 subjecu cleaiiy took the second category name <D> to be a synonym for the 
originally learned category name <A>.
Those subjects who resisted the assumption that <D> was a  synonym were able to 
presove the contrast principle in several ways. The option apparently taken by almost all 
such subjects was to assume name <D> to be a  subordinate category name for a subset of 
<A> exemplars. Subjects preserving contrast appear to favour a subordinate category 
hypothesis over a superordinate category hypothesis.
General Discussion
Experiment 2a shows that in the absence of other cues, adults assume a new name 
applies to  a previously unnamed basic level category. In dtxng this, adults are fcrflowing the 
two assumptions which have been attributed by Mark man to children learning category 
names, the taxonomic assun^tion (names describe basic level categories), and the mutual 
exclusivity principle (each object belongs to only one category).
C lark 's  contrast principle would make much less specific predictions about adult learners* 
assumptions concerning the meaning of novel names. The contrast principle dictates that no 
two w ords should have exactly the same meaning, or that no two names should describe 
identical cattgories. Presented with a new categexy name, the contrast principle would rule 
out the hypothesis that the new name is a synonym for an old one. but would leave equally 
likely any number of possible hypotheses that the new name is a superordinate (e.g. 
covering all three types of shape in Experiment 2a, ex just two types of shape, or all shapes 
of tw o types and some of the shapes of the third type.... and so on) or a subordinate 
category name. In essence, aside from rejecting synonymy, the contrast principle would not 
provide learners with any consistent default assumptions about the meaning a new 
category term. In fact, the subjects in Experiment 2a showed a consistent pattern of 
assumptions, which were precisely those provided by the mutual exclusivity and taxonomic 
rules described by Markman.
In the second experiment, subjects were presented with a situation where the mutual 
exclusivity rule was violated by one exemplar being supplied with two category names. In
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this situation, half the sub|ects assumed the new name was a synonym for an already known 
basic level category name. This assumption explicitly violates the contrast princi|rfe, in a 
situation where it could easily be respected by attributing the new name to a superordinate or 
subordinate level category.
Clark has claimed that the contrast principle is a general property of language which 
guides the linguistic behaviour even of young children. In this experiment, however, it was 
found that even adults (whose experience and understanding of language and its properties is 
surely wider than those o f  children) do not consistently follow this principle in their 
assumptions about word meanings.
The mutual exclusivity principle, on the other hand, has been put forward by Markman 
not as a general principle o f language, but merely as a heuristic. The principle may guide 
children to making the correct attributions of word meaning more often than it misleads 
them, but children must learn to violate it in order to acquire r»n basic level category names. 
Neverdieless. this imperfect and transient linguistic principle appeared in Experiment 2a to 
govern the assumptions o f  adult word learners in a situation in which there were no other 
cues for them to fall back on.
A finding interest in Experiment 2b is that where subjects preserved the contrast 
principle, they tended to  do so by assuming the new name to be a subordinate term in 
preference to a superordinate term. A similar tendency to interpret new names whidi vicíate 
mutual exclusivity as a name for a subordinate category has been reported with young 
children. Taylor and Gelman (1989) taught two*year-old children a new nonsense-word 
label for an object with a  known name, e.g. the name *‘fep** for a dog. Rather than accepting 
the new name as a syiKMiym for “dog”, as most of the adults in the present study seemed \o  
do, the children appeared tt> interpret the new name as a new subcategory name. If the name 
“fep“ was taught for a toy basset hound, the children would apply it to other toy Itesset 
hounds, but not to other types of dog such as toy terriers.
Whedier the adults* preference (second to the synonym interpretation) for interpreting 
mutual exclusivity violating names as names for subcategories represents a consistent bias in 
adults’ assumptions about the meaning of itovel words depends on how this behaviour 
gertermlises lo other situations where there is an equal likelihood o f a new term apfrfying to a 
subset of one category o r  a superordinate category covering many known categories. If 
there is indeed such a bias, one could speculate that it may arise because attributing a itew 
name lo a subcategory results in fewer viciations of the mutual exclusivity princi|ie than 
attributing it lo a superordinate category • fewer viciations in the sense that there would be
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fewer exenq>lan with two names i^>plied lo them in the fonner case than in the latter. The 
contrast principle would make no predictions about subjects' preferences in this situation.
In conclusion, let us return to the two questions posed in the Introduction to this chapter 
and put forward some provisional answers. Firstly; How many names do people expect a 
category to have? On the basis of Experiment 2a, it is possible to suggest that people expect 
a category to have only one name, and expect new names to refer to unnamed level 
categories. Secondly; On encountering a new name, what hypotheses do people form about 
its meaning? This, of course, is a much broader question. From the current experiments it 
appears that people's h3fpotheses tend to avoid attributing more than one category name to an 
exemplar. Where this must be done, adults are not as reluctant to accept synonymy as 
Qaric's theory would predict and, where they do preserve linguistic contrast, they do so by 
assuming a new name refers to a subcxdinatt category.
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The r c ^  of verbal labels in learning artntrary collections.
Summary
Subjects learned arbitrary collections consisting of pictures o f  familiar (Experiments 
3a,b,e*f) or unfamiliar objects (Experiment 3c), grouped randomly into sets of four objecu. 
They performed a matching task in which category membership was indicated by verbal and 
non-verbal category labels, by position, or not explicitly indicated. Verbal labels led to faster 
learning and higher confidence ratings than non-verbal category labels, but only when 
explicit feedback during learning was withheld (Experiments 3b and 3c) and when the vobal 
labels were more discriminabk than the non-verbal labels (Experiment 3e). In experiments 
3a,b, and c, confidence ratings reflected accuracy most closely when learning with verbal 
labels. In Experiment 3e, subjects who reported inventing verbal names for the non-verbal 
labels performed the learning task better than those who did not report naming the non­
verbal labels, but this difference in learning performance was found only with the set of 
highly discriminable non-verbal labels. In Experiment 3f an attempt was made to investigate 
properties other than discriminability which may be in^xatant for cate^>ry labels. The rc^  
of labels in classification learning, and the ecological validity of arbitrary collections as 
categories, are discussed.
Introduction
As set out in Chapw  1, this thesis aims to bring empirical scrutiny to the question 
whether verbal category labels are important for category learning. Verbal category labels 
might affect learning in a number of different ways. A distinction has been made so far 
between two - the possible importance of category names as a guide to uncovering the 
similarity-baaed coherence of a category, and category names as a source o f  similaity or 
conceptual cohoence in themselves (Chapter 1). This importance can also be measured in 
d i^erent ways. There is the importance of category names relative to some other, non­
verbal indicator of category membership, aird the importance o f  category names relative to 
no category label at all being supplied to or used by the subject.
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The issue o f the importance of the medium employed to sy /^ ly  category m embership 
information is easier to  investigate experimentally than the importance of the cognitive uses 
to which category names are put, such as the effects on coherence o f  each member of a 
category being associated with a name.
The experimental strategy used in this chapter is to contrive a category lewning situation 
where the use o f category membership information supplied by labels is necessarily 
important to the subject's learning task. This is done by requiring subjects to learn arbitrary 
ctrilections of objects. In this task, the effects of supplying category names (i.e. verbal 
category labels) for exemplars as opposed to supplying category membership information by 
some other medium (non-verbal category labels) are compared. It is a straightforward 
empirical matter then to say whether the supply of category membership information via 
names has led to better, worse, or similar learning of the categories than the supply of 
category information via non-verbal labels.
Overiaid on this simple question is the more Indeterminate matter the effects on 
conceptual coherence o f associations between exemplars and verbal category labels. One 
possibility is that, if this factor is important, verbal category labels are more likely to  be used 
in this way where names are supplied, than where category membership information is 
conveyed by non-verbal category labels. Thus any effects associated with supplying 
category information through different media might be attributable to the effectiveness of 
those media as sources of category membership information, but they m ight also be 
attributable to the effects o f  names as a source of coherence. This interpretation rests on a 
number €)f assumptions, one of which, the extent to which subjects verbally nam e non­
verbal labels, is investigated in this chapter.
The use of arbitrary collections in a category learning task departs ffom conm on practice 
in category learning experiments, where the categories to be learned are often defined by a 
prototype, and exemplars are generated as distortions of the category prototype. An 
arbitrary collection o f  items might be regarded as an intermediate step between remem bering 
individual items and learning proiotypically structured categories. An arbitrary collection is a 
category, but lacks internal structure.
Arbitrary collections have an advantage over prototyjncally structured categories for an 
experiment where the influence of class labels is being examined: learners can be forced to 
attend to the class labels, since the presentation of category membership information can be 
carefully controlled. With arbitrary collections, all category membership cues have to be 
given artificially to the learner, with proiotypically structured categories, on the o ther hand,
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such cues are lo some extent appeient h tm  the pettnns of similarities and differences among 
the exemplars.
A  prototypical structure is not a necessary property for a category in a category learning 
experiment, although it is certainly a typical one. As discussed below (see General 
Discussion section) arbitrary collections may even have some ecological validity dther as a 
particular type of cognitive category, o r as an early stage in the acquisition of more 
structured categories. There is of course a  well propounded theory (Medin and Schaffd. 
1978) that even prolotypically structured categories are learned by remembering 
exen^lars.
A verbal label can only be a **good’* source of category membership information (or 
indeed coherence) relative to some other medium of supply. In the experiments described in 
this chapter, the pronourtceable non-words used as verbal labels were initially compared 
with labelling by positional cues, and labelling by non-verbal labels which were selected 
from a set of small, square segments of a complex black and white pattern. An infinity of 
o ther visual, non-verbal labels could have been created. The black and white pattern 
segments were chosen because they were recognisable individually, yet seemed relatively 
hard to name • loose criteria by any standards.
Experiment 3a.
In this experiment subjects learned arbitrary ccrflections of pictures of familiar objects. In 
each conditKMi, 12 new objects were grouped at random into three sets of four. Each triakof 
the category learning task involved being shown a “target object”, then three “selection 
objects”. The three selection objects were always one from each of the three subsets, and 
the subject's task was to pick out the selection object belonging to the same subset as the 
target.
Subjects perfonned the collection learning task in four conditions, with different types oi 
collection label used in three of the conditions, and no collection label at all sup|4ied in the 
fourth condition. The aim was to see whether subjects learned the collections more easily 
when the collections were labelled, and if ao. what kind of labels aided learning.
Method
Subjects
The 12 subjects were undergraduate students panicipating in the experiment lo satisfy a
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requirement of their introductory psychology course.
Apparatus
Stimuli were presented on e  high resolution monitor controlled by an Acom Ardiimedes 
310 mtcrocompuier. The stimuli %vere digitised using an Archimedes 440 computer fitted 
with a Watford Electronics digitiser and a video camera.
Stimuli
A set of 48 black and white pictures common objects (selected Oom stimulus pictures 
published by Snodgrass and Vanderwart, 1980) were digitised for use in the experiment. 
The full set of pictures is contained in Appendix 4a.
Two sets o f labels were used. One set of labels consisted o f 27 pronounceable non- 
words (as used for Experiment 2b, and presented in Appendix 3b) and the other set 
consisted of 27 small, rectangular, black and whitt, abstract patterns (presented in Appendix 
4b).
Design
The experiment followed a within-subjects design with four conditions. Each subject 
performed all four conditions, the order of the conditions for subjects following a latin 
square.
Procedure
In each condition the subject encountered a set of 12 pictures which had been arbitrarily 
divided into three subsets, with four pictures in each subset. The subject's task was to learn 
which pictures were grouped tegether in subsets.
Trials, of which there were 36 in each condition, consisted o f  two distinct stages. On the 
first part o f each trial, the 'choosing stage', one of the 12 pictures - the 'target' picture, was 
shown for 1.5 seconds at the left hand side of the screen. The target then disappeared and 
three 'selection' pictures, one from each subset, were shown along the right hand side o f the 
screen. The subject was required to choose the selection picture which Vhe thought most 
likely 10 belong te the same subset as the target picture, and to give a confkknce rating for 
this choice.
Feedback was then immediately provided for the correctness of the choice: a tick was 
shown on the screen alongside the correct selection picture, and crosses next to the two
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inconect selection pictures. If the subject had chosen correctly, a snalinf-face icon was 
presented in the top left com er of the monitor screen, or. if  the subject had chosen 
incorrectly, a firowning-face icon was shown. The feedback was shown for 3 seconds.
In the second stage o f each trial, the 'looking stage', three pictures, one from each 
subset, were shown at the right hand side o f the screen for S seconds. The subject had the 
opportunity to look at the three pictures, but was required to take no other action.
In order to help the subject tell the two stages o f the trial apart, a question mark icon was 
d i^ a y e d  at the top left comer of the screen during dte choosing stage, and an eye icon w u  
displayed during the looking stage.
THals in each of the four conditions were procedurally identical at the c h o o ^ g  stage. 
Procedural differences between conditions were introduced at the looking stage of the trials. 
In every condition during this stage three pictures were presented, conning one from each of 
the three subsets. Subjects were given additional cues to subset membership of the three 
looking stage pictures as follows:
Condition VL (verbal labels): three verbal labels were chosen, one for each of the three 
subsets. Alongside each of the looking stage pictures was the label representing the subset 
to which it belonged.
Condition NVL (non-verbal labels): three non-verbal labels were chosen, one for each of 
the three subsets. Alongside each of the looking stage pictures was the non-verbal label 
representing the subset to which the picture belonged.
Condition NLF (no labels, fixed positions): at the looking stage, pictures belonging to one 
subset were always inesented at the tc^ right of the screen, pictures belonging to another 
subset were presented at the right-middle position on the screen, and pictures belonging to 
the third subset were presented at the bomxn right o f the screen.
Condition NLR (no labels, random positions): at the looking stage, no cues were given to 
subset membership for the three pictures shown.
Whenever three object pictures were shown on the screen at the same time (during the 
choosing or the looking stage of each trial) they were arranged at the right hand side of the 
screen with one picture at the top, one in the middle, and one at the bottom of the screen. 
The allocation of pictures lo positions was always random, with the sole exception of the 
looking stage in condition NLF, where systematic positioning was a cue for subset 
membership.
Subjects were run individually. At the beginning o f  the experiment, for each subject, the 
48 piettues were divided randomly into four sets o f  12, and each set of 12 was randomly
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divided into three subsets o f four pictures. The three verbal labels and the three non-veital 
labels to be used by the subject were selected randomly horn the two pools of 27.
Each condition consisted of 36 trials divided into three blocks of 12 trials, within which 
each of the 12 object pictures appeared as the target picture of the choosing stage just once. 
The 36 seu  o f three selection pictures and three looking stage pictures used in each condition 
were randomly selected fiom the 64 possible sett. Order of presenution o f  the 12 pictures as 
targett was random within each block, subject to the constraint that the picture used as the 
target on any trial could not also feature as one of the three selection pictures on that trial.
Subjects indicated their choice of selection picture at the choosing stage of each trial by 
pointing to  it with the computer’s mouse. The subject was then required to give a 
confidence rating for the choice, using the nxHise on a similar scale to that used in 
Experiment 2a. This was marked along its length and "I!'*, corresponding, the
subjects w ere told, to "very unsure","unsure","sure", and "very sure". For scoring 
purposes, the continuum was treated as a scale from 0 to 100. Selections, confidence 
ratings, and decision times for each trial were recorded.
At the beginning of the experiment subjects read instructions which explained the 
procedure. The experimenter recapped on the procedure verbally, also introducing an 
analogy with a  card game with shufHed piles of cards to emphasise the arbitrary nature of the 
division of the sets o f pictures into subsets. A message on the c o m p u ^  screen at the start of 
each condition told subjects which condition was about to follow and reminded them of the 
fMocedure for die looking stage of trials in that condition. The experimental session lasted 
apimiximately 45 minutes.
Results
Regarding the number o f trials on which subjects’ choices were correct, although 
subjects showed some evidence of learning, there was no difTerence in performance between 
the four conditions. The mean numbers of conect responses achieved by subjecu in each 
block of each condition are shown graphically in Figure 4.1.
C h a fe r  4
F ifw e 4.1. Correct choices by Mock end condition in Experiment 3a (nal2). The abbreviationi for the 
conditiont are as uaed in the text (vl •  verbal labels indicate subset membership, nvl a  non*vefbal 
labels, nir a  no labels, but fixed positions indicate subset membership, nir a  no labels and no 
cues).
A two way analysis of variance yielded a significant main effect o f block (F-5.16, 2J22 
df, p^ .014), reflecting the imfnovement in subjects' performance with i^actice in each 
condition. There was no significant main effect of condition (F-0.45. 3.33 df. p-0.718) 
nor a significant interaction of condition with block (F -0 .73 ,6.66 df. p^ .6 2 4 ).
Subjects* confidence ratings, which arc depicted in Figure 4.2. followed a similar 
pattern. A two way analysis of variance yielded a significant main effect of block (F-24.6, 
2.22 df. p<0.001) but no significant main effect of condition (F-1.21. 3,33 df, p«0.322) or 
interaction of condition with block (F> 1.30, 6,66 df, p-0.268).
Figure 4.2. Confidcfice ratings for su b jecu  in Experiment 3a. (vl > verbal labels indicale subaet 
membership, nvl •  non-verbal subset labels, nlf ■ no subset labels, but flxed positioM  indicals subset 
membership, air ■ no  subset labels and no poeitkmal cues)
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An analysis relating confidence ratings to correctness on each trial was also performed. 
Thif analysis produces a score to be referred to as ‘confidence accuracy’, which is calculated 
for each subject on each condition as the difference between mean confidence ratings given 
on trials when the subject chose cotrenly and mean confidence rating given for trials on 
which the subject chose incorrectly. The mean confidence accuracy scores for each 
condition are depicted in Figure 4.3. Confidence accuracy scores were not calculated for 
individual blocks because, with only 12 trials per block, the number of dials on which the 
subject was correct or incorrect could be very small or even zero.
B  nir
F i l m  4 .3. Confidcnce-iccuracy scores by conditioa for Expcrimcni 3a. (vl ■ verbal ^ i c a l e
subset membership, nvl ■ non-verbal subset labels, nif •  no subset labels, but fixed positions indicate 
subset membership. nIr ■ no subset labels Mid no positional cues)
As can be seen from Figure 4.3, confidence accuracy for condition VL exceeded that for 
the other conditions; this difference was not sladslically significant A one way analysis of 
variance was performed on the confidence accuracy scores, yielding no significant effect of 
condition (F-0.68, 3,33 df, p-0.370), and a linear contrast o f the means for conditions VL 
and NVL showed they were not significantly different from one another (F -0 .9 8 ,1,33 df).
Decision times, depicted in Figure 4.4, were analysed using a two way analysis of 
variance, yielding a non-significant main effect of block (Fw3.09, 2,22 df, p^ .0 6 6 ), no 
main effect of condition (F.0.36, 3,33 df, p-0.780) and no significant interaction (F-1.06, 
6,66 df, p-0.397).
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Figure 4.4. Decision times for subjects in Experiment 3a. (vl ■ verbal labels indicate subset 
membership, nvi ■ non-verbal subset labels, nlf « no subset labels, but fixed positions indkale subset 
membership, nlr « no subset labels and no positional cues)
Discussion
Although subjects made substantial progress in learning the arbitrary categories task, 
responding with increasing accuracy and confideiKe as each condition progressed, there 
were no clear differences in subjects' performance between conditions.
In condition NLR subjects had received minimal category cues during the looking stage 
of each trial - the only category information being that the three pictures each belonged to 
different subsets. In the other three conditions, however, explicit category cues (posidm, 
verbal labels or non-verbal labels) were available during the looking suge o f the trial. 
Subjecu might have been expected to perform the category learning task significantly worse 
in condition NLR. This expectation was not fulfilled.
Category informadon was also available to subjects in the choosing suge of every trial, 
primarily in the feedback given to the subject after each choice was made - a tick drawn next 
to the correct selection and crosses next to the two incorrect selections. Provided that the 
subject could remember what the target object was on that trial, the feedback gave the subject 
the chance to leant; a) whether the target and the selection object belonged lo the same subset 
and b) that the target was in a different subset to each of the selection objects which were 
marked with a croas. Thus the choosing stage of the trial was informationally very rich, and 
iu  information content was the same across the four conditions.
A possible explanation for the similar performance of subjects in the four conditions was.
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then, that the amount of category infonnation available at the choosing stage of trials in all 
conditions made the differences introduced at die looking stage relatively unimportant. In 
view of this possiMlity, in Experiment 3b the procedure was modified to eliminate the 
feedback.
Experiment 3b
In this experiment the procedure o f  Experiment 3a was modified so that at the choosing 
suge of trials, no feedback was given for the subject's selection. In order to allow the 
subjectt to monitor their performance during the category learning task, they were instead 
informed after every block of 12 trials how many correct selections they had made in the 
preceding 12 trials.
Method
Subjects (none of whom participated in Experiment 3a), apparatus and stimuli were 
exactly as described for Experiment 3a.
The procedure fcrilowed that used in Experiment 3a, except that at the choosing suge of 
each trial the feedback was omitted, so that once the subject had made a selection and 
confidence judgement, the choosing suge ended and the looking suge began. After every 
12 trials, a message appeared on the monitor screen informing the subject how many correct 
selections s/he had made in the previous 12 trials.
Results
Looking first at the number of correct responses made by subjects in each condition 
(shown in Figure 4.5), the most correct responses were made in condition VL, followed by 
condition NVL, followed by conditions NLF and NLR.
A two way analysis of variance yielded a significant main effect of Mock (F«5.65, 2,22 
d f, p ^ .O l) and a significant main effect of condition (F>16.44, 3,33 df, p<0.001), with a 
significant interaction of block with condition (F>2.43, 6,66 df, p^ .035). Subjectt had 
succeeded in making progress in learning which pictures belonged to which category, and 
the amount of learning was greater in some conditions than in others.
Comparisons between die means for the four conditions, using linear contrasts, showed
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thaï correct chcMces in condition VL significantly exceeded correct choices in condition NVL 
(F«7.15, 1.33 df. p<0.025), and that performance in condition NVL significantly exceeded 
performance in  condition NLF (F«8.S, 1,33 df, p<0.01). There was no significant 
dinerence between conditions NLF and NLR (F«4).40, 1,33 df).
Subjects* confidence ratings for each condition and block are shown gri4>hically in 
Figure 4.6. The confidence ratings were analysed using a two way analysis of variance. 
This yielded a significant main effect for block (F«21.6S, 2,22 df, p<0.001) reflecting the 
subjects’ increasing confidence ratings as each condition progressed, and a significant main 
effect for condition (F«7.21, 3,33 df, p>0.001), with the interaction also signiHcant 
(F-6.12, 6,66 d f. pcO.OOl).
Figure 4.S. Mean ccurect responses by block and condition for subjects in Experiment 3b (nai2). (vl ■ 
verbal labels indicate subset membership, nvi ■ non*verbal subset labels, nlf ■ no subset labels, 6ut 
fixed positions indicate subset membership, nir * no subset labels and no positional cues)
Figure 46. Confidence ratings for Experiment 3b. (AbbreviationB as above.)
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Mean confidence rarings for di^erent conditions were compared using linear contrasts. 
Confidence ratings in condition VL significantly exceeded confidence in condition NVL 
1.33 df, p^.O S), but the difference between conditions VL and NLF did not 
achieve significaiice (F-2.91. 1.33 df). Conditions NVL and NLF were not significantly 
different (F«0.15.1.33 dO. tnd  the mean o f  these two conditions exceeded that o f condition 
NLR (F -9 .7 I, 1.33 df. p<0.01).
Confidence accuracy scores (the difference between subjects* confidence ratings on trials 
on which they were correct and their confidence ratings for trials on which they were 
inconect) were computed for each condition, and are shown in Figure 4.7. A one way 
analysis o f  variance was performed on the confidence accuracy scores, yielding a significant 
effect o f  condition (F"6.35, 3,33 df, p«0.002). Comparing ccmfidcnce accuracy scores for 
conditions VL and NVL, the difference between them was not significant by linear contrast 
(F«2.23. 1,33 dO* Confidence accuracy in condition VL significantly exceeded confidence 
accuracy in condition NLF (F*11.55, 1.33 df, pcO.Ol) but the difference between 
conditions NVL and NLR did not reach significance (F*3.63, 1,33 dO-
Subjects* decision times are shown in Figure 4.8. Decision times for all conditions 
appeared to decrease with successive blocks, and this is reflected in a significant main effect 
for block in the two-way analysis o f variance which was performed on the decision time 
data. There was no significant main effect of condition (F ^ .78 . 3,33 df) nor a significant 
interaction o f block with condition (F>0.39, 6,66 dO-
ngure 4.7. Mean confidence-accuracy acofei for subjecu in the four condiiioni of Experiment 3h. (vl 
« verbal labels indicate subset membership, nvi > non-verbal subset labels, nif •  no subset labels, but 
fixed positions inthcaie subset membership, nlr > no subset labels and no positional cues)
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Figure 4.8. I^ is io fi limes for Esperimeiil 3b. (vl ■ verbal labeis indicale subset membership, nvi m 
non-verbel s i i ^ l  l ^ l s .  nif ■ no subset labels, but fised positions indicale subset membership, nir -  
no subset labels and no positional cues) '
The number of conect responses made by subjects in Experiments 3a and 3b were 
compared for all four conditions. Looking at Figures 4.1 and 4.5. it can be seen that in 
conditions VL and NVL subjects made mote correct selections in the present experiment than 
did subjects in Experiment 3a, whereas for conditions NLF and MLR correct responses in 
Experiment 3a exceeded those obtained in this experiment. Correct responses in each 
condition were compared across Experiments 3a and 3b using correlated sample t tests. [As 
f**” h^ i other correlated sample t tests referred to in this chapter, scores were summed across 
subjects by trial. Thus in this case, summed scores for each oral in Experiment 3a were 
paired against the summed score for the corresponding trial of the same condition in 
Expeninent 3b.J For condition VL correct responses in Experiment 3b significantly 
exceeded those in Experiment 3a (t-2.86, 35 df, p ^ .0 0 0 7 ) , while the difference, although 
in the same direction, was not significant for condition NVL (t-0 .89 , 35 df). For 
conditions NLF and NLR, performance in Experiment 3a exceeded that in Experiment 3b, 
this difference being non-significant for NLF ( t - 1.21, 35 dO but highly significant for NLR 
(t-4.46, 35 df, p-O.OOOl).
Overall, subjects succeeded in learning the arbitrary collections of object pictures, 
becoming more confident and responding faster with practice. The pattern was not the same 
in all conditions, however. In condition VL subjects responded mote accurately than in any
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ocher condition, and tended lo exhibit higher conHdence ratings and a  cloter relationship 
between confidence ratings and accuracy within trials.
The data of primary interest were the number of correct re^ionses made by subjects in 
each coTKlition, shown in Figure 4.5. When learning the arbitrary collections with vertad 
labels, subjects performed betm- than than when learning with non-vertral labels, which in 
turn led to better performance than the use of petition as a category cue. How could this 
patmn of results be accounted for? Firstly, the inferiority of learning in condition NLF 
could be due to the added difficulty for the subjects o( remembering w hat was supposed to 
be going on in that condition. Where a category label was supplied at the looking stage of 
the trial, the subjects would have had no difficulty remembering that a cue told them which 
subset a picture belonged to; where no label was present, it would have been relatively easy 
to forget that such a cue (position) was available.
The superiority o f verbal labels over non-verbal labels as a category cue suggests that it 
may be easier to learn an arbitrary ccdlection labelled by a word-like label than an arbitrary 
ccdlection labelled by a visual pattern.
In comparing the results of Experiment 3a with those of Experiment 3b, there would 
seem to be an infraction between the presence of feedback and learning perfonnance in the 
different conditions. Subjects learned less successfully in the labelling conditions VL and 
(non significantly) NVL when feedback was given on each trial than when feedback was not 
given, while subjects in the non labelling conditions NLF (non significantly) and NLR 
performed better in the experiment where feedback was provided than in the experiment 
where feedback was not given.
It may seem anomalous that providing subjects with extra categOTy information in the 
form o f feedback could lead to poorer learning than when this extra category information 
was not supplied. Since the feedback provided information about pairings of pictures rather 
than category membership, a possible explanation for this result could be couched in terms 
of strategies employed by the subjects. In the experiment where feedback was given, 
subjects may have been inclined to attempt to learn the arbitrary collections task by 
remembering associations between pairs of objects rather than by attempting to learn the 
subsets as lists of items. In the experiment where no feedback was given, subjects may 
have associated pictures with labels, which may be a more effective step towards learning 
c(41ections of items. Thus associating the pictures with the labels may be a lew preferred 
strategy for performing the task, but ultimately a more effective one.
The poorer performance of subjects in the non labelling conditions when feedback was
Chaptsf 4 97
not present does not, on the other hand, seem anomalous. It would be expected a priori 
that learning nmy be worse in situations where less infonnation is available than in situationa 
where more information is provided. Following the line of argument above, when feedback 
is present subjects might use the paired associates method of learning the collections, and 
fare moderately, whereas when feedback is not present they have available neither this 
strategy nor the labelling strategy, and consequently they fare badly.
Experiment 3c
The previous experiment's results suggested that verbal labels may be a more effective 
category cue than non-verbal labels for learning collections. Since the stimuli were pictures 
o i  objects, it is not clear what the subjects took the collections to consist of. Were they 
learning collections o f words, collections of pictures, or collections of some vaguer entity, 
"concepts”?
The stimuli used in Experiment 3b were pictures o f common objects, all of which could 
have been named immediately and simply by the subjects. In the present experiment, the 
stimuli are replaced by pictures of unfamiliar and non existent objects. The motivation for 
this change was twofold: firstly, to replicate Experiment 3b with a different set of stimuli in 
order to see if the same pattern of results emerged between the four conditions; secondly, to 
attempt to investigate the importance o f readily available names for the items in learning 
arbitrary collections.
The non-object pictures used as stimuli in this experiment are shown in Appendix 4c. 
The objects depicted are all either non existent, invented ot^ects, or rare and unfamiliar 
objects. The pictures were taken from two sources, the majority being taken from Kixrfl aiKl 
Potter (1984) and the rest from Begg (1990).
Some data are available on the nameability of the rton-objects compared with the 
Snodgrass and Vanderwart common object pictures used in Experiments 1 and 2.
In an experiment on object and non-object perception, Begg (1990) required 20 subjects 
to name members of a set of 24 pictures of familiar objects, and to give the ‘nearest available 
name* for members of a set of 24 unfarruliar objects. It took subjects considerably longer lo 
name the unfamiliar objects, the mean naming latency being 441 cs as compared with a mean 
naming latency of 151 cs for the familiar objects, the difference in these two means reaching 
statistical significance by a correlated sample t test (t>5.IS. 19df.p«0.0001).
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The procedure used in this experiment was almost identical to that used in Experiment 
3b, except for the use of the set of 60 non existent and unfamiliar object pictures as 
described above. The only procedural change introduced was that 12 o f the pictures 
(numbered 49 to 60 in Appendix 4c) were reserved as a set of examples of "non existent and 
unfamiliar objects" which the subjects viewed in the course of reading the experimental 
instructions. None of the 12 subjects had been involved in experiments 3a or 3b.
Results
The number o f correct responses made by subjects on each block of each condition are 
shown in Figure 4.9. It can be seen that the greatest number of correct responses were made 
by subjects in condition VL, followed by conditions NLF and then NVL. with the fewest 
correct responses made by subjects in condition MLR. With the exception of condition 
NLR, performance increased steadily with practice within each condition.
1 fo ' subjects in Experiment 3c (n .I J ) .
r  I ! * * '- * ”  * ' l i ' “ “  " '“ "beiship; nvi •  non-verbal subset labels; n i r .  no
ubelt. but fixed potiuont indiaue subset membership; nlr ■ no subset libels and no potiitonal
The dau  for correct responses were subjected to a two way analysis of variance. From 
this, significant main effects of block (F-18.12, 2,22 df. pcO.OOl) and condition (F-4.56, 
3 J 3  df. p<0.01) were apparent, with a significant interaction between the two faeton
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(F-2.8S. 6.66 df. p»0.016).
Linear contrasts showed that performance in condition VL significantly exceeded 
performance in condition NVL (F«6.93, 1,33 df, p<0.02S), but the superiority o i  condition 
VL over condition NLF did not achieve significance (F«1.09, 1,33 df) and there was no 
significant difference in perfonnance in conditions NVL and NLR (F«0.60,1,33 df)>
Confidence ratings are plotted by Mock and condition in Figure 4.10. A two way 
analysis o f variance of the confidence rating data 3rielded a significant main effect of Mock 
(F-97.43, 2,22 df, p<0.001) and condition (F~10.53, 3.33 df. pcO.OOl) with a significant 
interaction term (F*2.3S, 6,66 df, p^.041).
Comparisons between conditions by linear contrasts showed that subjects in condition 
VL gave significantly higher confidence ratings than subjects in condition NVL (F«9.11, 
1,33 df. p<0.01). There was no significant difference between confidence ratings given in 
conditions VL and NLF (F ^ .3 0 , 1,33 df) and the difference between conditions NVL and 
NLR did not reach significance (F«3.76 (1,33).
Figure 4.10. Conndence ratings for subjects in Experiment 3c.(Abbreviations: vl ■ verbal labels 
indicaie subset membership; nvi ■ non-verbal subset labels: nlf •  no subset labels, but fixed positions 
indicate subset membership; nir « no subset labels and no positional cues.)
Confidence accuracy scores were computed for each condition (see above) and are 
depicted in Figure 4.11. Confidence accuracy was highest for condition VL. A one way 
analysis o f variance was performed on the confidence accuracy scores, yielding a non­
significant effect o f condition (F«2.5S, 3,33 df, p^ .07). Comparisons between conditions 
showed that confldence accuracy in condition VL was not significantly higher than in 
cofKlition NVL (F«2.89, 1.33 df) but did significantly exceed conndence accuracy in 
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Figure 4.11. Confidence-accuracy scorei for sub jec it in each condition of Experiment 
3c.(Abbreviationi; vl ■ verbal labelt indicate subset membership; nvi * non-verbal subset labels; nlf > 
no subset labels, but Fixed positions indicate subset membership; nir « no subset labels and no 
positional cues.)
Decision times, plotted in Figure 4.12. were analysed by a two way ANOVA. yielding a 
significant main effect of block (F-8.65, 2.22 df. p=0.002). no significant main effect of 
condition (F ^ .0 5 . 3.33 df). but a significant interaction between block and condition 
(F«2.47, 6,66 df, p-0.032).
Figure 4.12. Decision times for subjecu in Experiment 3c. (Abbreviations as above.)
Comparing the results of the present experiment with those of Experiment 3b, on all 
conditions except NLF fewer correct responses were made when the stimuli were unfamiliar 
o b ^ s  than when subjects were learning about arbitrary collections of familiar obiectt. This
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difference was sifraficant for conditions VL (t"2.63, 35 df, p^.O O l 2, correlated samples) 
and NVL (t«2 .89 , 35 df. p«0.0065) but not for condition NLR (t>0.42, 35 df). 
Performance in condition NLF was better in Experiment 3c than in Experiment 3b, although 
this difference was not significant (t>1.75,35 df, p>41.089).
In Experiments 3a, b, and c, the confidence accuracy exhitnied by subjects in the four 
conditions followed a consistent pattern - VL > NVL > NLF > NLR. Since the difference 
between conditions VL and NVL did not achieve significance on any of the three 
experiments individually, the confidence accuracy scores for the three experiments were 
combined and a correlated samples t test performed on the data for conditions VL and NVL. 
For Experiments 3a, b, and c, together, subjects exhibited significantly greater confidence 
accuracy on condition VL than on condition NVL (t*2.69, 35 df. p«0.011).
Discussion
When learning to put pictures of unfamiliar objects into arbitrary collections, the present 
experiment suggests that it is harder for subjects to perform this task when the collections are 
labelled by a meaningless pattern (condition NVL) than when labelled by a meaningless 
word (condition VL). This relationship is the same as that observed in Experiment 3b. 
Overall, the arbitrary collection learning task appeared to be more difficuU in the present 
experiment using unfamiliar objects, than in the previous version where the arbitrary 
collections were composed of familiar objects.
The superiority of learning in condition VL over learning in the condition where 
collection membership was indicated by position, observed in Experiment 3b with 
collections of objects, was not replicated in the present experiment with collections of non- 
objects. It would be possible to speculate that labelling by position may be a more effective 
category cue for non-objects than for real objects - this possibility will not be followed up, 
however. Post hoc, it is easy to speculate that category labelling by position tray be an 
unsuitable form o f  labelling for use in these experiments. For one reason, this procedure 
may be apt to confuse the subjects, since apart from the instructions at the beginning o f the 
trials, there is no obvious cue to distinguish this corKlition from condition NLR. If the 
subject does understand the procedure, the three positions may easily be verbally labelled 
(e.g. **top**. **middle**, “bottom”) by the subject.
Confidence accuracy, the difference between subjects’ mean confidence when correct and 
mean confidence when incorrect on a trial, might be considered an index of subjects'
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awareness of how well they are performing - an index of the extent to which, when asked a 
question about membership of the collections, the subjects know whether or not they know 
the answer.
Confldence accuracy in this experiment followed the same pattern as in Experiments 3a 
and 3b. Subjects learning the collections with verbal labels exhibited greater confidence 
accuracy than when learning the collections labelled by patterns or by position. Aldiough 
these differences did not reach significance in individual experiments, the trend is significant 
when the data fitxn all three experiments are combined.
Experiment 3d
In Experiments 3b and 3c subjects learned the arbitrary ccrilections more successfully 
when the collections were given verbal labels than when non-verbal labels were applied to 
them. One possible explanation for why learning was poorer with non-verbal labels is that 
the non-verbal labels may be harder to discriminate one from another than are dte verbal 
labels.
The main source of category membership information for the subjects was the labelling 
o f the three category members shown at the looking stage of each trial. If the subjects could 
not reliaMy tell the non-verbal labels apart, the beneficial effects of being shown labelled 
category members would obviously be reduced.
In order to compare the discriminability of the verbal and the non-verbal labels used in 
the previous experiments, a simple experiment was performed in which subjects were 
required to perform a label matching task using the verbal and non-verbal labels.
Method
Eight new subjects were taken from the same pool as drawn on for Experiments 3a. b, 
and c. The two sets o f  labels, verbal and non-verbal, were presented to the subjects using 
the same apparatus as in the eariier experiments.
Each subject was tested with two sets of three verbal labels, and two sets of three non­
verbal labels. A different set of labels was used in each four conditions, with each 
condition consisting of 36 trials.
The fnocedure on each trial was as fellows: a target label was presented at the left of the 
monitor screen for 130 centiseconds (cs), after which it disappeared and the three labels in
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the cunent set were displayed in randomised positions in three boxes drawn on the right 
hand side o f  the screen. The subfcct's task was to pick out the target label from the set 
three, using the mouse pointer lo click on the appropriate box. Within each bk>ck of 12 
trials, each o f the three labels served as the target label an equal number of times. At the end 
o f each trial the mouse pointer was repositioned on a spot on the left hand edge o f the screen 
and the three selection labels were erased. The succeeding trial began when the s u f a ^  
indicated their readiness by pressing one of the mouse buttons.
The order in which the four conditions were presented followed an A B B A design, 
four subiects beginning the sequence with a set of veitNd labels and the other four beginning 
the sequence with a set of non-verbal labels. Each set o f labels was a random selection of 
three from the appropriate pool of 27 labels of each kind.
Subjects were instructed that the number of mistakes they made and their response times 
would be recorded. If a mistake was made on a trial, it was repeated, with the three 
selection labels in a new random order.
Results
Out of a total of 1132 label matching trials, only four errors were made, all of these 
occurring with the non-verbal labels. In view of the tiny proportion of errors made, no 
statistical tests were carried out on this data.
The data for the response times are shown in Table 4.1. The overall mean response 
times were 103.7 cs for verbal labels, and 113.4 cs for non-verbal labels. The difference 
between these means was significant (t«9.23, 33 df. p<0.0001) by a correlated sample t 
test.
Table 4.1. Response times for label matching task (cs).
non-verbal labels
mean standard deviation
fust set 106.2 12.23
second set 101.2 8.24
both sets 103.7 7.26
first set 126.3 12.69
second set 104.3 9.34
both sets 113.4 8.96
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Discussion
The aim of the experiment was to see how much harder the non-vertaU labels are lo lell 
apart than the verbal labels, in case confusions within the sets o f  non-verbal labels could 
explain why subjects in Experiments 3b and 3c learned the collections better with verbal than 
non-verbal labels.
Since so few cnors were made with the non-verbal labels on the label matching task, it 
seems unlikely that subjects in Experiments 3b and 3c had difficulty correctly discriminating 
between the non-verbal labels. It is clear that subjects can tell the labels apart very 
accurately, even when performing a speeded task.
Although die results of the present experiment suggest that inability lo discriminaie 
between the non-verbal labels was not a problem during the arbitrary collection learning 
experiments, the results do support the idea that the non-verbal labels are slighdy harder to 
discriminate. Subjects took approximately one tenth of a second longer to perform the label 
matching task with the non-verbal labels than they did with the verbal labels. Thus during 
the arbitrary collection learning experiments, at the looking stage of the trials, subjects may 
have had to expend a larger proportion of their cognitive resources on discriminating 
between the labels when they were non-verbal than when the labels were verbal.
In the arbitrary collection learning experiments, at the loc^ng stage of each trial, the 
labels and collection members were shown lo the subject for five seconds. It is possible, 
although it seems unlikely, that a minor difference in the time taken to discriminate the labels 
(approximately one tenth of a second in the label matching experiment) during a  long 
inspectKMi period could account for the observed sizeaUe differences in subjects* learning i*n 
the verbal and non-verbal labelling conditions.
Experiment 3e
In Experiments 3b and 3c subjects performed the arbitrary collections learning ta«k bemr 
when the categories were labelled with verbal labels than when category membership was 
indicated by a non-verbal label. In Experiment 3d, it was found that the non-verbal labels 
took longer to discriminate than the verbal labels used in the experiments. One possible 
interpretation of the earlier results is that subjects learn better with more easily discriminable 
labels, regardless o f  the type - verbal or non-verbal - of those labels.
The aim of the next experiment was to investigate the importance of label discriminabtUty 
relative to label type in the arbitrary collections learning task. To this end, subjects
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petfofmed the leeming task with the vertial and non-vertNd labels as before, but also with a 
set o f  non-verbal labels which were more discriminable than the verbal labels. If learning 
performance is simply a function of the discriminability o f the labels, then learning should be 
best with the most highly discriminable labels (the new non-verbal labels), poorest with the 
least discriminable labels (the old non-verbal labels), and at an intermediate level with the 
verbal labels.
A matter of some interest in the comparison of verbal and non-verbal labels is whether 
subjects make up verbal names for the non-verbal labels, and if so, whether naming the non- 
verbal labels is related to learning performance. In order to investigate this, subjects were 




Thirty-two subjects, drawn ftom the same pool as for experiments 3a-d, participated in 
this experiment. None had taken part in experiments 3a-d. Eight subjects performed the 
label matching task, and 24 performed the arbitrary collections learning task.
Stimuli
The stimuli were as used in Experiment 3b, with the addition of a second set of 27 non­
verbal labels. These labels were square segments taken from a multi-coloured abstract 
pattern. They are shown, in black and white only, in Appendix 4d.
The disetiminability o f the new non-verbal labels was assessed using the same procedure 
em ployed in Experiment 3d, with eight new subjects.
Very few errors were made (6 errors out of 576 trials for verbal labels, and 15 errors out 
o f  576  trials for non-verbal labels), so, as in Experiment 3d, the error data were not 
analysed. The response times for the verbal and new non-verbal labels are shown in Table 
4.2. Using the same sutistical procedure employed in Experiment 3d, the overall response 
tim es for the new non-verbal labels were significantly lower than subjects* response times 
for the  verbal labels (t-2 ,14, 34 df, p-0.039).
Ihocedure
The atbiirary collections learning task was as performed in Experiment 3b, vrith three 
alterations made to the procedure.
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Table 4.2. Response tim es for label matching Usk (cs).
new non-verbal labels
mean standard deviation
fifst set 142.5 26.4
second set 117.0 13.6
both sets 129.7 15.9
first set 130.5 22.2
second set 115.2 16.0
both sets 122.9 14.2
The fin t alteration w as that the condition NLF was dropped. In its place, an additional 
condition in which the exemplars were labelled with non-verbal labels was introduced, using 
non-verbal labels selected from the new set of non-vetbal labels described in the Stimuli 
section above. The two conditions with non-verbal labels will be lefeited to as condition 
NVLl (old non-verbal labels) and condition NVL2 (new non-verbal labels).
The second alteration to the procedure was unintentional, resulting from the accidental 
deletion of a line in the computer program running the experiment This had the effect that 
on each trial the allocation o f subsets to positions on the screen (top, middle, or bottom) was 
only randomised once, between the choosing and the looking suge, rather than being 
randomised for the choosing surge then randomised afresh for the looking suge.
The practical consequence of this was that the the three categories appeared in the same 
positions in the choosing stage of each trial as they had occupied in the looking stage of the 
previous trial. If subjects noticed this, they could leam the subsets by learning chains of 
pairs of pictures which had  occurred in the same positions on two consecutive trials, without 
reference to the labels at a ll if they so chose.
The third alteration to  the procedure was that, at the end of the experiment, subjects were 
shown each of the six non-verbal labels they had seen, and asked whether they had made up 
a name for it. If they had made up a name, they were asked to type it into the computer, or, 
if they had forgotten the nsune, to just type “F ’.
Results
The subjects’ learning performance in the four conditions is depicted in Figure 4.13.
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The were anelyaed using a two within subjects factors ANOVA, which yielded 
significant main effects of Mock (F>41.18. 2.46 df, p<0.001) and condition (F*8.64. 3,69 
df, p<0.001), and a significant Mock by condition interaction (F-6.80. 6.138 df. p<0.001).
Learning performance in condition VL significantly exceeded that in condition NVLl 
(F»5.38. 1.69 df, p<0.025) but not condition NVL2 (F<1) by linear contrasts. Peformance 
in NVL2 did not significantly differ from  that in condition NVLl (F»2.94, 1,69 d0> 
Comparing VL with die mean of NVLl and NVL2 comMned, again the difference was not 
significant (F«2.85, 1,69 df).
Figure 4.13. Correct responses by block and condition for subjects in Experiment 3e (n«24). 
Abbreviations: vl ■ verbal labels in^cate subsets: nvil ■ original non-verbal subset labels: nvl2 “  
new non-verbal subset labels: nir > no labels or positional cues.
Hgure4.14. Confidence ratings of subjects in Experiment 3e. Abbreviations as above.
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FifUfe4.1S. ConfKlefice-accuracy tcorei for the four conditioni in Experiment 3e. Abbreviationf: vl ■ 
verbnl labels indicate subsets: nvil ■ original non*verbal subset labels: nvl2 ■ new non*verbal subset 
labels: nlr ■ no labels or positional cues.
block
Figure 4.16. Decision times for subjects in Experiment 3e. Abbreviations as above.
Subjects* confidence ratings are plotted in Figure 4.14. The confidence ratings were 
analysed in the same manner as the learning scores, yielding significant main effects of block 
(F-42.75, 2,46 df, pcO.OOl) and condition (F -1 1.75, 3,69 d f . p<0.00l), and a significant 
block X condition interaction term (F-7.26, 6,138 df, pcO.OOl). Comparisons between 
conditions showed that confidence ratings in condition VL signiBcantly exceeded draae in 
condition NVLl (F»5.52, 1,69 df. p ^ .0 2 5 ) but not condition NVL2 (F«1.73, 1,69 d0< 
The difference in confidence ratings between conditions N V L l and NVL2 was also not 
significant (F-1.03, 1,69 df).
The confidence difference scores calculated for the four conditions are shown in Figure
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4 .IS. A one within-subjects factor ANOVA yielded a significant effect o f  condition 
(F«8.48, 3,69 df, p<0.001) but comparisons of VL vs. NVLI, VL vs. NVL2, and  NVLI 
vs. NVL2 were non significant (all Fs <1, 1,69 df)-
Decision times, depicted in Figuie 4.16. were also analysed. The main effect o f  block on 
decision times was significant (F-14.42, 3,46 df, p<0.(X)l) reflecting the expected fall in 
decision times with practice within each condition. There was no significant main effect of 
condition (F<1,3,69 df) nor a significant block x condition interaction.
At the end o f the experiment, subjects were shown the six non-veibal labels again and 
asked whether they had made up names for them. Cases where a sufc^t reported they had 
named a label but forgotten the name were poc4ed with cases where the actual nam es used 
were reported. Slightly more names were reponed for the NVLI labels (39 in total) than for 
the NVL2 labels (33 in total). The distribution of the number of labels subjects reponed 
having named is shown in Table 4.3.
TaMe 4.3. Number o f non-verbal labels subjects reported having named.
Labels named Number of subjects.
0 10
The subjects appear divided into two sub-groups: those who reported having namid 
none (or just one) o f the non-verbal labels, and those who reported having nam ed all or 
nearly all (five or six) o f the n<Mi-verbal labels. Only two subjects fall outside these groups.
The learning performance of the two sub-groups was compared for each o f  the four 
conditions. The number of correct responses summed across blocks for each condition for 
the two sub-groups subjects are shown in Table 4.4.
TaUe 4.4. Correct responses by sub-group and condition.
sub-group
O o rl label (n-11)
S or 6 labels (n * ll)
VL NVLI NVL2 NLR
mean sd mean sd mean sd mean sd
21.5 8.02 16.8 7.07 17.0 6.47 15.6 4 .8 0
22.5 6.76 19.2 7.64 25.9 6.52 12.7 4 .03
The difference between the two sub-groups subjects is largest for condition NVL2,
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with s u t ^ a  who leponed having Ubelled the non-verbal labels petfonning sigtiificamly 
better than the other sub-group (t-3 .22 , 20 df. p-0.004). There was no significant 
difletence for any other condition (VL: t-0.34, p-O.73, NVLl: t^ .7 S , p ^ .4 6 , NLR; 
t-1 .54 , p-0.14).
Discussion
In this experiment, as in Experimenu 3b and 3c, subjecu performed the arbitrary 
collections learning task significantly better when the subsets were labelled with verbal labels 
than with the original set of non-verbal labels.
With the new set of non-verbal labels used in condition NVL2, learning performance was 
extremely similar to that with the verbal labels. This shows that altering the discriminability 
o f  non-verbal labels within the parameters identified in Experiment 3d can affect learning 
peiformsnce in the arbitrary collections learning task.
Label discriminability does not appear to be the only factor affecting learning 
performance, however. If there were a simple relationship between discriminability and 
learning performance, it was predicted that learning in condition NVL2 would be better than 
learning in condition VL - this was not the case. Although they were significandy faster to 
discriminate, the new set of labels led to learning that was slightly (but not significantly) 
worse than learning with the verbal labels. It seems that some property other than simple 
discriminability may be needed to account for subjects’ learning performance with the three 
sets of labels in this experiment.
As mentioned in the Introduction to the current experiment, the procedure for the learning 
task was acctdentally altered in such a way that could have made it easier than in previous 
expenments for subjects to learn the collections without relying on the labels supplied. This 
does not appear to have been a problem. Comparison o f subjects’ learning performance in 
condition NLR in this experiment with that of NLR subjects in previous experiments 
suggesu that the change in procedure actually made no difference to subjects’ learning 
strategies: NLR performance remains poor relative to the labelled conditions. This 
conclusion is further reinforced by the finding of the same relationship between VL and 
NVLl learning in the present experiment as was observed between VL and NVL learning in 
previous experiments.
The dau  on whether subjects reported giving verbal names to the non-verbal labels are of 
tome interest Roughly half the subjects reported having named the non-verbal labels, and
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th o «  who reponed nwning n y  of .he non-vert»I tabels generally reponed name, for aU of 
them.
Reladn* the reponing of names for non-verbal labels K> learning performance, subjeca 
who reponed having used names performed subsouidally better Uian * e  odrer subjects on 
condition NVL2. and slightly better, but not signiHcandy better, on condition NVLl. There 
was no difference in the learning perfomrance of tfte naming « u l non naming sub-group, on 
conditions VL m i  MLR. so it doe. no. seem »  be the case * a .  the non-verbal label nw..!. ,  
sub-group singly performed better on all conditions. Ib e  intpUcations of this finding, m l  
qualifications to it. u e  considered furtiier in the General Discussion section below.
Experiment 3f
In tite experúnente reported so far in titis chapter d«re is some evidence tiui. learning 
arbittary collections may be faciliteted nxae by * e  use of verbal labels for the groups d«n 
when group ntembership is indicated by non-verbal labels. What factors, otiier than 
ditettiminability. might make verbal labels beneficial? Ib is experiment attempted to examine 
two properties of verbal labels, discreteness and pronounceability.
The faa  that words are pronounceable is obviously importen, for tireir role in vocal 
communication. PronounceabiliQ, of words can also be important for titeir role in cognitive 
processes, such as the use of rehearsal in short term memory. In onier to attempt ro see 
whedrer label pronounceability was an importen, factor fo r  learning in the arbitrary 
collections tesk. a set of 27 hard to-pronounce non-wonis w ere creteed {these are lided in 
Appendix 4e).
The hard »  pronounce labels (hereafter referred K. as unprorrounceable labels) were used 
as collection labels for one experimentid condition. VU (verbal, unpronounceable), of an 
experiment which apart from dte use of different group labels was proceduntily identical tt, 
Experiment 3b. For comparison with learning in condition V U. in another condition. VU 
subjects leaned the collections wiU. tire original set of pronounceable verbal labels as used in 
earlier experiments.
The second property of verbal labels investigated here w as discreteness. Words are 
discrete entities (see discussion of this in Chapter 1. Section III  . and Chapter 2). and it may 
be asked how important this discreteness is to  their role in category learning.
In order to compare learning with discrete and continuous labels for the collections, two 
condition, were run where dte subset label, were white lines o f  vteious lengdis. In one
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conditiofi, LD (lines, discrete), there were three lines, one acting as a non-vertMl label for 
each of the three subsets. In another condition, three ranges of line lengths were used, each 
range acting as a  non-verbal label for one of the three subsets. Experiments on learned 
categorical perception for line length (Chapter 2) suggest that subjects would not, even after 
considerable experience of learning to categorise lines into sets, perceive such sets discretely 
or categorically.
The subjects, ^>paratus and object pictures were identical to those used in Experiment 3b. 
None of the subjects had participated in Experiments 3a-e. The procedure was also the same 
as used in Experiment 3b, except that labels for the collections were supplied in every 
condition at the looking stage of the trials.
For condition VL, verbal labels were selected from the same set as for the condition of 
the same name in Experiment 3b. For condition VU, unpronounceable verbal labels were 
selected randomly from the set listed in Appendix 4e. For condition LD, the three non­
verbal labels were white lines of approximate lengths 17.6, 19.3 and 21.3 mm. The lengths 
increased incrementally by 10 per cent, each step being approximately two jnds Oust 
noticeable differertces). For condition LC, the non-verbal labels were lines from three 
ranges of length, each range representing the label for one of the three collections of objects. 
The three ranges were, approximately, 17.6 to 21.3 mm, 23.4 to 28.2 mm, and 31.1 to 37.8 
mm. Each range spanned two 10 per cent increments, and the ranges were separated bjr 10 
per cent increments. The actual lengths of the LC line labels were chosen at random fixim 
the appropriate range on each trial.
There was little difference between conditions in the number of correct responses made 
on each Mock, as can be seen from examination o f Figure 4.17. Subjects consistently 
performed marginally better in condition VL than in the other conditions which are almost 
inseparaMe on the graph.
Chspfr 4
Figure 4.17. Mean correct reaponsea by block and condition for aubjecu in Experiment 3f (fi>l2). 
Abbreviutiona: vl ■ pronounceabie verbal labeia for aubaeu; vu -  unpronounceable verbal aubaet 
labela: Id •  diacrete linea aa aubael labeia; Ic -  rangea of linea aa aubaet labeia.
A two wuy gnalysis of variance of the correct response data yielded a significant main 
effect o f  block (F -46.43 , 2,22 df, p<0.001) reflecting the steady improvement in 
perfonnance across blocks for subjects in each condition. There was no significant main 
effect o f  condition (F-0.48, 3,33 df) nor a significant interaction of block with condition 
(F -0 .43 , 6,66 df).
A linear contrast was used to compare the means of condidon VL and condidon VU. The 
superiority of condition VU did not reach significance (F-1.12, 1,33 dO- Similarly, 
conditions LD and LC did not differ significantly (FM).02 (1,33).
Mean confidence ratings for each condition are plotted in Figure 4.18. A two way 
analysis of variance yielded a significant main effect of block (F-40.I0, 2,22 df, psfl.OOl) 
but no significant main effect of condition (F ^ .9 0 , 3,33 df) nor a significant interaction 
(F -0 .86 , 6,66 df).
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Figure 4.18. Confidence ratings for subjects in Experiment 3f. Abbreviations: vl ■ pronounceable 
verbal labels for subsets: vu ■ unpronounceable verbal subset labels; Id ■ discrete lines as subset 
labels; Ic •  ranges of lines as subset labels.
Confidence ratings for conditions VL and VU did not differ signiricantly (F<i).01. 1.33 
df) when compared by a linear contrast, and likewise conditions LC and LD were not 
significantly different (F»1.96, 1,33 dO-
Confidence accuracy scores were computed for each condition as described above, and 
are shown in Figure 4.19. A one way analysis of variance of the confidence accuracy scores 
yielded no significant effect o f condition. Linear contrasts were used to compare conditions 
VL and VU, which were not significantly different (F-1.39, 1,33 df) and conditions LC and 
LD, which also did not differ significantly (F ^ ,5 7 , 1,33 df).
condition
Figure 4.19. Confidence-accuracy scores for the four conditions in Experiment 3f. Abbreviations as
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Decition dmei for each block and condition are ploned in Figure 4.20. A two way 
analysis of variance yielded a significant main effect o f block (F«8.82, 2.22 df. p^ .002) 
but no significant main effect of condition (F ^ .27 . 3,33 df) nor a significant interaction of 
block with condition (F ^ .5 9 ,6,66 dO-
Fifuie 4.20. Decision times for subjects in Experiment 3f. Abbreviations: vl -  pronounceable vertwl 
labels for subsets; vu « unpronounceable verbal subset labels; Id ■ discrete lines as subset labels; k  
■ ranges of lines as subset labels.
Discussion
Subjects learned the arbitrary collections slightly more successfully when using verbal, 
pronounceable labels than in any other condition, but the difference in performance was not 
statistically significant.
As an attempt to investigate the importance pronounceability for collection labels, this 
experiment probably failed in its aim: it seems that subjects are not inclined to treat 
unpronounceable non>words as words at all. Many subjects spontaneously reported having 
referred only to the first letter of the unpronounceable non-word labels. Individual letters, 
course, may be pronounced easily.
Looking at subjects' performance with the discrete and continuous sets of line labels, it 
would ^>pear that there was no difference in the extent to which these two types of label 
facilitated lewning the c<rilectk>ns.
One might conclude that continuously varying labels are not intrinsically worse than 
discrete, unvarying labels for learning collections. There are two qualifications to bear in 
mind here, though.
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Firstly, the continuously vsrying sets of labels did not abut one another, but were 
separated by approximately two jnds (subjects would have been able very easily to 
discriminaie the longest line in one set from the shortest line in the next). This may not be 
typical o f continuously varying stimuli. If continuously varying sets of ocrilection labels 
abutted one another, that may indeed make collection learning harder.
Secondly, both the discrete and the continuous line labels could easily be named C**bort'\ 
“medium**, and **k>ng**. for example), so it is quite possible that in these conditions subjectt 
were effectively working with pronounceable, verbal labels for the collections.
General Discussion
From Experiments 3a to 3e a general conclusion emerges: in learning arbitrary 
collections, verbal labels for the groupings can lead to faster learning, greater confidence, 
and give learners greater insight into their performance, than is achieved when non-verbal 
labels are used.
Siqrplying category membership information via verbal labels led to superior learning of 
the arbitrary collections of objects in Experiments 3b and 3e, and led to superior learning erf 
collections of novel objects in Experiment 3c. Two factors were found to moderate this 
effect: the presence o f non-verbal feedback in Experiment 3a was associated with similar 
learning in all conditions regardless erf the presence or type of exemplar labelling, and the 
use o f non-verbal labels which were more discriminable than the verbal labels (Experiment 
3e) led to similar arbitrary collection learning performance lo that obtained with the verbü 
labels.
Why was arbitrary collection learning better with the verbal labels than with the Mack and 
while pattern segments? One possiMlity is that the difference was due to the ease with which 
category membership information could be extracted from the two types of label. The 
discrimination time data for the verbal and Mack and white non-verbal labels supports this 
interpretation, as does die finding that with a set of more discriminaMe. multicoloured non­
verbal labels, no significant verbal label advantage in arbitrary collection learning was found.
It would be leaaonaMe to say that differences in arMtrary collection learning were 
ast4Kiated with differences in the relative discriminability of the verbal and non-verbal 
labels, but the relationship may be no more than correlational. Performance on the 
discrimination task may co-vary with some other property of the labels which affects 
petformance with them in the arMtrary collection learning task.
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I f  the difference in category learning performance with die verbal and non-verbal labels it 
not wholly attributed to their relative e^ectiveness at conveying category membership 
information, what other explanations would be possible? One possibility it that greater 
concqm ial coherence was derived from associating the different exemplars with the same 
verbal category label, than associating them widi a common non-verbal label.
One piece of evidence bearing on this possibility was collected: the extent to which 
subjects reported using verbal names for the non-verbal labels. It was found (Experiment 
3e) that the non-verbal labels were named by roughly half of the subjects, if  their reports of 
verbal labelling « e  to be believed. Thus it is possiMe that where non-verbal labels were 
supfdied, subjects would have been less inclined to be cognitively making use (in whatever 
w ay, but beyond merely extracting category membership information) verbal cattgory 
labels during the learning task. It was also found that, for one set of non-verbal labels at 
least, subjects who reported using verbal names for them performed the category learning 
task significandy better.
The possiUe relationship between verbally naming the non-verbal labels, cognitively 
using  verbal labels during the learning task, and performance on the task, is further 
com plicated by the possibility o f a relationship between label discriminability and the 
invention of names for the non-verbal labels. If label discriminability is at the root of the 
difference in category learning performance, and if more discriminaMe labels are more likely 
to  be named, then it would be expected that naming the non-verbal labels would be 
associated with better category learning, for reasons nothing to do with the possible 
contribution of verbal labels to conceptual coherence. Equally, however, it is possible that 
performance on the label discrimination task reflects how easy the non-verbal labels are to 
nam e, and that l^iel naming really lies at the root of the observed verbal label advantage over 
the black and white non-verbal labels.
The issues of the possible advantages of verbal labels in arbitrary collection learning, and 
the entangled nature of the relationship between label type, discriminability, and narmng, 
w ill be put to one side from this point in the discussion, which turns to other aspects o f the 
experiments re ported above.
T o  what extent i r a ^ t  the results of these experiments on arbitrary collection learning 
generalise to other category learning tasks? To what extent are arbitrary collections a valid 
type o f  category? Despite the obvious differences between arbitrary collections and teal 
w orid categories, there may be a case to be made for some limited ecological validity to be 
attributed to them.
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Artitrary collections are certainly a special kind o f  category, but they are probably not 
comfrietely outside natural experience. Categories as arbitrary collections may in some cases 
precede a more meaningful representation of a category which comes when we have enough 
knowledge or intelligence to formulate a theory (in the sense of Murphy and Medin, 1985) 
which can give the category cohestveness. For example, the classes foods which make 
you ill, actions which make the computer crash, occasions on which a child is badly 
behaved, or seismic events which precede earthquakes, may all begin life cognitively as 
arbitrary collections, becoming meaningful c<rilections when, later, they are united by a 
causative theory. Ontogenically, many classes for children may start out as arbitrary 
c<rilections (e.g. things you are not allowed to touch, actions which make ocher people 
angry, food which adults w on’t let you eat) until, backed up by greater knowledge or 
cognitive development, a theory is found which gives the members of the category 
cohesiveness. Some categories may remain, even for adults, arbitrary ccrilections, such as 
financial dealings which are against the law, things you can buy at a petrol station, drugs 
which cure headaches, or drinks which makes you ill.
If verbal labels are a key to better learning of ccrflectkms, there is some evidence from 
these experiments to  suggest that subjects are either not aware that attending to labels is a 
good learning strategy, or that when plenty of other information is available, subjects do not 
use labels to learn collections. In Experiment 3a. where feedback was provided, subjects in 
the labelling conditions fared worse than subjects in Experiment 3b, where feedback was not 
given.
For subjects in the non labelling conditions, however, performance was better where 
feedback was provided (Experiment 3a) than when feedback was not provided (Experiment 
3b). This finding was more in accord with expectations - it is generally assumed that 
feedback aids rather than hinders category learning, as, for example, was reported by Homa 
and Cultice (1984).
What the experiments repcmed here suggest, as regards the role of fee<tt>ack, is that 
where feedback is provided in addition to collection labels, it may actually impair subjects* 
learning performance. As proposed above, one possible explanation for this finding is that 
feedback may induce subjects to aittmpt to learn the collections by associating collection 
members with ocher members, which may be a less effective strategy for learning than 
associating collection members with collection labels. In ocher words, feedback may 
distract subjects from  using a strategy involving collection labels, which would actually lead 
them to learn the aihitrary collections more erfectively. The role of feedback in other
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category learning situations is discussed at length in Chapter 5.
In Experiments 3a>c, when subjects were supplied with verbal labels they were 
appaiendy more aware of their performance than when learning with the non-verbal labels, 
with positional cues for ct^lection membership, or with no class membership cues. This 
suggests that learning categories o r collections with verbal labels may lead to better 
awareness on the part of subjects o f  their categorical knowledge. This awareness is not 
directly related to the level of performance. The same pattern of confidence accuracy scores 
across conditions emerged in Experiments 3a, 3b and 3c, a pattern which mirrored the 
subjects* categorising accuracy across the four conditions only in Experiment 3b.
It is suggested here that confidence accuracy scores may reflect or measure subjects* 
awareness of their categorical knowledge. Subjects learning with verbal labels appear to be 
more accurate in estimating how well they are performing the categorisation task. However, 
the assumption that confîdence accuracy scores can be translated into a  measure of 
awareness, although defensible, is only an assumption. A more parsimonious interpretation 
of confidence accuracy data may be that it measures subjects* compliance in using the 
confidence scale in the experiments. In that case, the finding to be explained is why subjects 
learning with verbal labels, irrespective of their performance, should be particularly 
coii^liant in giving confidence ratings to  the experimenter.
An atten^t was made in Experiment 3f to investigate which properties o f  verbal labels, 
other than discriminability, might account for their facilitatory effect on learning collections. 
In this experiment, |m>nounceable verbal labels for the collections were compared with 
unpronounceaUe verbal labels, non-verbal labels that were continuously varying, and non­
verbal labels that were discrete, or unvarying. Pronounceable verbal labels showed a slight, 
but non significant, facilitatory effect on collection learning over the other three types of 
label. However, subjects showed a tendency not to treat the unpronounceable verbal labels 
as words, but rather attended only to their first letters, which were of course pronounceable. 
Thus as an investigation of the importance of pronounceability for verbal labels, this 
experiment may have inadvertently compared like with like.
Subjects learned the collections equally well with discrete and continuous labels in 
Experiment 3f. This result suggests that discreteness, per se, may not be an inqxwtant 
property of verbal labels. However, as noted above, the ranges used for the continuous 
labels did not abut one another, so that there would have been little confusion as to which 
range any stimulus belonged. Had the ranges abutted, i.e. the labels had been continuous 
between ranges as well as within ranges, values near the border between two ranges would
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have been hard or impossible to tell apart, the labels would have been ambiguous, and 
learning would probably have suffered. An additional problem with the discrete and 
continuous stimuli used was that either set would have been easy for the subjects to label 
verbally.
It may be difficult to investigate which propertie s  o f  verbal labels are important in 
collection or category learning, for the reasons encountered in Experiment 3f. Once a 
property is taken away firom a word (such as the property of ¡Monounoeability) what you 
have left may no longer be, to the cognitive system o f  the learner, a **word** minus that 
property. A word that is not fm>nounceaUe may be treated not as an unpronounceaMe 
word, but as a letter string. The property o f **wordness” may be relatively fragile aral all or 
nothing - discrete - in nature.
Oite property o f  words as labels has been successfully manipulated in these experiments, 
however. The experiments have shown that for verbal labels to faciliute learning, it is not 
necessary for the labels to be meaningful, at least in the sense of having pre-existing 
meaning. (The non-words used in these experiments, although initially meaningless, 
presumably acquired meaning as the s u b ^ ts  learned about the categories they represented.)
The question of meaningfulness also crops up, as has already been discussed at length, in 
relation to the categories themselves. In these experiments, the categories were arbitrary 
collections of objects. The collections had no meaningful structure, whereas the majority of 
categories humans leam about do have meaningful internal structure, such as is provided by 
similarity (Rosch and Mervis, 197S), typicality gradients (Barsalou, 1987), a  theory to give 
the members o f the category cohesiveness (Murphy and Medin, 198S), or selection rules 
(Barsalou, 1983). Perhaps the most important question springing from this work on verbal 
labels and learning arbitrary collections, is whether verbal labels facilitate the learning of 
other kinds of cognitive category.
Whether veibal labels aid the learning of arbitrary ccrflections by providing cohesiveness 
between members of the same category, or by being  better at providing category 
membership information, where the categories to be learned have a meaningful internal 
structure to provide cohesiveness and cues to membership, the beneficial effects of verbal 
labels might be expected to diminish. Experiments to investigate this hypothesis are reported 
later in Chapter 6.
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Chapters
A comparison of error correction and category labelling as feedback in schema learning.
Summary
Reviewing the experimental literature in svhich the role of feedback in calegosy learning 
has been examined, it it  noted that there is no consensus over the effect, facilitatory or 
otherwise, o f feedback on learning performance. There is also little consistency across 
different experiments concerning the type of information which is provided as feedback. 
The hypothesis is advanced that different types of feedback - error correction (telling the 
subject only whether the previous response was correct) and category labelling (telling the 
s u l ^ t  which class the previous exemplar belonged to) may have distinct effects in category 
learning. An experiment is repotted where, in a sotting usk, these two types of feedback 
are compared. Subjects perfottned the task better with both types of feedback combined 
than with error correction alone. No other significant differences between feedback 
conditions were found.
Whilst the role o f feedback in category learning has been investigated, unfortunately die 
definition o f what is meant by "feedback** in category ieaming has been left vague. 
Consequently, the feedback investigated in various experiments has ranged from supplying 
correct category names on a labelling task (Homa and Cultice 1984) to superimposing 
relevant or irrelevant shapes over exemplars in a same-different task (Smallwood and 
Amoult, 1974).
The aim o f this chapter is to focus on the different kinds of information that may be 
conveyed in feedback, on the grounds that the role of feedback in category learning cannot 
be clarified when different experimenters have used the term to cover different types of 
infomution. The experiment reported in this chapter concerns a hypotheais that error 
correction and category labelling may exist as separate forms of feedback with different
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efTects.'
Feedback i t  not necessary for all forms of category learning, but may be necessary under 
certain conditions. This is the position outlined by Evans (1967) and which is supported by 
the experimental literature. Evans distinguished between **schematic concept formation'' 
which does not requite feedbag, and "didactic concept formation" which does require i t  
Schematic concept formation was defined by Evans as category learning without prior 
familiarity of the classes, without external instruction, from items whose category structure 
falls into clusters which are self evident from the exemplars encountered by the learner. This 
form of learning is similar to the learning process described by the Gibsons (e.g. Gibson, 
1969) where dte learner extracts categorical knowledge by an automatic process of searching 
for invariants in the input, motivated by a desire to "reduce uncertainty".
Evans described a second category learning process, didactic concept formation, where 
the categories are taught to the learner by some external input. Learning which relies on 
feedback would fall into this category. The didactic learning process would enable people to 
leam even arbitrary categories where members are linked by no apparent category structure 
(as for example in the experiments reported in the previous chapter of this thesis).
Evans’ position as regards feedback, then, is that feedback may aid category learning or 
even at times be necessary for category learning, but under some circumstances category 
leaning may proceed without feedback if the category structure is sufTiciently obvious to the 
learner. This formulation is not as parsimonious as the Gibsonian view, nor, at the other 
extreme, the claim made by Bruner. Goodnow. and Austin (1956) that in the absence of 
feedback people will cease to attempt to leam categories. It is Evans' view of the rcrfe of 
feedback which is supported by the experimental literature, however. The two most 
painstaking investigations of the role of feedback in category learning conducted to date 
show that in some circumstances feedback is critical importance (Homa and Cultice 1984) 
whereas in others (Fried and Holyoak 1984) feedlMck appears to contribute little or nothing.
Feedback appeared to have a substantial effect on category learning in the experiment 
conducted by Homa and Cultice (1984) in which subjects learned to recognise three 
categories o f shapes generated from distorted patterns of dots joined by lines to form closed
' la isnni of the two faactioai of category labels distinguished in Chapter 1, labels as a source of 
information on where to look for similarity, and labels as a source of cohoence in thmnsetves. this 
Chapter is concerned with discussing the Arm function: the importance of labeb, and feedback which 
does not provide cai^ory labels, in directing subjects* search for similarity-based coherence. Despite 
this slant, the possible role of labels in contributing to category learning by providing coherence 
between exempilars. through a common Msociation with the category label, remains confounded with 
the effects latmls may have as a form of feedback. Having re-acknowledged this second function, 
however, for the sake of economy of expression its possible presence will be ignored for the remainder 
of diis chapter.
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fífures. The level of distortion introduced into the exempUrs of eech shepe cetegory wes 
varied in different conditions, and the three categories of shape were labelled A, B, and C 
throughout. Subjects attempted to label a shape on each trial, then were either given 
feedback in die form of the correct label, or were given no feedback. After 144 learning 
trials with a set of 18 shapes, a  transfer test involving labelling new instances of the 
cattgories was given. Homa and Cultice found that in the absence o f feedback, subjects 
could learn only the most highly structured categories (i.e. exemplars generated with little 
distortion from the class prototype), and consequendy, that transfer performance of subjects 
who had learned with feedback greatly exceeded diat of the no-feedback subjects.
In the experiments reported by Fried and Hcdyoak (1984) feedback appeared to have 
much less effect on category learning, presumably because the category structure was mote 
obvious in the exemplars than in Homa and Cultice’s study. Fried and Holyoak required 
subjects tt> learn to categorise matrix patterns (10 x 10 grids in which each element could be 
either black or white) as paintings produced by one of two fictitious anists,"Sfnith" and 
'^Wilson". Subjects in one condition were given feedback as they attempttd to label each 
picture as either a Smith or a Wilson, being told “correct" or "incorrect" ap¡»opriaiely on 
each trial. Subjects in another condition were not given feedback. The exemplars were not 
repeated during the learning trials, which continued until a criterion of ten consecutive error 
free trials was met or until 200 trials had been given. Two levels of distortion were used for 
generating the exemplars, giving four conditions in total, feedback being crossed with 
disrortion in a between subjects design. A transfer test followed the learning trials.
The results obtained using this procedure did not suggest that feedback had a large effect 
on category learning. In two experiments (lA  and IB) each involving 45 subjects, feedback 
had no statistically significant main effect on learning or transfer, although in the transfer 
phase o( Experiment IB feedback did significantly intoact with level of distortion during 
training.
In a third experiment (Experiment 2), Fried and Hc^yoak again found no significant main 
effect of feedback on training or transfer, each subject this time learning two categories, one 
o f h i ^  variability, and one of low variability. However, of the subjects learning widiout 
feedback, a high proportion (S/12) failed to reach the learning criterion, whereas all 12 
subjects given feedback reached the criterion.
Thus in Fried and Holyoak's experiments there is evidence that in some circumstances, 
feedback appears to have little or no effect on category learning performance. The moat 
plausible explanation for why feedback had a large influence on learning in Homa and
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Cultice'i experiment, but relatively little influence on learning in Fried and H dyoak’s 
experiments, is that in the latter experiments the category structures were, lo put it plainly, 
easier to learn.
O f the studies conducted prior to diese. one found that feedback apparently facilitated 
category learning (Edmonds. Mueller and Evans 1966) others that it had no effect 
(Smallwood and Amoult 1974, Tracy and Evans 1967), and others that feedback impaired 
category learning (Posner and Keele 1968, Experiment 2, Brown, Walker, and Evans
1968).
Etfrnonds et al. required subjects lo perform  a task where on each trial they were shown 
three patterns, two from one category and one from a different category, arul were required 
to choose the **odd one out”. The stimuli, bar-charts with particular sequences of ctdumn 
heights, were drawn fiom four prototypically structured categories. One group o f  subjects 
was given feedtutek on each trial, in the form being told what the correct selection was 
after they had chosen. Another group of subjects did not receive this feedback. The 
experiment was extremely short, with only 15 trials administered. By the fifteenth trial, both 
groups were performing at an equal level which was above chance, an outcome which 
Edmonds et al. interpreted as evidence that feedback was of no importance on the task. 
Until the last group o f  three trials, however, the performance of subjects receiving feedback 
was consistently better than that of the no-feedback subjects, which Edmonds et al. 
commented on (but failed to report any statistical test of this difference).
At the other extreme for complexity of experimental design. Smallwood arxi Amoult 
(1974) described an experiment where subjects were required to learn to recognise two 
classes o f shape (random distortions of eight-pointed polygons) in eight different feedback 
conditions. Two shapes were presented on each trial (of 70). the subject's task being to say 
whether two shapes were from the same or different categories. The eight feedback 
conditions involved combinations to two kinds of feedback - overiaying correct or incorrect 
prototypes over the shapes at the end of each trial, and providing or not providing the correct 
answer after the subjects had responded. The verbal, error correcting feedback made no 
significant difference to the acquisition or retention performance of any group, although 
regardless o f  verbal correction, overiaying ^>pro|Miate prototypes on the exemplars was 
found to improve both acquisition and retention.
A similar, negative finding for the role of feedback was reported by Tracy and Evans 
(1967) from an experiment where subjects sorted into piles 60 cards bearing exemplars from 
four categories of probabilistic, histogram patterns. Five types of feedback were employed:
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indicatinf whidi pile an exemplar should have been put into; telling the subject “conect” or 
'incorrect'*; the first two kinds of feedback combined; each pile labelled with a conect 
exemplar, or finally, piles labelled with exemplars plus the subject being told which pile each 
card should have been placed in. There were no differences in socting perfomnance between 
groups.
With exemplars drawn from four prototypically structured categories of doc pattern, 
Posner and Keele (1968, experiment 2) n o ^  that transfer test perfonnance was significantly 
worse for a group of subjects given feedback (correct category indicated) during the test than 
for a group of subjecu given no feedback. A detrimental effect o f feedback was also 
reported by Brown et al. (1968) for a task involving three categories of the histogram-like 
patterns employed elsewhere. On each o f 20 trials subjects picked ftom three alternatives an 
exen^lar belonging to the same category as a target exemplar: subjects informed of the 
correct answer after they had chosen performed worse overall.
A detrimental effect o f feedback on learning or task performance has been reported in some 
ocher fields: in motor skills learning, increasing fiequency of feedback can reportedly lead to 
poorer learning (Winstein and Schmidt, 1990); Schulze (1989) reported that for one subject, 
feedback led to poorer performance in a rhythm detection task. Elsewhere in this thesis 
(Chapter 4) it was noted that subjects learned arbitrary collections less well when labels and 
feedback were provided than when given only class labels. It seems quite possiMe that 
under some conditions feedback leads to poorer category learning performance. If so, the 
particular circumstances required have yet to be investigated or understood. The possibility 
that feedback may impair category learning is not accounted for by Evans* ( 1967) conception 
of schematic and didactic concept formation. No theoretical analysis o f how feedback may 
in^Mir category learning has been atten^ted: indeed, this aspect of the role of feedback has 
received little attention. The answer might lie in afreets of the feedback or adjects of the 
category learning situation, or some more complicated interaction of the two factors. 
Possibly the close analysis o f  the type of information given in feedback attempted in this 
chapter might help clarify die issue of when and why feedback is detrimental rather than 
beneficial or unimportant in the category learning process.
A single theoretical analysis of feedback m i^ t take the following form: the feedback 
typically given in category learning experiments can be broken down into two types of 
information contingent on the last response o f the subject. One component is simple error 
flagging on the last response, telling the subject whether this response was correct or 
incorrect. This component is the minimum of information which must be provided if
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feedback i t  given. A second type of information may be provided alto. This component it 
category labelling o f an exemplar. It it  through category labelling that feedback it 
coiranonly provided in category learning experimenta. To take some concrete examfdet, in 
Homa and Cultice't (1984) experiment, subjects received a t feedback the correct category 
name of the exemplar they had just attempted to label. This feedback told them whether dteir 
last response had been correc t or incorrect - error flagging - and provided category labelling 
of die exemplar just presented. In Smallwood and Amoult's (1974) experiment, however, 
the feedback given ro subjecu provided error flagging but not category labelling, since the 
task was to judge pairs of exemfriars as belonging to the same or different categories and the 
feedback only consisted only of being tcdd "correct'* or "incorrect".
Paying closer scrutiny to the category labelling component o f feedback, it can be argued 
that diis may also be subdivided into two components. The category label tells the learner 
which other exemplars belong to the same category as the current exemplar, and also 
attaches a verbal cattgory label to each of these exem^dars and the category itself. In so 
dcHng, the category label supplies information about the exemplar by telling the learner 
which other exemplars it is associated with. The label also supplies information about the 
category, by telling the learner that this exemplar belongs to the category, adding to the 
ostensiva deflnition erf the category label.
The distinction between error flagging in feedback and cattgory labelling may be an 
important one: the influence of cattgory labelling in category learning might consideraUy 
outweigh the importance of error flagging. In Fried and Holyoak's (1984) experiments, 
although evidence for the importance of feedback was not strong (Experiments 1 and 2); in 
further experiments where learning with labelled instances was compared with learning 
knowing only the number of categories that should be extracted from the exemplars, 
labelling o f insunces proved to have a very large eflect on later transfer performance 
(Experiments 3 and 4).
Since there were only two cattgories to be learned in Fried and Holyoak's experiments, it 
seems contradictory that labelled instances proved inportant in their latter experiments, yet 
right-wrong feedback, which provides category labelling implicitly where there are only two 
alternatives, did not have such a marked effect on the efficacy of letfning. It would seem 
that direct category labelling of exemplars had a qualitatively different effect to that of right- 
wrong feedback, derrite the fact that the latter also provided the category labels - that is. 
allowed the co m et labels to be deduced - but provided them im|Micitly rather than exfdicitly. 
It would not have been possible for Fried and Holyoak to investigate the possible differences
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between error flagfing and category labelling, lince in their learning task, with only two 
categoriet, error flagging could not be supplied independently of category label information.
The experiment reported in this chapter sets out to investigate the relative in^xntartce of 
the error flagging and category labelling components of feedback in the category learning 
(Mocess. In order to do this it was necessary to devise an experimental learning situation 
where error flagging and category labelling could be given to the learner independently of 
one another.
Experiment 4
The task chosen for the current experiment was a sorting task, a direct measure of 
category learning which can be performed without any labels being intttxluced or defined by 
the experimenter^ . In order to be able to separately administer error correction and category 
labelling, it is necessary for the learning task to involve more than two categtMies. 
Accordingly, subjects learned to sort three categories at a time. Each subject performed the 
sorting task in four conditions. In one condition, no feedback was provided (condition 0). 
In condition F (feedback), after each sorting leqxmse the subject was told whether they had 
le ^ n d e d  correctly - the provision of error flagging. In a third condition, VL (verbal 
labels), a verbal category label was given for the exemplar - providing the category labelling 
component o f feedback. In a fourth condition. VLF (verbal label*»*feedback), after each 
sorting re^xmse the subject was told whether he had responded correctly artd was given the 
verbal category label appropriate for the exen^lar.
If the category labelling component o f feedback is mote important than the error flagging 
component for category learning, it would be predicted that subjects would learn more 
quickly in condition VL than in condition F. If error flagging is not of substantial utility in 
category learning, it would be predicted that subjects in coiKhtion F may perform no better 
than subjects in condition 0. If category labelling aids category learning, one would predict 
better performance in condition VL than in condition 0. Also, if the two components of 
feedback combined are beneficial and their effects are additive, one would predict better 
performance in condition VLF than in either condition VL or condition F alone.
* A Mme-difFereM cal^ory membenhip judgement task, or tome other variant such m  m  **odd 
one out” task or category matching to sample was rejected, despite these tasks having been employed 
in several previous studies where the role of feedback has been investigated. These uuks do not 
explicitly require the subject to learn to recognise the categories • there is the possibility that they 
could be performed using some heuristic such as judging the similarity of exemplws without laaming 




The subjects were 36 undergraduate students participating in the experiment to satisfy a 
requirement o f  their introductory psychology course.
Apparatus
An Archimedes 310 microcomputer was used to generate and present the stimuli on a high 
rest^ution cedour monitor.
Stìngili
The stimuli were closed figures formed by joining 12 points, as described in Chapter 3 and 
illustrated in Figure 3.1.
In each of the four conditions of the experiment, subjects atten^Mcd to learn to identify 
exemplar shapes generated from three prototype shapes. Thus 12 prototype shapes were 
used for each subject in the course of the experiment.
The prototypes were formed by randomly shifting the position of points in the starting 
shape by up to 3 mm (as used in Experiments 2a and 2b). The level of distortion introduced 
into exemplars generated horn prototypes varied for the three experimental groups, ik x  one 
group of 12 subjects, group A, each point could move up to 2.4 mm, for another group 
subjects, group B, the exemplars' points could be moved up to 2.0 mm away from their 
positions in the prototype, and for the third group, C, each point could be displaced by up to 
1.6 mm.
Design
The experiment involved two within subjects factors, feedback condition and learning, 
and one between subjects factor, the level of exemplar distortion.
Each subject performed the category learning task in four conditions, the type of feedback 
supplied in each condition being different. In each condition, the subject performed 36 
trials, which were ^>lit into tivee blocks of 12 trials. There were thus two within subjects 
factors, these being condition and improvement in performance from Mock to Mock. A third 
factor, level o f distortion of exemplars, was varied between three groups o f subjects.
Procedure
lite  basic procedure on each trial involved the su fc^ t being presented with an exemplar
generated from one of three possible prototypes. The subject's task was to indicate which 
category tfte shi^te presented belonged to, by choosing one o f three response boxes.
The category soning task was introduced, via written instructions, as a proMem of 
learning to recognise invented species o f  leaves which were found on four imaginary 
planets. On each planet, the subject was tcrfd, there were three species o f  leaves. The 
subject was told that he would be shown leaves one at a time, and asked to say which 
species each leaf belonged to. The subject was told that the leaves within each qtecies were 
similar but not identical to one anocho’ (see Appendix 5a for the full text of the instructions 
given to the subjects). It was explained that on each of the four planets, the infonmtion 
provided for the subjecu while they were trying to learn to identify the three species would 
be different.
There were four variants o f this sorting task. In condition 0, no feedback was given to 
the subject after they had chosen a response box. This condition was equivalent to a free 
sorting task. In condition F (feedback), the subject was given error flagging feedback; afler 
the sorting response, if the box conesponding to the correct species had been chosen, a tick 
and a smiling face icon appeared on the computer screen, whereas if the wrong box had been 
chosen, a cross and a frowning face were shown. In condition VL (verbal labels), after each 
sorting response the subject was shown a verbal, non-word label that was the name the 
species of leaf which the target shape belonged to. In condition VLF (verbal labels plus 
feedback) after each sorting response subjects were slxw^n the appropriate tick/cross and 
sirnlingArowning face icons, and were shown the non-word name belonging to the species 
represented by the target leaf shape. The order in which subjects performed the four 
conditions was counterbalanced using a ladn square.
The six verbal labels seen by each subject were drawn at random from the pool of 27 
pronounceable non-words listed in Appendix 3b. The three response boxes were grey 
squares, positioned one at the K^, one in the middle, and one at the bottom of the monitor 
screen to the right o f the target exemplar. Subjects selected a response box by positioning 
the mouse pointer over it and pressing a nxHise button.
In each condition a new set of three prototypes was used to generate the three classes of 
exemplars. There were 36 learning trials per condition, and the trials were arranged in 
blocks of 12. Within each block the target exen^lar was drawn from each of the three 
categories an equal number of times, with the order of presentation randomised. At the end 
of each block, a message appeared on the monitor screen telling the subject how many o f the 
36 trials in that condition had been comirfeted.
The target leaf on each trial was displayed mote or less in the middle of the monitor 
screen, the exact position varying at random by up to 10 mm horizontally and 40 mm 
veitically. The leaf was displayed for 1.5 seconds before the three response boxes also 
appeared on the screen to the right of the target leaf. When the subject had chosen a 
***Ptmae box, a scale appeared far him to make a confidence rating regarding this choice. 
The scale was a continuous one, as previously used in Experiments 2a and 2b and illustnted 
in Figure 3.2b. Confidence ratings were converted into an integer between 0  and 100 for 
scoring purposes.
After the confidence rating was given on each trial, feedback appropriate to the condition 
was administered for 3 seconds. The target leaf remained visible during this time. Face and 
tick /  cross icons, when shown, were positioned to the left o f the uugei leaf, and categoiy 
names, w hen given, were written under the response box that the subject had selected. In 
condidon 0, where no feedback was given, the target leaf shape alone remained on the 
screen fo r 3 after the confidence rating had been given.
The tim e taken to select a response box on each trial was recorded.
Three groups of 12 subjects peiformed the pseudo-leaf sorting usk. The procedure for 
each group was as descnbed above, the only difference between the three groups' task being 
the amount o f distortion introduced when generadng the exemplars from the prototypes, as 
described in the Stimuli section above.
In condidons F and VLF, the correct allocadon of species to response boxes was 
predetermined for the subject. In condidons where no error correcting feedback was given - 
conditions O and VL - the allocadon of response boxes to species was necessarily derided 
upon by the s u l^ t s .  These conditions were the equivalent o f a  free sorting task, with the 
constraint that the leaves had to be sorted into three categories.
To be able to score the sotting responses as correct and incorrect in the free aordng 
condidons required that the allocadon of boxes to species setded on by each subject in each 
of these conditions was known by the experimenter.
A ccordingly, at the end of each condidon subjects were shown the three species 
prototypes and asked to indicate which response box they had allocated to each of the 
species. This procedure was only necessary for the subsequent scoring of the free sorting 
conditions, but for simplicity it was carried out at the end of each o f  the four conditions.
Before starting the experiment, subjects performed a practice task involving pseudo-leaf 
stimuli generated in the same manner as the experimental stimuli. In the practice task, which 
consisted o f  36 trials, subjects attempted to sort three species o f  leaf into three response
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boxes, labelled A**, "B** and "C". Error correcting feedback was given during the practice 
trials, using the tick/cross and smiling/frowning face icons.
The main dau o f  interest are the number of correct responses made by subjecu on the 
three learning blocks o f  each condition. These scores are depicted for each group 
individually in Figure 5.1 a-c, and averaged over all 36 subjects in Figure 5.2. Overall, It 
appears that subjects learned the sotting task most effectively in condition VLF, and least 
effectively in conditian F.
The learning data was subjected to an analysis of variance, with two within subjects 
factors (block and condition) and one between subjects factor (level of distortion of 
exemplars).
O f the main effects, the effect of block (F-8.76, 2 ,66 df, pcO.OOl) and distortion 
(F-9.46. 2,33 df, p-0 .001) were highly significant, but the main effect of condition was 
not significant (F-1.92, 3,99 df, p3^.131). None of the two way interactions, nor the three 
way interaction, was significant.
The planned comparisons between pairs of conditions were VL vs. F, F vs. O, VL vs. 0, 
VLF vs. F and VLF vs. VL. These comparisons were made by linear contrasts. The only 
difference which reached significance was the comparison o f  VLF vs. F (F-5.58, 1,99 df, 
p<0.025).
Subjects' confidence ratings are plotted in Figure 5.3 a-c and 5.4, These were analysed in 
a similar manner to the sorting dau, yielding a significant main effect of block (F-63.35, 
2,66 df, pcO.OOl) but no  significant main effect of distortion. The main effect o f conditian 
was not quite significant (F-2.52, 3,99 df, p-0.062). The interaction term for distortion by 
block was significant (F -4 .62 , 4,66 df, p<0.01), but no other two-way term nor the three- 
way interaction was significant Of the planned comparisons between conditions, only the 
difference between confidence ratings in conditions VLF and F was significant (F-7.18, 
1,99 df, p<0.0l).






Pifvre 5.1 ft-c. Mean correct reaponief for the three grogp* of tubjectf. Group A (top). Group B 
(mkkne). and Group C (bottom). AbbreviatiofM; vl m verbal category labelf supplied; fbk ■ error 
correcting feedback supplied.
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Figure 5.2. Correct responses averaged across the three groups of subjects (N«36). Abbreviations: vl • 
verbal category labels supplied: fbk ■ error correcting feedback supplied.
Decision times for the 36 subjects are shown in Figure 5.3a-d. A three way analysis of 
variance yielded a significant main effects of block (F«20.15, 2,66 df, p^.O O l) and a 
marginal effect of condition (F>2.66, 3,99 df, p*0.052), but no significant main effect of 
distortion. The condition by block interaction yielded an F value o f  2.12 (6,198 df, 
p«0.053); no other interactions between the factors were near or at significance. Planned 
comparisons between conditions yielded no significant differences in decision times.
One fuither analysis was carried out on the data: this was an analysis of confidence 
accuracy - a measure of the extent to which each sufc^t's confidence ratings reflect actual 
sorting performance (the procedure for calculating confidence accuracy is described fiiUy in 
Chapter 4). Confidence accuracy scores are plotted for each group o f  subjects in Figure 
S.7a>c, and for the three groups combined in Figure 5.8. A two way analysis of variance 
was performed on the confidence accuracy data, with one within subjects factor, condition, 





PifWfe 3.3 •< .  Confidence ratinfs for the three groups of subjecu. Group A (lop), Group B (middle). 
m d  Group C (bottom). Abbreviations: vl -  veibal category labels supplied; fbk ■ error correcting 
feedback supplied.
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Figure 6.4. Mean conFidence ratings for the three groups combined (N«36). Abbreviations: vl ■ verbal 
category labels supfriied; fbk •  error correcting feedback supplied.
The ANOVA yielded a significant main effect of distcMtion, reflecting the tendency for 
subjects learning with less distortion to have a higher confidence accuracy index 
2,33 df, p^ .012). The main effect of condition, and the condition by distortion interaction, 
were not signiHcant. None of the planned comparisons between conditions yielded 
significant F values.
Group A.
(Figure S.S continued overleaO
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Figure 5.5 a-c. Mean declaim times for three groupa of subjects. Group A (top). Group B (middle). 
Group C (bottom). Abbreviatiofis: vl « verbal category labels supplied; (bk ■ error correcting feedback.
Figure 5.6. Decision Umes averaged acrore the three groups of subjecU (N«36). Abbrevialious: vl .  




Improvement in the number of cottect sorting responses, increasing conridence 
judgements, and shorter decision times across blocks all show that subjects were making 
substantial progress in learning to categorise the stimuli during the course of the 36 trials 
within each condition. The general trend, as reflected by the significant main effects of 
distortion, was for subjects to leam the categories more quickly when exemplars were less 
distorted, as would be expected from previout studies (e.g. Posner, Goldsmith, and Welton, 
1967, Homa and Cultice 1984).
There were few signiflcant differences between learning performance in the four 
conditions, representing category learning with different amounts and kinds of feedback. 
Learning with either category labelling or vrith error flagging alone was not significantly 
different from learning with no feedback at all. In this respect, the results of the current 
experiment are in accord with the previous studies. Fried and Holyoak (1984) in particular, 
which found little evidence for the importance o f  feedback in some category learning tasks.
The present study found no evidence of an interaction between uuk difficulty and the 
importance of feedback, as was reported by Hoitui and Cultice (1984). Although sorting 
performance deteriorated as the amount o f  distortion introduced into exemplars was 
increased, this was not accompanied by any widening of the gap between performance with 
and without feedback (and/or category labels) supplied. It is possibie that if task difflcuity 
hud been varied beyond the parameters used here, such an interaction between difficulty and 
the importance of feedback would have emerged, but the present study implies tha( task 
difficulty and feedback do not automatically inttract.
The basic premise of the current snidy, however, did receive support from the outcome of 
the experiment. Subjects receiving a combination of category labelling plus error flagging 
feedback learned significantly more effectively than subjects receiving error flagging 
feedback only. This difference was also echoed in the confidence ratings given by subjects 
when learning under these two conditions - subjects were more confident when category 
labelling was supplied in addition to simple error flagging. This finding supports the main 
hypothesis embodied in the experiment - that different forma of feedback may have not have 
equivalent effects on the category learning process. Consequently, the experimem shows 
that in attempting the investigation of the role o f feedback in category learning, it it  indeed 
important to specify exactly what information is supplied to the subject as feedback.
Looking at Figure 5.2, it appears that subjects in the no feedback condition 0  and the
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labelling condition VL perfonned the aortinf taak with very similar accuracy, at a level more 
or less in between the performance o f  subjects in conditions VLF and F. If the performance 
in conditions VL and 0  lepiesent a baseline, then ri^t>wiong feedback alone appears lo 
have a detrimental effect on category learning, while right-wrong feedback combined with 
category labdling appears to have a  beneficial effect on learning. Such an interpretation is 
only qieculation, however, since statistically, condition VLF was not significantly superior 
to 0  and VL. and condition F was not significantly inferior.
In order to see whether the interpretation just described is indeed a valid model, it would 
be necessary to conduct further experiments. One drawback with the procedure used in the 
present experiment was diat since the prototype sets were generated afresh and at random for 
each subject, inevitably a certain amount of noise will have enured the learning data through 
the inequalities o f ease-of-learning o f different prototype sets. For example, a set of 
prototypes where two of the three happen to look very similar, would be expected to 
produce exemplars that would be harder to learn to sort correctly than three prototypes which 
were more mutually distinctive.
W ith a large enough pool o f subjects, such noise in the learning data would not 
necessarily obscure real differences between learning performance in the different 
conditions, if the differences are sufficiently large. Rather than increasing the size of the 
sample o f  course, another alternative to make the procedure more sensitive to diffnences 
between learning in the four conditions would be to use each prototype set for each condition 
an equal number times, following a latín square (as was used in the present experiment to 
counterbalance for oixler effects). It is only with the advent of fast microcomputer^ that 
generating distortions in real-time (i.e. in the in^-tria l interval) during the experiment has 
been a possible strategy, enabling new prototypes to be used for each subject with little 
additional work for the experimenter. Previous research with distorted shapes or matrix 
patterns has tended to use the same set of prototypes for every subject, which reduces 
random noise but of course increases the chance that any experimental effects may be 
artifacts o f  the particular set of stimuli employed. In the interests o f  reducing random noise, 
however, a slight increase in the danger o f aitifactual differences between conditions may be 
justified and advisable.
The results of the present experiment suggest that further investigation, using a more 
sensitive procedure, of the effect o f  different kinds o f feedback during category learning 
would be justifíed and would be potentially of some theoretical importance to the study of 




The of verbel labels in learning protocypically structured categories.
Summary
Four experimentt are reported in this chapter which extend the earlier comparison of the 
provision of vert«l and non-verbal labels in arbitrary c<41ection learning to the learning of 
protocypically structured categories. In the first experiment, verbal and non-verbal labels 
were used to label schema-based, polygon categories while subjects performed a category 
sorting task. There was no significant difference between subjects* learning performance 
widi the two types o f label. In the second experiment, a carefully contnrfled comparison 
was made of schema and arbitrary collection learning in the sorting task with the two types 
of label. A slight verbal label advantage was found, equally for the two types o f  category. 
Consequently, the negative finding of the first experiment was not attributed to its use of 
prototypically structured categories. Subjects’ reported invention of verbal names for the 
non-verbal labels was, in the arintrary collection learning task, related to their soning 
performance in Experiment 3b. as had been observed in Experiment 3e.
It is suggested that the sorting task may suppress the verbal label advanuge by 
encouraging subjects to use verbal labels in all conditions. An objection to the use of a 
matehing task instead with the prototype-based categories is raised - that category matching 
does not necessitate category learning in these circumstances. In Experiment Sc, subjects* 
acquisition of knowledge of prototype-based categories during the performance o f a sorting 
task and a matching task is compared, and no significant difference is found. In the final 
experiment in this chapter, subjects performed a matching task with new protocypically 
structured categories, labelled with verbal and non-verbal labels. Category matching 
performance was similar with both types of label, and exceeded matching performance 
where no labels were provided. Nevertheless, the absence of a clear learning effect implied 
subjects were not reljdng on category learning lo perform the category matching task.
Introduction
In this chapter, the comparison o f category learning with verbal and non-verbal cttegory
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labels which was undertaken in Chapter 4  with arbitrary collectiont is extended to the 
learning of prototypically structured categories.
Although still highly artificial, prototypically structured categories such as the distorted 
pcrfygon stiniuli used in Chapters 3 and S are probably a closer approximation to most real- 
w orld categories than are arbitrary collections. Like real-world categories, artíñcial, 
prototypically structured categories have a mixture of central, highly typical exemplars, and 
less central, less typical exemfrfars, and high within-caiegory similarity relative to between- 
category similarity.
It is  desirable therrfore to extend the conqtarison of category learning imder conditions 
where verbal and non-verbal labels are provided from the domain of arbitrary ccrflection 
learning to the s li^ tly  less artificial domain o f learning fnocotypically structured categories.
It is  anticipated, however, that any attempted comparison of the effects o f the provision 
of different kinds of category label in this new domain will be problematic. Whereas 
category labels are a vital source, in the absence of other feedback, of category membership 
information in arbitrary collection learning (Chapter 4), the contribution o f category labels to 
schema learning appears to be much less important. In the experiment reported in Chapter 5, 
subfects were no better at learning to sort the distorted polygon exemplars into categories 
when the exemplars were labelled (condition VL) than when the task consisted of hec 
sorting into a specified number of categories (condition 0).
Thus there are grounds for expecting that the verbal label advantage observed in Qu^Xer 
4 for learning sibitraiy collections would not persist in a task of learning procotypically 
structured categories such as that performed in Chapter 5. Where categories have simi(|uity- 
based coherence, the fMOvision of category labels for exemplars during learning (or ocher 
feedback) may be of little importance (but is not necessarily so, as Homa and Cultice, 1984, 
have demonstrated). Where this is the case, it would be surprising if the medium through 
which category membership information is conveyed would affect learning.
T he first experiment lo be reported in this chapter attempts to investigate whedwr the 
verbal label advantage found in Qu^xer 4 with arbitrary collections does indeed persist when 
the categories to be learned are procotypically structured. The stimuli employed are distorted 
pcrfy^Nis as used in Chapters 3 and 5, and the verbal and non-verbal label sets used in 
Chiqxer 4. If the verbal label advantage does generalise u> the prototype-based categories, 
learning would be predicted to be better when exemplars generated from the prototypes are 
labelled using the non-words than when they are labelled with the black and white, pattern- 
segment labels. However, for the reasons outliited above - the apparent unimportance of
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labdUng per le  in the prototype bated category learning task • the likelihood o f  obtaining 
such a verbal label advantage in the present experiment seems low.
Experiment 5a
In this experiment subjects performed a schema learning task under two conditions. In 
one condition, the categories of sh^ie were labelled with verbal, non-word labels, and in the 
other condition the labels  supplied were non-verbal, abstract patterns. Since label 
discrinnnability has been shown to be related to category learning performance (Chapter 4), 
a control for label discriminability was introduced. Two groups of subjects performed this 
experiment. For one group of subjects, the verbal labels were more discriminaMe than the 




The subjects were 24 undergraduate students, who participated in the experiment to 
satisfy a requirement o f their introductory psychology course.
Apparatus
An Acorn Archimedes 310 microcomputer was used to create the stimuli and present 
them on a high resolution cedour monitor.
Stimuli
The stimuli were 12 pointed polygons, created as described in Chapter 3. The amount of 
distortion introduced into the exemplars generated from the prototypes was the same as used 
for Group C in Experiment 4, a displacement o f  each point by up to 1.6 mm. Four new sets 
of three prototypes were created for each subject.
The verbal labels used by all subjects were drawn from the pool of 27 pronounceable 
non-words used in earlier experiments and presented in Appendix 3b.
The non-verbal labels used in this experiment were drawn from two sets. The non-veibal 
labels used by Group A in the current experiment were drawn from the pool of 27 black and 
white abstract patterns used in Experiment 3a-d in Chapter 4, which are presented in 
Appendix 4b. The non-verbal labels used by Group B were drawn from the multiccrfoured
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•et uwd in Expeiiment 3c, pmemed in Appendix Ad.
The two acts of non-veihel labeii differed in their leiative diiCTuninxbility ootnpered with 
the veihel labeii. The Mack and white non-verbal labeli uied by Oroup A were significandy 
harder to  distinguish one from an o th e r than were the verbal labels, w hereas the 
multiooloured non-verbal labels used by Otoup B were significantly easier to discriniinate 
than the vetbal labels (see Chapter 4, Experim enu 3<Wb for details).
Design
Twelve subjects were allocated to each o f Otoupa A and B. The ptocedure for each of 
the two groups was identical, except for the use of a different set of non-verbal labels for 
each group. The design of the experiment was within subjects, attempting to see whether 
there was any difference in sotting perfonnance with verbal and non-verbal labels in each 
group separately.
Procedure
Each subject performed a series o f four sorting tasks with exemplars drawn foom three 
categories in each task. On each trial, a  polygon exemplar was presented and the subject’s 
task was to sort it by indicating one o f three response boxes. After the exemplar had been 
sorted, the s u l ^  was shown the category label for the category the exemplar had been 
drawn from. This procedure was repeated fo r 36 trials, after which the subject was asked to 
indicate which response box he had chosen to  use for each category.
In two of the tasks, vetbal category labels, non-words, were applied to the categories, 
and in the other two asks  the category labels were non-verbal, abstract patterns. Two 
groups of subjects were run, the rally difference between the procedure for the two groups 
o f subjects being the set of non-vetbal labels they used, as described in the Stimuli section 
above.
The subjects were introduced to the a s k  as  a problem of learning to tell apart the leaves of 
invented species of uees on hypothetical planea. The foil instrucdois which subjeca read 
on the computer monitor are given in Appendix 6a. The subjeca svere told that they would 
visit four planets, and on each planet they would see leaves ftom three new species of tree. 
On each trial they would be shown one leaf, and their task svas to indicaa which o f three 
collecting boxes they srould put it into.
After doing this, they would be told the name used for that species o f  nee by the 
inhabitana of that planet: on two planets the names would be unusual but ptoncxinoeable
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wort», and on two planets the names would take the form o f  abstract patterns. Subjects 
were told n> try to be as consistent as possible in using each o f  the three boxes for only one 
species of leaf on the planet, so that, as far as possible, at the end of the 36 trials all the 
leaves of one specws would be in the top box, the leaves of a  second species would be in the
middle box, and the leaves of the remaining species would be in  the lower box.
After they had been shown 36 leaves on a planet, i.e. after completing the 36 trials which 
made up a condition, subjecU were asked to indicate which box they had used for each of 
the three species. In order to do this, subjectt were shown the three prototype shapes, and 
were asked which collecting box they would have chosen for CK h of these. The sutgects 
were allowed to repeat this allocation of prototypes (described as “a leaf with all o f the 
characteristics typical of its species”) to boxes until they were happy with their choices.
The 36 trials in each condition (or planet) were split into throe blocks. Within each block 
of 12 trials, four exemplars were drawn from each of the three categories. The order in 
which the exemplars were presented within each block was randomised.
Subjects supplied a confidence rating for their choice of response box on every trial using 
the standard confidence scale employed in previous chapters; the length of time they look to 
choose a box was also recorded.
Chi each trial, the exemplar was presented in a middle-left position on the monitor screen 
for 1.3 seconds before the three response boxes appeared along the right hand edge o f the 
screen. When a response box had been selected, the verbal or non-verbal category label was 
shown alongside the exemplar for 3.0 seconds, before the screen was cleared ready for the 
next trial. The interval between trials was 2.3 seconds. After every 12 trials the subjects 
were given a written message on the screen informing them how many of the 36 trials in that 
condition they had so far completed. Between conditions, subjects were allowed to pause 
for as long as they liked.
Before embarking on the experiment, subjects performed a practice task involving 36 
trials of attempting to sort polygon shapes generated from th ree  prototypes into three 
categories. In this practice task, the response boxes were labelled "A”, “B” and “C”, and 
feedback was given for the correctness of each choice v ia  “ tick" and "cross” and 
smilingArowning face icons displayed on the computer screen.
The four experimental conditions were ordered according to an  ABBA design, with the 





Sorting performance for the two groups of subjects is shown in Figures 6 .1 and 6.2. In 
each figure, performance is shown for the four runs separately in the upper graph, w ith the 
averages for each of the two labelling conditions in the lower graph.
The sorting dau  were analysed for each group separately using a three way analysis of 
variance, with three within subjects factors (condition, run. and Mock).
Figure 6.1. Sorting performance of Oroup A. In the upper graph, the mean number of correct sortings 
per block are shown for each of the two runs la each condition. In the lower graph, the  mean 
performance across the two runs is shown for each condition. Abbreviations: vll •  first conditioo with 
vcfbal labels: vl2 ■ second condition with verbal labels: nvil « first condition with non-verbal labels: 
nvl2 -  second condition with non-verbal labels: vl •  average of both verbal label conditions: nvl •  
average of both non-verbal label conditions.
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Fiíure 6.2. Sorting performance of Group B - mean correct sortings for each run ( u ^  
mwns for the two conditions (lower graph). Abbreviations: 1^1 - f irs t  c ^ u ^ i t h  vertml ! i ^  
vl2 » second condition with verbal tobéis; nvll -  first condition with non-verbal labels: nvl2 * 
condition with non-verbal labels; vl -  average of both verbal label conditions; nvl -  average of both 
non-verbal label conditions.
For Group A, the m«in effect of block was signiflcant (F-10.20, 2,22 df, p^.O O l), but 
no other trudn effects or interncdons were. For Group B, the mein effect of block w«s not 
significant (F-0.36, 2.22 df). and nor were the other main effects, nor any interactions 
between factors. Although there was no effect o f block for Group B, their sorting 
perfotmance was nonetheless significantly above the chance level of four com et responses 
in 12 (t-12.13, 71 df, p<0.0001 for NVL. t-10.24, 71 df, p<fl.0001 for VL).
Confidence Ratings
Figures 6.3 and 6.4 show the mean confidence ratingt on each block for subjeett in the
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two groups. The <3 B analysed using a three way ANOVA as for the sorting data.
Figure 6.3. Mean confidence ratings for Group A for each run (upper graph) and averaged across the 
two runs in each condition (lower graph). Abbreviations: vll > first condition with verbal labels; vl2 
« second condition with verbal labels: nvil •  first condition with non-verbal labels; nvl2 ■ second 
condition with non-verbal labels; vl •  average of both verbal label conditions; nvi « average of both 
non-verbal label conditions.
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Figure 6.4. Mean conAdence ratings for Group B. mean ratings for each of four runs (upper grapfi) and 
for the two Mailing conditions (lower graph). Abbreviations; vll •  first condition with verbal labels: 
vl2 > second condition with verbal labels; nvil « first condition with non-verbal labels: nvl2 > second 
condition with non-verbal l i^ ls ;  vl * average of both verbal label conditions: nvi « average of both 
non-verbal label conditions.
For Group A. the only significant effect was the main effect of block (F-13.52. 2.22 df. 
p<0.001), likewise for Group B (F*I2.95, 2.22 df, p<0.001).
Decision Times
Average decision times for each Nock for the two groups of subjects are shown in 
Figures 6.5 and 6.6. The d au  were analysed in a similar manner to the sorting dau.
Chapttre
block
Figure 6.S. Mean decision times for Group A. ptooed for each run (upper graph) and each oo9dition 
(lower g r ^ ) .  Abbreviations: vll > Tirst condition with verbal labels; vl2 -  second condition with 
verbal labels; nvll -  Tirst condition with non-verbal labels; nvl2 -  second condition with non-verbal 
labels; vl ■ average of both vertwl label conditions; nvi ■ average of both non-verbal label conditions.
Chapttre
block
Fiftire 6.6. Decision times for Group B in each run (upper graph) aiKl each condition (lower graph). 
Abbreviations; vll ■ first condition with verbal labels; vl2 ■ second condition with verbal labels; nvil 
■ first condition with non-verbal labels; nvl2 ■ second condition with non-verbal labels: vl •  average 
of both verbal label conditions; nvl « average of both non-verbal label conditiofu.
The ANOVA for Group A yielded significant main effects of nin (F«19.53, 1,11 df, 
p ^ .(X )l)  and block (F>7.04, 2,22 df, p«0.(X)4). For Group B, again the main effects of 
run (F -7.47. 1,11 df. p-0.019) and block (F-8.03, 2,22 df. p»0.002) were significant. 
No ocher main effects or interactions were signiflcant for the two groups.
Confidence Accuracy
The confidence accuracy scores for the two groups are shown in Figures 6.7 and 6.8. 
Fdr each group, the data were analysed using a two way analysis of variance with two 
within subjects factors, run and condition. For neither of the two groups were main effects 
of run o r condition significant, and nor were the interaction terms.
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o f  nin or condidon significant, and nor were the imeraction terms.
Figure 6.7. ConrtdBnce*accticacy tcoces for Group A. Abbreviations: vll > Hrsi condition with verbal 
labels; vl2 ■ second condition with verbal labels; nvll m first condition with non-verbal labels: nvl2 •  
second condition with non-verbal labels; vl « average of both verbal label conditions; nvl ■ average of 
both non-verbal label conditions.
Figure 6.8. Confidence-accuracy scores for Group B. Abbreviations as above.
Comparisons spanning the two groups
For neither group was there a si^ificant difference between sorting performance with 
verbal labels and sorting performance with non-verbal labels. Although the difference was 
not significant, Ckoup A 's performance with vertNU labels was better than their performance 
with the (less discrim inable) non-verbal labels. For Group B, where the relative 
discriminability of the label sets was the other way round, the relative performance on the 
two types of label also followed the o|^x>site trend tt> that observed with Group A. sorting 
performance with the non-verbal labels slightly, but not significantly, exceeding sorting
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pCTfbrmance with the verbal labels.
In order to lest whether the difference in performance with the two types of label differed 
significantly between the two groups, difference scores (VL-NVL) were calculated for each 
subject on each block, averaging across the two runs in each condition.
The relative performance on verbal and non-verbal labels did not differ significantly 
between the two groups by an independent samples t  test (t«1.47,70 df, p ^ . l 4 ) .
For confidence ratings, decision times and confidence accuracy, die difference between 
performance on verbal labels and non-verbal labels was in the same direction for each group 
o f  subjects.
Pooling the d a u  from both groups of subjects, confidence with verbal labels 
significandy exceeded cooHdence ratings with non-verbal labels (t*2.35, 71 df, p ^ .0 2 2 )  
by a  cone Is ted samples ttst. Using a similar procedure, overall decision times with verbal 
labels were not quite significantly faster than with non-verbal labels (t-1 .94, 71 df, 
p-0.057). For confidence accuracy scores, there was no significant difference between 
verbal and non-verbal label conditions, pooling dati from both groups.
Discussion
As predicted from the results of the investigation of the imponance of labelling and 
feedback in the schema learning task (Chapter 5), subjects in the present experiment learned 
the distorted polygon categories equally well regardless of the type of category label supplied 
for exemplars.
The sorting performance of (jroup B did not show a significant effect of block, i.e. 
learning, although they did show clear effects of Mock on their confidence ratings and 
decision time. This cautions against putting too much w e i^ t on the results obtained with 
this group of subjects, or any comparisons between labelling conditions which pool data 
from both groups.
With this caution in mind, it is worth noting that although there were no significant 
effecu of label type apparent in the performance o f the two groups considered separately, 
when the pooled data were examined some evidence of a labelling effect came to light 
Pooled sorting scores showed no effect of label type, but pooled confidence ratings showed 
a significant effect o f label type, while pooled decision times showed a marginally significant 
effect of label type.
In sum, the data of primary interest (sorting scores), and the dau  which contained clear
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evidence that cattgory learning was taking place (Group A only), conformed to the 
expectation that schema learning would be unafTecied by label type. Neverdieless, there was 
a  hint that performance on the learning task was affected by the use of verbal or non-verbal 
labels, since confidence ratings and decision times appeared to favour the verbal label 
conditions.
Experiment 5b
The previous experiment provided somewhat equivocal support for the view that in tasks 
where subjects are required lo leam prototypically structured categories, such as the schema 
learning task investigated in Chapter S, didactic labelling is of little importance, and 
consequently the medium through which labelling is given will not affect learning 
performance.
The aim of Experiment 5b is to provide a more definitive lest o f this interpretation of the 
relative importance of labelling, and consequently the medium used for labelling, in the 
learning of prototype-baaed and arbitrary ctrflection based categories.
The design of the experiment attempts to compare schema and arbitrary collection 
learning under near identical conditions. The task employed for both types o f category is a 
sorting task similar tt> that used in Experiment 5a. To conplement the distorted polygon 
stimuli used for the schema-based categories, arbitrary collections were also created using 
sets 12 pointed polygon shapes grouped at random into subsets.
In an effort to reduce random variability in subjects* learning performance caused by 
differences in the “leamability” of diffierent sets of polygon prototypes, steps were taken in 
this experiment to equate the schema sets for ease of learning (based on data from previous 
experiments) and to counterbalance the use of particular schema sets and arbitrary ctrflections 
with the verbal and non-verbal labels between pairs of subjects.
The experiment also includes the procedure previously used in Experiment 5e, of asking 
subjects to report their use of verbal names for the non-verbal labels. This will enable a 
comparison to be made o f  the relative effect on procotype-based and arbitrary collection 
based category learning (reported) naming of the non-vertMtl labels.
Rather than the null result anticipated and found in Experiment 5a, in the present 
experiment it is hypothesised that if the provision verbal as opposed to non-verbal 
category labels affects only aititrary collection learning, there will be a significant interaction 




Twenty-four undergraduate students participated as subjects in the experiment in order lo 
satisfy a requirement of their introductory psycholosy course.
Apparatus
An Acorn Archimedes 310 nucrocomputcr was used tocontix^ the experiment, presenting 
instructions and stim uli on a high resolution colour monitor.
Stimuli
Prototype-based categories.
The stimuli w ere 12 pointed polygons, as described in Chapter 3. Exemplars were 
generated from the category prototypes by displacing the position of the 12 points in a 
random direction by  a  random distance of up to 1.6 mm.
Eight sets <3f three prototypes were used in the experiment These sets prototypes 
were selected from those used by Group C in Experiment 4 (Chapter 5), with the aim of 
obtaining sets w hich were to some extent equated for leamability. This was done as 
follows: from the 12 different sets of patterns used in condition F by the 12 subjects in 
Group C of Experiment 4, and the 12 sets learned in condition 0, the three sets in each 
condition on which subjects scored least well were dropped as were the three sets on which 
the subjects scored b est This left six sets from each of two conditions, a total of 12 sets of 
inorotypes. Eight o f  these sets were employed in the current experiment
Arbitrary ccrflections or “exemplar-based categories”
The stimuli used for the exemplar-based categories were a set of 24 twelve-pointed 
polygons. These polygons were created using the same general method as was used to 
create the 12 pointed shapes used as category prototypes, as described in Chapter 3. This 
involved starting w ith 12 points equally spaced around the perimeter of a square, then 
nnoving each point in  a random direction a random distance up to a predetermined limit, the 
maximum distance in  this case being 10 mm. The twelve points were then jcnned by lines to 
form a closed figure.
The 24 shapes used in the experiment are shown in Appendix 6b. The exemplar-baaed 
categories were created by randomly dividing the 24 shapes into six subsets o f four.
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For e«ch subject, six v erbal labels were selected at random  from a pool o f 27 
pronounceaMe non-words (as u sed  in Experiment Sa and listed in Appendix 3b). The six 
non-verbal labels seen by each subject were selected at random from the set of 27 coti^>lex, 
abstract Mack and white patterns (as used in by Group A in Experiment Sa and shown in 
Appendix 4b).
Stimuli used in the practice task.
Two sets of three (Mototypes and a further set of 24 exemplars w ere used in the practice 
task. These materials were all constructed in the same way, using the same parameters, as 
the experimental stimuli described above (although the sets of prototypes were not drawn 
from those used in the previous experiment). The non-verbal labels used in the practice task 
were drawn frixn the set 27  coloured, abstract patterns shown in Appendix 4d. The 
verbal labels used in the practice task were the pronounceable non-words Orod, Wetup, 
Vixop, Yupest, Zoddler, Sozz.
Design
The experiment employed a  wholly within subjects design. Each subject performed a 
free sorting task under four conditions, the order in which the conditions were presented 
following a latin square.
In order to counterbalance between conditions the particular category stimuli to be 
learned, subjects were paired. Within a pair o f subjects, the same two sets of prototypes 
were used, the same division o f  the  24 exemplars into six arbitrary collections was used, and 
the order in which the conditions were performed was the same. Within each type of 
category, however, allocation o f  category stimuli to type of label was reversed for one 
subject in the pair.
This counterbalancing o f sets of stimuli between pairs of subjects is complicated to 
explain, but should be clear from  the following example. Let us consider one pair 
subjects. If the sets of prototypes they learned are called set A and set B, one subject in the 
pair was given verbal labels w ith  set A and non-verbal labels with set B, whereas die ocher 
subject in the |Mir was given non-verbal labels widi set A and verbal labels with set B. 
Likewise, if the arbitrary collections they learned are called collections 1-3 and cMlections 4- 
6, one subject in the pair was given verbal labels widi collections 1 -3 and non-verbal labels 
with collections 4-6, while the ocher subject in the pair learned collections 1-3 with non-
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verbftl labels and sets 4-6 with verbal labels.
Procedure
Subjects performed a task which involved sorting shapes into tivee categories. They 
performed this task in four conditions. The condìtk>m diffiered in the type of category to  be 
learned - prototypkally structured categories o r  arbitrary cdlecttons, and in the type o f  
category label that was supplied • verbal category labels or non-verbal category labels.
The four conditions were as fellows: condition PROTO-V, in which subjects learned 
prototypically structured categories with verbal labels; PROTO-NV in which subjects 
learned prototypically structured categories with iKm-veibal labels; EXEM-V in which the 
categories were arbitrary ccrfkctions exemplars and verbal category labels were supfrfied; 
EXEM-NV in which subjects learned arbitrary collections of exemplars supplied with non­
verbal labels.
Subjects were given written instructions on the  computer screen which explained that 
they were to play the role of a naturalist travelling in  space. They were told that they would 
visit four planets, and that on each planet three species of tree grew. Their task would be to  
learn to identify the species membership of the leaves on each planet.
It was explained in the instructions that there were two kinds o f planet: on one kind o f 
planet, leaves belonging to the same q>ecies varied in  shape to some extent but had a tyincal 
shape in common; on the other kind of planet, each  of the three species o i tree grew four 
different shapes of leaf, but these leaves grew strictly into these shapes and did not vary 
apart from that Subjects were also told that on tw o  o f the planets they would be told which 
species the leaves belonged to by being told the nam e of the species, and on the other two 
planets they would be told which species each lea f belonged to by being shown a small, 
square pattern which was a picture of the species* DNA. The full text of the instructions is 
contained in Appendix 6c.
In conditions PROTO-V and PROTO-NV the exemplars of each category (i.e. leaves 
belonging to each species) shown to the subjects were distortions of the three category 
prototypes. In conditions EXEM-V and EXEM -NV. the exemplars of each category were 
subsets of the 24 exemplars which were randomly divided into six groups of four for each 
pair o f subjecu.
The procedure on each trial was as f<4k>ws: a  target leaf, drawn from one of the three 
q>ecies. was presented on the left erf the monitor screen, while three grey ‘^ collecting boxes** 
were shown along the right hand edge of the screen, one at the lop. one in the middle and
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one at the botioca Subjects were told that on each planet they should strive to put die three 
species of leaf into three separate collecting boxes, a lthou^ the choice o f  which box to use 
for each species was up to them. The subject *‘put” the target leaf into one of the collecting 
boxes by indicating which box they had chosen for it with the mouse.
After a collecting box was selected for the target leaf, subjects gave a confidence rating 
for their choice using the confidence scale employed in previous experiments.
Following the confidence rating, the subject was told which species the target leaf 
actually belonged to. According to the condition, this was accomplished by displaying 
alongside the target leaf either the appropriate verbal label or the non-verbal label C*DNA 
pattern^ corresponding lo that species.
In the prototype learning conditions, this was the end of the tria l. In the arbitrary 
collection learning conditions, an extra stage was included, in which three more labelled 
exemplars were displayed on the screen for five seconds, one from each category. This 
stage was added in order to balance the rate of learning for the two types of category • pilot 
experiments found that without it, the arbitrary collections look considerably more trials lo 
learn dian did the prototype categories. The labelled exemplars were always shown in the 
same sets o f three, the four sets so formed being pnesented in rotation on successive trials. 
The sets displayed were fixed, rather than being put together at random  on each trial, in 
order to ensure that each exemplar was presented an equal number tim es in each Mock.
In the prototype learning conditions, the target exemplar belonged to  each of the three 
categories an equal number of times within each block, the presentation order being random 
within this constraint. In the arbitrary collection learning conditions, each of the 12 
exemplars served as the target exemplar once in each block in a randomised sequence.
After the four blocks had been completed in a condition, subjects w ere asked to indicate 
which cMlecting box they had used for each of the three species. In the  prototype learning 
conditions, this was done by showing the subject the three category prototypes and asking 
them to move each one to the appropriate collecting box using the mouse. In the arbitrary 
collection learning conditions, the subject was shown the three groups o f four shapes 
making up each collection, and required to move each group to the appropriate cMlecdng 
box.
Between conditions, the subjecu were shown written instructions explaining which kind 
of category and which kind of label would be present on the next planet they visited.
Before beginning the experiment, subjects performed a practice task which was a 
shortened version of the experiment with only six trials in each condition (the label sets and
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stimuli used in the practice task were completely separate from those used the the actual 
experiment). The aim o f the practice task was to familiarise subjects with the rather 
com plicated experimental procedure. The subjects were presented with the w ritten  
instructions again before beginning the experiment
At the end of the experiment after the subjects had compleied all four conditions, they 
were asked, for each of the six non-verbal labels they had seen, whether they had made up 
any kind o f  verbal name for i t
Results
The sorting performance of the 24 subjects is depicted in Figure 6.9a, where means are 
INVsented for each block, and in Figure 6.9b, where only overall means for each condition 
are shown.'
For the purposes of statistical analysis, the scores of subjects who were paired in the 
experimental design were summed, yielding 12 sets o f scores for analysis from the 24 
subjects.
An analysis of variance was performed on the sorting data, with three within subjects 
factors (category type, label type, and block). The main effect of label type was significant 
(F-5.50, 1,11 df, p-0.039) as was the main effect of block (F-17.12, 3,33 df, p<0.001). 
There was no significant main effect of category type (F«1.91, 1,11 dO: as intended, the 
prototype and aiintrary collection learning tasks had proved to be. overall, more or less equal 
in difficulty. Nor was there a significant interaction between category type and label type 
(F ^ .IO , 1,11 df). Coupled with the significant main effect of label type, the absence o f 
this crucial interaction implied that learning had been b e t^  with verbal than widi non-verbal 
labels, both when subjects were learning prototype-based categories and when learning 
arbitrary collections.
No other two way interaction, nor the three way interaction, was significant. The effect 
of label type on sorting accm cy  was also tested for the |Mototype and arbitrary collection 
learning conditions separately, using linear contrasts. The effect of label type was not 
significant for either type o f  category considered in isolation (F«3.74, 1,11 d f, for 
prototypes. F»1.9, 1,11 df. for arbitrary collections [F crit. a*0.05 « 4.84)).
'  One subject was replaced because they indlcaied that they had used the same collectlag box  for 
more lhaa one ^ e c le s  oa several o f  the planeu. No other subject allocaied more than oae ^ e c le s  to  a 







F ifw e 6.9. Mean ccMTCct sortinf reqxmses by condition and bkKk (upper graph), and meant for each of 
the four conditions averaged across blocks (lower graph). Abbreviations: protos ■ prototype-based 
categories; exemplws •  exemplar-based categories or arbitrary collections.
The confldence rating data« depicted in Figure 6.10« was analysed using a similar three 
way ANOVA, yielding a similar pattern of results. As for the sorting scores, there were 
significant main effects of label type (F-11.12. 1.11 df. p ^ .0 0 7 )  and block (F-10.92. 












Mean decision times by condition and block.
A third analysis of variance was performed on the decision times, depicted in Figure 
6.11, o f the subjects in the four conditions. This analysis yielded a significant main effect of 
category type (F«21.I6, 1,11 df, p<0.001), reflecting the much shorter decision times in 
conditions inve^ving prototypically structured categories than when the categories consisted 
o f unrelated exemplars. The main effect of block was significant (F-8.56, 3,33 df. 
p<0.001) but there was no significant main effect of label type (F-0.15, 1,11 df, p-0.71). 
There were no signifleant interaction terms.
Subjects* spontaneous generation of verbal names for the non-verbal labels.
Each subject encountered six verbal labels and six non-verbal labels. At the end of the 
experiment each subject was asked, for each of the six non-verbal labels, whether they had
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experiment each subject was asked, for each of the m  non-verbal labels, whether they had 
invented a verbal name for i t  The number of non-verbal labels, from none to a maximum of 
six, which the subjects reported having verbally named is shown in Figure 6.12. The 
number of subjects who lepoited naming the non-verbal labels was similar in the exemplar 
learning and the prototype learning conditions, where 40 and 39 names for non-verbal labels 
were reported reflectively out of a maximum possible of 72 names in each case (24 subjects 
X 3 non-verbal labels per condition).
number of names reported
Figure 6.12. Distribution of the number of non-verbal l^wls. from a maximum of six, for which i 
were reported by the 24 subjects.
As can be seen from Figure 6.12, seven subjects reported having named none of the rKxi- 
verbal labels, and seven reported having named all six of the non-verbal labels.
An analysis was conducted to investigate the relationship between verbally naming the 
non-verbal labels and performance in the sorting task. Two sub-groups of subjects were 
formed • one group being subjects who reported having labelled none or only one o (  the 
non-verbal labels (group (VI, n>i9) and the other group being subjects who reported having 
labelled five or six o f  the non-veibal labels (group S/6, n«l 1).
The performance of the two groups was compared* in both conditions in which non­
verbal labels were supplied, conditions PROTO-NV and EXEM-NV. Each subject's 
performance was averaged over the four Uocks in each condition, giving a mean score per 
Mock. The mean scores for groups (VI and for the two conditions are depicted in Figive 
6.13.
'  This analysif, unlike those described above, does not benefit from the counterbalancing o( the 
allocalion o f  label type to stimuli.




P i g «  6.13. The loniiif perfoniMnce of Uie two <ub-group> on Ihe iwo conditions involving non-veitnl 
labels (n^ih sundard e m n ) .
A two way analysis of variance was performed on the data, with one within subjects 
factor (condition) and one between subjects factor (group, i.e. (VI or 5/6). The main effect 
of group just failed to reach significance (F-3.90, 1,18 df, p-0.064). The main effect of 
category type was non significant (F ^ .5 3 . 1,18 df, p-0.48), as was the group x category 
type interaction (F-0.48, 1,18 df, p^ .5 0 ).
Although the analysis of variance yielded no significant effects, since the difference in 
performance between the two groups with each type of category was of parocular interest, it 
was also tested using t tests. For prototype categories, the difference in performance 
between the two groups yielded a non significant t vaiue ( t^ .9 8 , 18 df, p-0.34). For 
exemplar based categories, the difference in performance between the two groups of subjects 
yielded a significant t value (t*2 .41 ,18 df, p .^.027).
Discussion
The experiment succeeded in presenting subjects with schema-based and arbitrary 
collection based learning tasks which were closely balanced for ease of learning - there was 
no significant difference in performance on the sotting task with the two types of category.
There was an effect of label type, and thU did not interact with category type. Subjects 
showed a verbal label advantage when learning both types of category. This outcome of the 
experiment suggests that the verbal label advantage repotted in Chapter 4 it  not specific to 
arbitrary collection learning, contrary to the expecution which motivated this and the
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previous experiment.
The verbal label advanuge was not, however, very strong. Tw o observations support 
this assertion. Firstly, it did not reach sutistical significance for sorting performance with 
either category type considered in isolation. Secondly, in the arbitrary collection learning 
experiments reported in Chapter 4, subjects* sorting performance with verbal labels, by the 
thiid block, was typically better than their sorting performance with non-verbal labels by 
between two and three correct choices in 12. In the arbitrary collection learning conditions 
in the present experiment, the verbal label advantage was approximately one more correct 
choice in 12. after four blocics. Verbal labels made less difference to arbitrary collection 
learning in the present experiment than in thcMe repotted in ChafKer 4.
Subjects’ reports of having invented verbal labels for the iK>n-verbal labels were 
examined in this experiment, as they had been in Experiment 3e in Chapter 4. As in the 
earlier experiment, subjects who (reported having) verbally labelled the non-verbal labels 
performed the sorting task better. This difference was significant only in the arbitrary 
collections learning task.
One other finding of interest to emerge from the present experiment concerns the 
difference in decision times for the schema learning and arbitrary collection learning usks. 
Decision times for the arbitrary ccrflecdons were considerably slower than for the prototype 
learning usk . This finding has some bearing on exemplar-based theories of category 
learning, and will be discussed at more length in Chapter 7.
Why was the effect of label type in the present experiment, significant as it was. 
apparently smaller than in the arbitrary collection learning experiments reported in Chapter 4? 
There are many procedural differences between the present experiment and those in the 
earlier chapter which could account for this difference. One difference is that subjects 
performed the learning task for four blocks of trials in the present experiment rather than 
three blocks as used earlier, but since the gap between the verbal and non-verbal label 
conditions did not narrow with successive blocks, the reduction in the size of the advantage 
conferred by verbal labels is unlikely to be attributable to this factor.
It seems possible that the reduction in the verbal label advanuge observed with the 
arbitrvy collections might be due to the change in the type of stimuli of which they were 
composed - the use of arbitrary collections of distorted polygons rather dian line drawings of 
known or unknown objects that were used in Chapter 4. Another possibility, out of a 
muMnide of others, is that the use of a sorting task in the present experiment, rather than the 
matching u sk  used in the earlier arbitrary collection learning experiments, might have
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atlenuated the verbal label advantage.
In the sorting task, a unique response is associated with each category during learning • 
in this case, putting the exemplars into one of die three response boxes on the screen. Any 
such discriminative response is inevitably, if  described verbally by the subject, a potential 
source of a  verbal category label (e.g. using **top", “middle”, “boCKim” to describe the 
boxes).
The suggestion that die sorting task might have been die cause of the attenuation of the 
verbal label advantage in Erqieriment Sb is entirely speculative. This speculation may be 
extended, however, to the possibility that the sorting task might have attenuated any labelling 
effects in Experiment Sa, or indeed that had some other task been employed in Experiment 4, 
the effects of labelling and feedback might have been other than they were.
The remaining experiments in this chapter consider the implications o f using a sorting 
task and alternative tasks in category learning experiments. Experiment 5c compares schema 
learning in a sorting and a matching task, attempting to check that a matching task is suitable 
as a measure of schema learning. Experiment Sd compares prototype learning with verbal 
and non-verbal labels using a matching task.
Experiment 5c
In a category matching task, on each trial the subject is presented with a target exemplar 
and an array of selection exemplars. The subject’s task is to choose a selection exenqilar 
which belongs to the same category as the target exenplar.
The category matching task is potentially very useful for experiments attempting to 
investigate the role of category labels in category learning. The subject is not required to 
label the exemplars, so the task can be performed without any category labels being 
introduced by the experimenter. The subject it also not required to sort the exemplars by 
category. Sorting necessarily introduces a  unique response for each category (e.g. lop box, 
middle box, bottom box in the sorting experiments repotted above) which may easily be 
verbalised by the subjea thus introducing veibal category labels. In the Discussion section 
of Experiment 5b above, it was suggested that the sorting task might have suppressed the 
verbal label advantage by increasing the use of veibal category labels in conditions where 
non-verbal category labels have been provided by the experimenter.
A category matching task was employed in the experiments with arbitrary coUectkms 
reported in Chapter 4, but not in the schema learning experimena reported earlier in this
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chapter. The category matching u sk  wa« avoided with the prototypically structured 
categories due to the possibility that performance on a matching u sk  with this type of 
category does not necessarily index category learning.
Unlike arbitrary collections, prototypically structured categories have high within 
category similarity. Members o f a prototypically structured category are usually more 
similar »  other members of the same category than they are to members of other categories. 
Categories can abut or even overlap in the feature spaoe so that a particular atypical member 
of category A might be more similar to a nearby exemplar of category B than to another 
category A exengtlar, but on average within category similarity will be higher than between 
oategory similarity.
This property of prototypically structured categories leads to the possibility that category 
matching performance might not reflect category learning in the sense of learning how many 
clusters there are in the feature space, and which cluster a particular exemplar is most likely 
to belong to. This is because the category matching task with protolypically structured 
categories could be performed solely on the basis of judging the similarity between the target 
exemplar and the selection exemplars, and choosing the selection exemplar which is most 
similar to the target exemplar.
The use o f  this snategy, which will be termed the “similarity heuristic”, to achieve better 
than chance matching performance may necessitate that the subject learns which dimensions 
should be used to judge similarity i.e. which dimensions are relevant to category 
membership. It does not necessiute that the subject learns how many categories the 
exemplars are divided into, nor which category the target and selection exemplars come 
from. The similarity judging heuristic could only lead to perfect performance where the 
categories are non overlapping and where the nearest neighbours from different categories 
are further from one another than they are from the closest same^rategory exemplar. ’. Even 
where these conditions ate not fuiniled, however, the similarity heuristic could lead to 
performance substantially above chance, without subjects learning to categorise the 
exemplars.
Mom studies in the category learning literature have used a labelling task, since they have 
been interested in aspects o f category learning other than the m ìe  o f category labels in the 
process, and labelling provides the most obvious and direct measure of ability to categorise. 
The category matching task has been employed with prototyincally structured categoriet.
* The heuristic would also fall to produce perfect performance w here the category structuie Is 
prototypical, bu t where there are identifiable exemplars which must be learned a t  exceptions • a hybrid 
of a  prototypical category and an arbitrary collection.
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however, by investigators who have not questioned the validity of the assumption that 
matching performance indexes categorising performance. Brown, Walker, and Evans 
(1968) used the category matching task in a study of the effectt of feedback on category 
learning, while Edmonds, Mueller, and Evans (1S166) used a similar ¡Mocedure, an odd one 
out task, where the similarity heuristic could be applied in reverse (choose the exemplar least 
like th e  ochen). Other studies (e.g. Smallwood and Amoult 1974) have used a same- 
different task, which could be performed uring some variant o f the similarity heuristic where 
the answ er “same” is given when the two target exemplars' similarity exceeds some learned 
threshold.
G iven the desirability o f  employing the category matching task in experiments where the 
influence of category labels is under examination, the present experiment atten^ts to assess 
the extent to which subfects* matching performance actually indexes their ability to categorise 
exemplars. To do this, two groups o f subjects, one having learned to match to criterion and 
the o ther having learned to  label to criterion, are conpared in their ability to recognise 
exemplars as belonging to the (mviously encountered categories, and to sort exemplars into 
categories. If subjects performing the matching u»k use the similarity heuristic rather than 
relying on learning to categorise in order to perfonn the task, it is predicted that they will be 
poorer at the subsequent old/new category task and the s it in g  task.
Method
Subjects
The subjects, 39 undergraduate students took part in the experiment in order to satisfy a 
requirement of their introductory psychology course.
Apparatus
A n Archimedes 310 microcomputer was used lo generate and present the stimuli on a 
colour computer monitor.
Stimuli
T he stimuli were 12 pointed polygons as used in earlier exponments in this chiqNer. 
Thirteen new sett of three prototypes were created u  described in Chapter 3. The exemplars 
seen by subjects were distortions of the prototype shapes, in which each point had been 
moved in a random direction by up to 1.2 mm. For the labelling group, a set of 27 
pronounceable non-words (listed in Appendix 3b) was used to provide verbal labels, and a
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pocrf of 27 colourful ab s tn c t patterns Oittod in Appendix 4d) was used lo provide non-verbal 
labels.
Design
The subjects were sp lit into three groups with 13 in each. There w oe two experimental 
groups, group Label and  group Match, and a  contn^ group. Each experimental group 
performed a different initial learning task, then two common test tasks. The control group 
performed only the two ^ t  tasks.
The experiment employed a between subjects design, with subjects in the duee groups 
matched for the prototypes used to generate the categories. Each set prototypes provided 
the categories to be learned for one subject from each group (matched subjects also saw 
exemplars from the same three distractor prototypes in the category recognition test).
Procedure
For all the s u b ^ ts , the experiment was introduced as an imaginary task in which they 
were naturalists travelling in space who were faced with the problem of trying to learn to 
recognise leaves from the  three species of tree which grow on the planet **Zipto.” The full 
text of the instructions read  by the subjects in the three groups is given in Appendix 6e.
Labelling task
This task was performed only by subjects in group Label. The task was similar to the 
sorting task used in earlier experiments in this chapter - on each trial the subject was 
(»esented with an exemplar and required to sort it into the correct response box for that 
category. The main change to the sorting procedure was that the response boxes (grey 
boxes as used in previous experiments) were labelled with category names, and the position 
o f  each box (top, middle, bottom) on the screen on each trial was raiKlomised.
The response bmtes each bore two labels - a verbal label which the subjects were told 
was the name of the leaf ^lecies which should be put into that box, and a non-verbal label 
which was described as a  picture of the DNA o f the q>ecies erf leaf which should be put iiMo 
that box. Whenever the response boxes were displayed on the monitor screen, a verbal and 
a iKm-veibal label appropriate lo one species were displayed adjacent so each box. At the 
beginning of the experiment a verbal label was selected at random from the pool of 27 for 
each of the three categories, and a non-verbal label was similariy allocated to each category.
On each trial the target exemplar was displayed for 1.5 seconds before the response
Chapter d
boxes also appeared on the screen. A fter subjects had chosen a box, and given a  confidence 
rating for this choice (confidence rating data was not analysed), they were given feedback 
for diree seconds. In the feedback stage of the trial, the re^Kxise boxes were erased but the 
exemplar remained on die screen. To the  right of the exemplar, its category labels (verbal 
and non-verbal) were displayed. To the left o f die exemplar were shown a tick icon and a 
smiling face icon (if the subject had responded oorrecdy) or a croas icon and a frowning face 
icon (if the response was incorrect).
Trials were arranged in Mocks of 12, although the boundaries between Mocks were not 
drawn to the attention of the subject Within each Mock, die target exemplar was drawn 
from each of the three categories an equal number of times, with the order of presentation 
within blocks randomised.
Subjects were instructed that they w ould move on to the next stage of the experiment after 
they had identified the leaves correctly  on ten consecutive trials. Between trials, a 
thermometer-like scale was displayed on  the screen showing the number o f consecutive 
correct trials the subject had currently scored, their best score so far, and the number of 
consecutive correct choices they were required to achieve. Subjects pressed a  mouse button 
when ready to terminate this display artd move on to the next trial. Every 20 trials, the 
display also informed the subject how many trials they had completed so far. Subjects were 
instructed at the beginning of the experiment that the maximum number o f sorting trials 
allowed was 108.
Matching task
This task was performed only by subjects in group Match. As with the labelling task, 
subjects were required to reach a criterion of ten consecutive correct responses within a 
maximum of 108 trials.
The procedure for the matching task w as as follows: on each trial, a target exem|rfar was 
shown on the left hand side of the m onitor screen for 1.3 seconds then erased. Three 
selection exemplars were the displayed along the right hand side o f the screen, one from 
each of the three categories. The position of the three selection exemfriars, top, middle, or 
bottom, on the screen was randomised on  each trial. Next to each selection exemplar was a 
grey response box. Subjects were required to choose the box which was next to  an 
exemplar belonging to the same category as the target exemplar.
When the subject had chosen a selection exen^ar (and given a confidence rating for this 
choice), feedback w u  presented for three seconds. During the feedback stage of the trial,
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the selection exemplars remained on the screen. A tick icon was shown next to the correct 
selection exemplar, and a cross icon next to the o ther two. A smiling face icon was 
di^layed in the top right of the screen if the subject had chosen correctly; if the subject had 
chosen incorrectly, a frowning face icon was displayed.
Between trials, the display showing the number o f  consecutive correct c h c ^ s  was 
shown, as for the subjects who performed the labelling task.
Control group
The control group performed neither the labelling task nor the matching task. Before the 
c a lo r y  recognition test and the sorting test which were performed by ail subjects, subjects 
in the control group were shown one exemplar from each o f the three categories which their 
paired subjects in the two experimental groups had learned to label or match. The control 
group subjects were told that these three exemplars w ere leaves from each of the three 
species of tree which grow on the imaginary planet Zipto. The three exemplars were not 
labelled in any other way. The control group subjects could inspect the three exemplars for 
as long as they wished, before pressing a mouse button to  indicaw that they were ready to 
move on to the next stage of the experiment.
Category recognition test
In this task, subjects were presented with 36 exemplars which consisted of six from each 
of the three already encountered categories, plus six from each o f  three new categories. The 
exemplars were presented in a random order, the subject’s task being to decide, for each 
exemplar, whether it came from an old category (’’leaves from planet Zipto”) or a new 
category (“three new species from another nearby planet, Zog”).
On each of the 36 trials, an exemplar was presented on the monitor screen above two 
re^xmse boxes, one labelled “old” and the other labelled ’’new”. The exemplar remained on 
the screen until the subject chose a response box using the mouse pointer. The subject then 
supfriied a confidence rating for this chcMce (dtis data was not analysed), whereupon the 
screen cleared and the next trial began immediately.
Sorting test
TWs task was similar to the labelling task described above, except that the subject’s task 
was to lewn to choose a particular response box (top. middle, or bottom) for each category. 
Peetttwck was given for three seconds after a response box had been selected on each trial.
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The feedback consisted of a tick icon and a smiling face if the dKHce was correct  ^or a cross 
icon and a ftt>wning face if the choice was incorrect. The criterion that subjects were 
instructed to attempt lo meet was, as with the labelling and matching tasks, ten consecutive 
correct responses within a maximwn of 108 trials.
Questions asking subjects to report the use of verbal labels.
Subjects in dte two experimental groups were asked, after they had completed the initial 
learning task, **Did you use any names for the three leaf species?*’. The term  ’’name” was 
defined for the subjects as ”a word or a few words which you used fairly consistently to 
refte to the species when you thought about them”.
Subjects were presented with three blank lines, and told to type any nam es used for the 
three species on  the three Mank lines, or if no names were used, to type “none”  on each line.
At the end o f  the experiment, i.e. after the completion of the sorting task, subjects were 
shown their answers to the naming question, and to explain why they had chosen or 
invented each nam e (or to type “none” again if their original answer was “none”). Subjects 
in group Label were told to type “Ziptonian name” if a name they had used was one of the 
ones supplied in the labelling task.
Results
The number o f  trials taken to criterion in the labelling and matching tasks, along with the 
scores for the three groups of subjects* on the category recognition and sorting tests, are 
depicted in Figure 6.14.
* One M bject ta  the labelling group failed to reach the crlierian within lOg trials. T h is  subject and 
the sec o f prototypes involved were elimlnaied and replaced.
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F ifiue  6.14. Mean trials to criierion for the two experimental gfoups’ initial teaming, with recognition 
test performance and trials to  criierion on the sorting test for all three groups (standard errors o f means 
shown by bars).
Scores were compared using correlated sample t tests. For the initial learning tasks, 
group Label toc^ significantly more trials to reach the criterion than did group Match 
(t«4.32, 12 df, paO.OOl). There was no significant difference, however, in the two 
experimental groups’ scores on the category recognition test (t«0.38, 12 df, p ^ .7 1 ) aiKl on 
the sorting test ( t^ .8 6 , 12 df, p*0.40).
The conotri group’s performance on the category recognition test was lower than that of 
group Label ( t^ .5 4 , 12 df, p ^ .(X )l) and of group Match (t*6.0, 12 df, p<0.001). The 
contrcrf group’s performance was not quite significantly above the level of 18 correct trials 
from 36 which would be expected by chance alone (t«2.14, 12 df. p^.0S4).
For the sorting test, the control group’s performance was significandy lower than that of 
group Label (t«2.20, 12 df. p ^ .0 4 8 ) , but the difference between group Match and the 
control group was not significant (ta l.17 , 12 df, p ^ .2 7 ).
There was tK> apparent association between the number of trials taken by subjects to reach 
the criierion on the label learning task and the number of trials to criterion required by the 
subjects paired with them on the matching task. The Pearson correlation coefBcient for the 
two sett of scores was 0.1, equivalent to a t (11 df) of 0.34, p«0.74.
Confidence ratings
Confidence rating data was collected in all three stages of the experiment, but analysed 
only for the lecognition test The mean confidence ratings for subjects in the three groups 
were similar, the means being 65.0 (id  20.5), 70.7 (sd 10.8), and 64.8 (sd 13.2) for the
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labelling, matching, and control groups respectively. The confidence ratings of the two 
experimental groups did not differ significantly by correlated sample t test, nor did either 
experimental group’s confidence ratings diner significantly from the control group.
Reported use of verbal labels
Subiects in the two expoimental groups were aaked, when they had finished the ftrst 
learning task, to list any names they had used to describe the species to themselves, and 
w oe asked to explain how they chose or invented these names at the end o f the experiment 
These reqxNises are l i s ^  in Appendix 6e.
Subjects in group Labd listed a total o f 20 names in the first question, and mentioned an 
additional IS names when questioned the second time, making a total of 3S out of a possible 
39 categories reportedly named by the end of the experiment. Fourteen of the 3S names 
used were chosen because they were the verbal labels supplied by the experimenter, 
according to the subjects* responses to the two questions. None of the subjects repotted 
having chosen or invented a  name because it was a  description of the species DNA patterns 
(non-verbal labels) supplied. The remainder the descriptions of motives for choosing 
names said they had been chosen because diey described features of the q>ecies’ shiqies 
(e.g. “four spike”), or named an object the shape as a whole resembled (e.g. “diamond”).
Subjects in group M a^h reported a total of 16 out of a possible 39 categories named. 
O ily three of these names were reponed in response to the first question, all by one subject.
Group Label reported significantly more verbal labels than group Match in re^xmse to 
the first question (X ^12 .37 , 1 df. p<0.01) and overall (X^a*18.4S. 1 df, pcO.Ol).
Discussion
The results of the present experiment do not support the hypothesis described above, that 
subjects performing a category matching task may use a similarity-based heuristic without 
actually acquiring categorical knowledge.
Subjects in the labelling group and the matching group performed the category 
recognition test with a very similar level of accuracy, both groups performing better than 
subjects in the contnri S>oup whose previous exposure to  the categories had involved seeing 
only one exemplar from each.
In the sorting test, there was again no significant difference between the two experimental 
groiq>s* performance, a lth o u ^  there was less of a  clear cut difference between die matching
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and the control groupt’ perfomunce on this task than there was between the control group 
and the labelling group.
One imerpretation of the three groups* performance on the sorting task is that although 
the matching group were good at kiK>wing whether an exemplar belonged to a familiar 
ca t^ory , they were not quite as good as the labelling group at knowing which of the three 
familiar categories such an exemplar belonged to. The category recognition task could be 
seen as accessing a different kind of categorical kitowledge to diat required to perform the 
sorting test, and the m a k in g  task could be hypothesised to have promoted die former kind 
o f  categorical knowledge more efficiently than it promoted the latter.
Although the data might encourage speculation along such a vein, they certainly do not 
suppon any such conclusions about differences in the categorical knowledge acquired by die 
two expoimental groups, since the two experimental groups* performance on the sorting 
task did not differ significantly. It might be possible to investigate the hypothesis that 
subjects learn less about which categories exemplars fall inK> from matching task than fixim a 
labelling task by repeating a variant of the experiment with a lower criterion for the two 
initial learning tasks, supposing that less learning experience might exaggerate the possible 
difference in sorting performance between the groups.
Another inierpreution of the lack of a significant difference between the matching and 
control groups* performance on the sorting task is that by the time the sorting task was 
performed, initial differences between the control and experimental groups* categorical 
knowledge were diluted by the three groups’ common experience. It is possible diat in the 
course of the die category recognition task, the control group began to  recognise the (six) 
different categories through the operation the automatic process described by Evans 
(1967), “schematic concept formation** (see Chapter 3). The truth of this speculation could 
be tested by performing the experiment again, with the initial learning tasks being 
inmiediaiely followed by the sorting test
The subjects’ responses to die questions about their use of verbal labels are of some 
interest Not surprisingly, subjects in the labelling group reported using more names for the 
categories than did those in the matching group, suggesting, if subjects* reports are to be 
believed, that when performing a category matching task, learners tend not to make up 
category names. No subject in the labelling group reported using a category name that 
described the non-veibal label (DNA pattern) - names used that were other than the verbal 
labels supplied by the experimenter were, according to the subjects* reports, invented 
because they described distinctive features of the polygon shapes or named an object the
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shape as a  whole resemMed. This might explain why in Experiment 5b earlier in this 
chillier, subjects' reports of having used names lo describe the non-verbal labels did not 
appear related to  their schema learning performance - subjects may have invented names 
based on the appearance of the polygon shapes which they used as category labels regardless 
o f whether they also named the non-verbal labels. In other words, names for the shapes 
may have more effect on schema learning than names for non-vabal labels.
In conclusion, this experiment is successful as a  first step in assessing the category 
matching task as a  viable measive o f cat^ory  learning. The experiment has shown that after 
reaching a category matching criterion with schema baaed categories, subjects are as efficient 
at recognising new exemplars from the already encountered categories as subjects who have 
previously learned to label the categories. This result shows that it would certainly not be 
true to say that subjects learn no long term representations of the categories when performing 
a matching task with prototypically structured categories, as was hypothesised in the 
Introduction section above. What the experiment has not investigated, and an important 
point if it is intended to use category matching in category learning experiritents, is whether a 
subject’s level o f performance on a matching task actually indexes how much he or she has 
learned about the categories involved.
Experiment 5d
In this experim ent the question of whether a subject’s matching accuracy with 
proiotypically structured categories can be used to measure how much she/he has learned 
about them is temporarily put aside, in the interests of comparing matching performance (and 
possiMy category learning) where the categories are labelled with verbal and non-verbal 
labels.
The categories used in this experiment are not single polygons, but multi-dimensional, 
prototypically structured categories similar to categories that have been employed in a 
consideraUe number of previous studies of category learning (e.g. Reed (1972), Richardson 
(1987), Medin, Dewey, and M ur|^y (1983)).
The verbal labels used were taken from the set eirq>k>yed in earlier experiments in this and 
other chapters, while the non-verbal labels were a new set o f multicoloured, abstract patterns 
which were not significantly easier or harder to discriminate one from another than the verbal 




The subjects were 30 undergraduate students participating in the experiment lo satisfy a 
requirement o f their introductory psychology course.
Apparatus
An Acorn Archimedes 310 microcomputer was used to control a display on a high 
resolution colour monitor.
Stimuli
The stimuli were a set of con^uter-animated pseudo caterpillars. The visual appearance 
of the cateqnllars varied along a number o f dimensions, and on the basis of their appearance 
they were divided into three categories or (fictional) species. Species membership was 
systematically related to the values the caterpillars exhibited on four dimensions - body 
colour, number of body segments, radius o f body segments and length of hair on body. For 
each dimension there were three values. The category structure based on these dimensions 
and values is shown in Table 6.1.
Table 6.1. Attribute structure used in Experiment 5d.
radius segments colour hair
Species 1
Prototype 1 2 1 3
Exen^lar a 1 2 1 2
templates b 2 2 1 3
c 1 3 1 3
d 1 2 2 3
Species 2
Prototype 2 1 3 2
Exemplar a 2 1 3 3
templates b 3 1 3 2
c 2 2 3 2
Species 3
d 2 1 2 2
Prototype 3 2 2 1
Exemplar a 3 2 2 2
templates b 2 2 2 1
c 3 3 2 1
d 3 2 3 1
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The four exemplar templates for each species were derived from q>ecies prototypes 
which are also shown in Table 6.1. Each exemplar is a one feature« one step distortion of its 
species prototype. The prototypes themselves were not presented as stimuli.
The three possiMe values for each feature were not abscrfute values but represented ranges 
from within which the exact values were randomly allocated (the feature hair length diverged 
slightly from this rule, see below). The ranges were non overlapping.
Specifically, the ranges for each value of each feature were as follows. Radius: a value 1 
indicates a radius chosen randomly from the set 2.20 mm, 2.56 mm, and 2.93 mm, value 2 
a radius from the set 4.03 mm, 4.39 non and 4.76 mm. and the set for value 3 was S.8S 
mm, 6.22 mm, atul 6.59 mm. Segments: a value of 1 indicates 4 or 5 segments, value 2 
indícales 8 o r9  segmenu aiKl value 3 indicates 12 or 13 segments. Colour the range of hues 
for values 1, 2, and 3 were greens, browns and oranges respectively. Hair: a value 1 
indicates no hair, a value 2 indicates hairs on each segment protruding by up to one diird the 
segment radius, and a value 3 indicates hairs protruding by up to three times the radius of the 
segment. The caterrñllars varied at random on some other dimensions that were uiuelaled 
to species membership, these being the width o f  stripes on their body segments, the ctriour 
of these stripes, and certain characteristics of their animated movement across the display 
screen.
Some exanq>les of caterpillars generated from the exemplar templates shown in TaNe 1 
are inosented in Figure 6.15a.
The caterpillars were presented individually against a background consisting of a 
rq)resentation of a branch o f a tree, so that it appeared that the caterpillar was crawling along 
the branch from right tt> left (Figure 6.15b). At the top of the monitor screen was a boxed 
display where names and non-verbal labels for the caterpillars could be displayed before and 
during the presentation of the caier;Mllars.
The verbal names of the caterpillars ^weies were drawn randomly for each subject from 
the pool o f 27 proiKHinceable non-words listed in Appendix 3b. The non-verbal species 




Figure 6.1Sa/b. Examplet of pseudo-caieipillar exemplars (top), and the animated target caterpillar 
pfeaented on a branch background (bottom).
Procedure
The experiment was run in three condirions, eir^loying a between subjects design. 
Subjects in each condition performed a category matching task involving the three invented 
species of pseudo cateipillars. Subjects in condition VL (verbal labels) were supplied with 
vCTbal names for the species during learning, subjects in condition NVL (non-veibal labels) 
were supplied with non-verbal species labels, and subjects in condition NL (no labels) 
learned the categories without being supplied with any names for the three species.
Except for the experimentally manipulated presence of species labels during learning, the 
procedure was nearly identical for the three groups o f subjects.
The subjects, who were run individually, were given the following instructions to  read 
before the start of the experiment.
**In this experiment your task is to try to learn to identify three different species of 
caterpillar.
T h e  following procedure will be repeated on each trial: You will see a 'target' caterpillar 
for a few seconds, then it will disi^)pear. Shortly afterwards tluee more caterpillars will 
appear on the screen. Use the mouse to point at the one you think belongs to the same
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appear on the scieen. U te the mouse lo point at the one you think belongs to the same 
species as die target caterpillar you just saw.
T h e n  press any of the buttons on the mouse, to sell the computer your choice. Next say 
how sure you are by pointing and clicking alone a scale from 7T  meaning very unsure 
through to '!!* meaning very sure. You will then be told whether you have chosen correctly, 
and what the correct answer was.
"At first you will just have lo guess, but eventually you will learn whidi caterpillvs 
belong to the same species as each other."
Thefoitowing section was read only by subjects in condition VL:
"Each species has a name. At the start of each trial the species name appears briefly at the 
top left comer of the screen. You must then use the mouse to point at diis name from a list 
of three - and press one of the mouse buttons - before the trial will start. The correct name 
will be flashed up again for you to have another try if you select the wrong one, and the 
correct name once chosen stays on the screen when you see the target caterpillar. It may be 
helpful to use these names while you are learning to identify the three species.
"After every three ordinary trials, there will be a 'test' trial where you will have to 
identify a cater^Hllar without being told iu  species name."
The following section was read only by subjects in condition NVL:
"Each ^>ecies has a unique and distinctive DNA structure. At the start of each trial a 
picture o f the species DNA appears briefly at the top left comer of the screen. You must then 
use the mouse to point at this picture from a set of three - and press one o f the mouse buttons 
‘ before the trial will start.
'T he conect DNA fncture will be flashed up again for you to have another try if you 
select the wrong one, and the correct picture, once chosen, suys on the screen when you see 
the target cattrrMllar.
"It may be helpful to use these DNA pictures while you are learning to identify the three 
species.
"After every three ordinary trials there will be a 'lest' trial where you will have lo identify 
a caterpillar without being shown its DNA picture."
The following passage was read only by subjects in condition NL:
"After every three ordinary trials there will be a 'test' trial."
The following passage was read by all three groups.
"You will know when a trial is a 'test' trial because a  red warning triangle iqipears at the 
top o f die screen. If you identify the caterpillar conectly on a test trial, you score one point
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The experiment ends when you heve tcoied 10 poinu. However, if on a  test trial you are 
wrong you lose all your po ina  and have to start again at aero. If you do not manage to get 
10 poin ts, when you have been trying to identify the caterpillars for 30 minutes the 
experiment will end.
"Either way, frfease do your best to identify all the caterpillars correctly. You will be told 
at the end of the experiment how many in total you got right.
"Please give your answers as soon as you have decided on them, as how long this takes 
will be noted by the com puto’. Evoy five minutes there is a  45 second rest interval."
O n each trial a "target" caterpillar was presented for 4 seconds, then it was removed from 
the screen. Next, three "selection" caterpillars were presented simultaneously, and the 
subject was asked to indicate the caterpillar which belonged to the same species as die target 
caterpillar which had previously been presented.
Subjects in conditions VL and NVL were told the species name of the target caterpillar 
when it was presented. Before the target caterpillar appeared, the appropriate verbal label 
(group VL) or a non>verbal label (group NVL) for its species was presented for 1.5 seconds 
at the top of the monitor screen, then the subject had to use the mouse to pick out that label 
from a  displayed list o f the three species labels. This procedure was repeated if the subject 
chose incorrectly, then the label remained di^ layed at the top of the screen during the 
presentation of the target caterpillar. The species label was not displayed during the qiecies 
matching stage of the trial when the three selection caterpillars were presented.
O n every fourth trial, referred to as a "test trial", the procedure differed slightly. For the 
VL and NVL groups the species label was not presented on test trials. Instead, a triangular 
warning symbol appeared at the top of the screen. For the NL group, test trials differed 
from non test trials only in their status as test trials and the presence of the warning symbol, 
since species labels were not presented to this group at any time.
O n each trial, once die subject had responded in the species matching task (by using the 
nKxise to  indicate the selection caterpillar he or she thought belonged to the same species as 
the target caterpilltf) a confidence rating for the selection was elicited. Subjects used the 
mouse to  marit their confidence rating on a continuous vertical scale as used in previous 
expe riments (see Figure 3a).
A fter giving the confidence rating, the subject received non-verbal feedback - a cross 
appeared next to the two incorrect selection caterpillars and a tick appeared next to the 
selection caterpillar «diich correcdy nuuched the target caterpillar for species membership.
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The subject was also given explicit feedback on dte correctness of their choice by the display 
of one of two icons in the top right hand comer o f  the monitor screen. A smiling face icon 
signalled a correct choice, and a frowning face icon signalled an incorrect choice.
Response latencies w ere recorded for the species matching task, and also for the label 
matching task performed a t the beginning of eadi non test trial by groups VL and NVL. 
Responses were recorded for the species matching task and the monbo' o f errors recorded 
for the label matching task.
Subjects performed the  category matching task until either they reached a performance 
criterion of 10 consecutive correct responses on test trials or they reached a time limit of 30 
minutes. Subjects scored pcrints equal to their current number consecutive correct test trial 
responses, and after each test trial a d i^ lay  of their points total was presented. The 30 
minute time limit excluded time spent on the label matching procedure, time spent giving 
confidence judgements, and  the 45 second rest intervals which were interspersed in the trials 
at fíve minute intervals.
The trials were arranged in blocks of 36 and sub-blocks of 12. Within each sub-block of 
12 trials, the target caterpillar was a member of each of the three species an equal number of 
times, with the order o f  appearance of the three qtecies randomized within the sub-block. 
Within each block of 36 trials, each of the 12 exemplar templates (see Table 6.1) was used to 
construct the target caterpillar an equal number o f times, with order within the block 
randomised. The selection caterpillars presented añer each target caterpillar were always one 
from each of the three species, the choice of exemplar template within each species being 
random, subject to the constraint that the same tonplate was not used for the target and for 
the correct selection caterpillar.
Results
Within the constraints o f  the time limit and the performance criterion, the mean number of 
trials completed by subjects in the three conditions were 120 for group VL, 131 for group 
NVL, and 109 for group NL.
Only one subject did not conq)lete two full Mocks before reaching the criterion or time 
limit. This subject (in group NL) completed all but four trials of block 2 before reaching the 
criterion o f 10 consecutive error free test trials. For the purposes of the analysis, the 
missing four trials o f data  for this subject were fílled with correct responses and with 
average confidence ratings and decision times for that Mock.
The analysis of the results of the category learning task concentrate exclusively on the
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d au  from blocks 1 and 2, so that subjecu* performance can be compared across groups 
equated for exposure to the 12 exemplar templates.
Cotrect species choices
The performance of the three groups on the species matching task is depicted in Figure 
6.16a and 6.16b for test and non test trials respectively. Chance level for the species 
matching task was 33% (3 ^  test trials or 9/27 ordinary trials per Mock).
The matching data were analysed using a  two way ANOVA, with one within subjects 
factor (Mock) and one between subjects factor (condition). For the test trials, the analysis 
yielded a significant main effect of condition (F»4.26. 2,27 df, p ^ .0 2 5 ) but there was no 
significant effect of Mock (F ^ .68 , 1,27 dO nor a significam Mock x condition interaction 
term. Comparing pairs of conditions, perform ance in condition VL exceeded NL (t* «2.21, 
17 df, p<O.OS), as did perfcmnance in condition NVL (t«2.97, 16 df, p<0.01). There was 
no significant difference between conditions V L  and NVL ( t ^ .8 9 ,14 df).
Figure 6 .1 6 1^ .  Mean correct responsei on the ca tegory  matching task for subjects I 
for lest trials (upper graph) and non test trials (lo w er graph). Abbreviations: vl 
labels: avl •  non-verbal labels; nl •  no category labels.
I the three groups, 
■ verbal category
” Tha t lu ti wad Um rebiwi procMhir* wImt« tampla varisnew sr« ikh Mtimad •qusl.wiili tha dagrMa of 
freadom being adjuaiad accerding to the ratio of tha variancaa, radiar than aiii t^ly calculaiad aa nl *n2 • 2.
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The analysis for the non test trials yielded no significant main effects (F ^ .7 4 . 2.27 df 
for c<Midition. F«1.63, 1,27 df, p«0.21 for block) nor a significant interaction term 
(F«1.48, 2,27 df, p ^ .2 4 ) . The differences between the means for conditions NVL and 
VL, and for each of these against condition NL. yielded non significant t values (t«1.27.17 
df. t ^ .3 2  17 df. t^ .4 3 . 17 df respectively).
Matching performance was significantly above chance level on both Nocks for both kinds 
of trial for all three conditions (nunimum t value 3.47,9 df, all ps<0.01).
In view the very small, and non significant, improvement in matching performance 
between Mocks 1 and 2. the subjects* matching performance (aggregated over both types of 
trials) across sub Mocks o f Mock 1 is shown in Hgive 6.17. It can be seen that there is little 
or no apparent improvement in matching performance over the course of the three sub 
Mocks. An two-way analysis of variance for the data shown in Figure 6.17 yielded no 
signiHcant effect of sub-block (F ^ .0 8 , 2,54 df), no effect of cortdition (F«1.69, 2,27 d0< 
and no significant condition x sub-block interaction (F«l .63,4.54 dO-
Figure 6.17. Matching performance over the three sub blocks o f b lock  1 of the experiment. The 
sum med per formance on test and non test trials are plotted. Chance-level performance would be four 
correct responses per sub-block. Abbreviations; vl •  verbal category labels; nvl •  non-verbal labels: 
nl a  no category W>els.
Confidence ratings
Subjects' confidence rating responses were converted to  integers between 0. 
corresponding to a response of "T?". and 100 corresponding to "t!" on the scale. Mean 
confidence ratings for the three groi^rs are shown in Figures 6.18a (test trials) aitd 6.18b 
(non test trials).
I 7 0 .
I
Fifure 6.18 Vb. Mean confidence ratings in the three conditions for test trials (upper graph) an d  non 
teat trials (lower graph). Abbreviations: vl ■ verbal category labels: nvl ■ non-verbal labels: nl •  no 
category labels.
A two way analysis o f variance was performed on the confidence rating data fo r each 
type of trial. For ten trial confidence ratings, the analysis yielded a significant main effect of 
condition (F«4.92, 2,27 df. p^ .O lS ) but no effect of block (F ^ .8 1 , 1,27 df) or block x 
condition interaction (F«2.12, 2.27 df, p«0.14). The means for conditions VL and NVL 
were not significantly different (t*1.3S, 17 df, p^ .20 ). The mean confidence rating for 
condition NVL exceeded that for NL (t«3.01, 17 df, p<0.01), but that for VL d id  not 
(t-1.88, 17 df, p-0.08).
For non test trials, the ANOVA similarly yielded a significant main effect of condition 
(F>3.94. 2.27 df, p<0.01) but not of block (F ^ .O l, 1.27 df), and no significant interaction 
term (F»1.93, 2.27 df, p ^ . l 6 ) .  Mean confidence in conditions NVL and VL did no t differ 
significantly (t*0.66, 16 df) but both exceeded condition NL (tw3.04, 17 df. pcO.Ol and 
t»2.79, 17 df, p ^ .0 1 3  respectively).
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Decision times
Mean decision times for the three conditions are plotted in Figures 6 .19a and 6.19b.
Figure 6.19 a ^ . Mean decision limes for test trials (upper graph) and non test trials (lower graph). 
Abbreviations: vl ■ verbal category labels; nvi «  non-verbal labels: nl ■ no category labels.
For tts t trials, a two way analysis of variance yielded signifícant main effects of condition 
(F>6.71, 2,27 df, p<0.01) and block (F~9.25, 1,27 df, p<0.01), and no signifícant 
interaction (FwQ.89, 2,27 dO- Comparisons between means for the three conditions showed 
NVL and VL both fell below NL (t-3.03, IS df, p<0.01, and t-3.69, 17 df, p<0.01), but 
did not differ significantly between themselves ( t^ .4 6 ,13 df).
For non test trials, the ANOVA gave a significant main effect o f condition (F*3.51. 2,27 
df, p ^ .0 4 4 )  and block (Fw21.88, 1,27 df, p<0.01), with a significant interaction term 
(FwS.02, 2,27 df, p*0.014). The means o f  conditions NVL and VL did not differ 
significantly (t-0.38, 10 df. p-0.71), nor did  NVL and NL (1-1.74. 17 df, p-0.10), 
although the mean decision time for condition VL was significantly lower than that for NL 
(t-3 .14. I I  df. p<0.01).
Confidence accuracy
Confidence accuracy aooies • die difference between each subject*« mean confidence 
rating when correct and when incorrect - were calculated as described in Chapter 4. and are 
shown in TaMe 6.2.
TaMe 6.2. Confidence accuracy for Experiment Sd.
Mock 1 Mock 2
mean se mean se
NVL test trials 0.85 9.24 1.39 3.93
VL test trials 9.63 6.86 25.43 9.41
NL test trials 13.80 6.50 14.28 5.86
NVL non test trials 10.12 3.21 11.70 5.20
VL non test trials 11.87 5.69 8.37 2.50
NL non test trials 13.90 3.41 12.43 4.64
For test trials, a two way analysis of variance was performed, yielding a marginally 
significant main effect of condition (F«3.34, 2,27 df. p>O.OSl) but no effect of block 
(F«0.79, 1,27 dO nor a block x condition interaction (F«0.53, 2,27 dO- Confidence 
accuracy was significantly higher in condition VL than in condition NVL (t«2.I4, 14 df, 
p>0.05), but did not significantly  exceed condition NL (t«0 .49 . 12 df. p*0.63). 
Confidence accuracy in NL exceeded that in condition NVL (t«B2.60. 16 df, p«4).02).
For non test trials, an ANOVA yielded no significant main effects nor a signiricant 
interaction term (condition: F«0.23, 2,27 df; block: Fa0.13, 1, 27 df; interaction: F«0.22, 
2,27 df). The differences between condition means were not significant.
Label matching performance 
Errors
The mean number of label matching errors made by subjects in group VL were 0.60 (se 
0.27) on Mock 1 and 0.80 (se 0.47) on Mock 2, and for group NVL mean errors were 3.00 
(se 1.69) on Mock 1 and 1.50 (sc 0.62) on Mock 2. A two way ANOVA yielded no 
significant effect o f type of label (F«2.68, 1,18 df, p ^ . l 2 )  or Mock (F«0.48, 1,18 <tf) and 
no significant interaction (F ^ .8 3 , 1,18 df).
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Decision times
Mean label matching decision times for group VL were 267 (se 24.0) centiseconds (cs) 
for Mock 1 and 173 cs (se 11.8) for Mock 2, and for group NVL the figures were 351 (se 
72.4) cs for Mock 1 and 193 (se 17.4) cs for Mock 2. An analysis of variance yielded no 
significant effect o f label type (F«1.24, 1,18 df, p-0.28). but the effect o f Mock was highly 
significant (F«15.7, 1,18 dO- There was no significant condition x Mock interaction 
(F -1 .01 , l,1 8 d f , p-0.33).
Discussion
Matching performance in the two labelling conditions was very similar and, on most 
measures, better than performance in the unlabelled condition NL.
This pattern o f results suggests that the verbal and non-verbal labels were equally 
effective in facilitating category matching; if category matching performance reflects 
category learning (see below), then the results would suggest that both types of label were 
equally effective in facilitating category learning in this task.
The relative performance of the three groups did not always follow the same pattern on 
test trials and non test trials alike. Subjects in groups VL and NVL performed the matching 
task nrare accurately than NL subjects only on test trials - on non test trials the performance 
o f  the three groups was similar. Likewise, on test trials but not on non test trials, VL and 
NVL subjects gave higher confidence ratings than subjects in condition NL, and on test trials 
but not non test trials subjects provided with verbal labels showed a closer confidence- 
accuracy association than subjects fnovided with non-verbal labels. Such d i f f e r e n t  in 
performance on the two types of trials are not entirely unsurprising, since the design of the 
experiment emphasised the need to perform as well as possible on the test trials, where 
matching performance counted towards a criterion, but placed much less stress on the need 
to choose carefully or correctly on the non test trials.
The only a|^>arent difference in the two labelling groups* performance on the was in 
their confidence accuracy scores for test trials. Subjects in condition NVL gave confidence 
ratings which were no higher when they performed the category matching task correctly than 
when they were wrong, whereas subjects in conditions VL and NL showed a greater 
association between their confidence ratings and their actual performance. The interpretation 
that might be drawn from this is that subjects given the iKMi-verbal labels were not very good 
at **knowing whether they knew*’ which items belonged to the same category. This
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difTeienoe in confidence accuncy between tubjects given non-verbal and verbal labels was 
noted also noted in Chapter 4 where subjects were performing the matching task for arbitrary 
collections.
The verbal and non-verbal labels used in this experiment, unlike earlier sets, were 
apparently matched for the ease with which they could be discriminated. In the label 
matching task incorporated in this experiment, there were no significant differences in the 
number o f errors made, or the response times taken, between the two types o f label. 
Comparisons of the discrinttnaUlity of this set of non-verbal labels (relative to the verbal 
labels which are common throughout) to other sets of non-verbal labels is hampered, 
however, by the use ctf a  different procedure for die discriminability test here. The label 
matching task itself was similar to that used eariier, but it was embedded in the category 
matching task, and comparisons between verbal and non-verbal label discriminability were 
between rather than within subjects.
If category matching performance can be assumed to reflect category learning 
perfonnance, the results o f  the current experiment suggest that, when verbal and non-verbal 
labels are approximately equated for discriminability, there is no advantage o f learning 
proiotypically structured categories labelled verbally over categories labelled non-veibally.
Whether this conclusion is justified hangs largely upon the assunq>tk>n discussed above 
arrd investigated in Experiment Sc, that category matching performance with proiotypically 
structured categories does index the learning of representations of the categories involved.
The present experiment provides some evidence for the hypothesis that category matching 
relies only on a similarity judging heuristic (as defined in Experiment Sc). Although 
matching performance was well above chance from the outset, there was very little 
iitifMxrvetnent in matching performance apparent during the course of diis experiment There 
was no significant improvement between the two Mocks, nor any apparent iir^novement 
within the course of the first block.
The clear and significant superiority of subjects* perfonnance (matching accuracy, 
confidence ratings, and response times) in the two labelling conditions NVL and VL, over 
performance where no category labels were supplied (NL), might appear to suggest that 
category representations were being learned and were being used to perform the task. It 
might be argued that the presence of category labels on ikmi test trials could only have 
affected subjects* performance on test trials if the subjects were learning representations of 
the categories and associating the labels with these, since apart from their being associated 
with the categories, the labels were meaningless and could not have improved subjecu*
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performance on the catefory matching task. However, the pretence o f category labels could 
have helped subjects identify which stim ulus dimensions were relevant to category 
membership and which irrelevant, knowledge which, if used to confíne the similarity 
judging heuristic to  relevant similarity, would be expected to  improve matching 
performance.
To sum up the outcome of this experiment, subjects performed a category matching task 
with prototypically structured categories equally well when the exemplars were provided 
with equally discriminate verbal and non-verbal category labels, and better than when no 
category labels were provided. The genermlisability of this result to category learning . 
however, is questionate, since the subjects' high and stable level of performance on the 
matching task suggests that it did not necessitate learning representations of the categories.
General Discussion
In the first two experiments reported in this chapter, the comparison o f learning 
categories labelled with verbal and non-verbal labels which was undertaken for arbitrary 
collections in Chapter 4 was extended to learning proiotypically structured categories.
In Chapter 4, it had been found that arbitrary collections were learned nxire effectively 
with verbal labels than ncxi-verbal labels, but only when the non-verbal labels were more 
difficult to discriminate on a label matching task. It was suggested, in keeping with the 
analysis of possiMe category label effects in Chapter 1. that the verbal label advantage might 
be due to their being a more effective means acquiring information about which category 
an exemplar belongs to. or associating exemplars with a verbal label might aid arWtrary 
collection learning by {noviding coherence for the members of the category.
In either case, the verbal label advantage might be expected to disappear or at least 
diminish when learning inherently coherent, prototypically structured categories, where the 
labelling of exemfrfars per se had already been found to have little apparent effect on the rate 
o f category learning (Chapter 5).
This expectation was not ultimately upheld. In Experiment Sa no advantage of verbal 
labels over non-verbal labels was found in a sorting task with schema-based polygon 
categories. In Experiment 5b a carefully controlled comparison of learning schema based 
and exemplar based categories with both kinds of label in the sorting task was conducted. 
This experiment found a slight verbal label advantage with both types of category.
Two inferences were drawn from the outcome of Experiment Sb. Firstly, die prediction
Chapter 6
that vertMU labels would facilitate the learning of exemplar-based categories to a greater extent 
than prototypically-based categories was not fulfilled. Whatever reasons there are for 
category learning to be better with the verbal labels than with the non-verbal labels appear to 
apply equaUy to exemplar-based categories (or arbitrary collections) and to prototype based 
categories. One possible interpreution of these resulu is that although, with prototypically 
based categories, subjecu do not need to use category labels during category learning, 
nevertheless they do attempt to make use of them, and verbal labels are more useful than the 
abstract, black and white patterns which served as the non-verbal category labels in this 
study. This usefulness m ight consist o f  the factors already discussed - ease of 
discrimination, effectiveness as a source o f category membership information for exemplars, 
or tendency to supply coherence through associations between the labels and the exemplars.
The second inference which was drawn from the outcome of Experiment Sb was diat the 
sorting task may be an inappropriate tool for the investigation of the effects of verbal labels 
on category learning, since sorting requires a specific response for each category, which 
may encourage the use of verbal category labels even when none are supplied. This 
hypothesis was motivated by the small advantage of vertel labels for arbitrary collection 
learning in Experiment 5b, using the sorting task, compared with the mote marked verbal 
lid>el advantage observed with arbitrary collection learning in Experiments where a
category matching task had been used.
If it were possible to investigate the role of class labels in learning prototypically based 
categories using a cattgory matching task, this would in some respects be preferable, since a 
matching task does not introduce discrete responses or labels for the categories. The 
objection was raised, however, that since it is not necessary learn k> categorise exenq>lar$ 
to perform the category matching task, subjects might not learn representations of the 
categories in the course of it.
This prediction was tested in Experiment 5c, which did not support the strong hypothesis 
just described. Subjects who performed a matching task with schema-based categories had 
definitely acquired some form of representation of the categories, and there was no firm 
evidence that they had learned any less about the categories than subjects who had performed 
a category labelling task lo a similar performance criterion.
Subjects in Experiment 5c were asked to report their use of verbal labels for the 
categories. Those performing the matching task reported using fewer class labels than those 
who peiformed the labelling task, and the veibal labels invented by subjects in bodi groups 
tended to be descriptions of typical features of the polygons they were learning to categorise.
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TMt provides •  possible, but highly speculative, explanation of why, in experiments 3e and 
5b, subjects' reported use of invented verbal labels for the non-verbal labels was related to 
category learning performance with arbitrary collections, but not, in Experiment Sb, with the 
prototype-based categories: when learning prototypically structured categories, subjectt 
make use of verbal labels which describe the prototypes. Any verbal labels they invent for 
non-verbal labels which happen to be provided by the experimenter are of little importance 
for learning the categories.
In Experiment 5d it was found that subjects performed a prototype-based category 
matching task equally well with verbal and non-verbal labels that were approximately 
equated for discriminability. Judgement was withheld as to whether this implies that 
learning piototypically structured categories is facilitated equally by verbal and non-verbal 
labels, since the relationship between category matching performance and category learning 
is unclear. The abseiKte of any clear learning effect in the subjects* matching perfonnance 
suggested that they were not retying on category representations to perform the category 
matching task.
What then, can be surmised from the empirical work described in this chapter about the 
role of verbal labels in learning proiotypically structured categories? On the basis of the first 
two experiments, it is possible to argue that whatever this role may be, it seems to be the 
same with prototypically-structured categories as it is with exemplar-based, arbitrary 
collections. If this is the case, it may have some inactical significance, since with exemplar 
based categories a matching task can be used to plot the course o f category learning, whereas 
with prototypically structured categories category matching performance may not be a 
reliable index o f  the acquisition of categorical knowledge.
If, contrary to the arguments advanced above, category matching performance actually 
does reflect category learning with prototypically structured categories, then Experiment 5d 
could be taken to suggest that such learning is facilitated by the provision of verbal category 
labels no more than by the provision of non-verbal labels of equal discriminability. 
Category learning aside, this experiment certainly demonstrates that category matching is 
facilitated by the labelling of exen^lars with both verbal aikl rKMi-verbal labels. If subjects 
are not actually learning to categorise die exemplars in the category matehing task, this effect 
of category labels might be attributed to labelled exemplars helping subjects learn which 
dimensions o f the exemplars are relevant to their category membership.
In what ways should the role o f verbal labels in learning procotypically structured 
categories be investigated, in the light of the experiments reported here? Prototype learning
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in a sorting task with equally discriminable verbal and non-verbal labels could be conyaitd; 
category matching with schema-based categories and verbal and non-verbal labels of unequal 
discriminatMlity could be examined...as could various other combinations of category type, 
task, and type of label. Thoe would be little point, however, in pursuing the methodology 
blindly. The aim of the experiments in this chapter was to extend the comparison o f  learning 
with verbal and non-verbal labels from learning arbitrary collections to learning prototype- 
based categories. In doing so, several problems with this methodology have been 
highli^ted:
i) non-verbal labels can be and are verbally named
ii) sorting responses might also be verbally named
iii) with schema based categories, the category matching tank which was useful with
arbitrary collections may be unsuitable as a measure of category learning.
There is thus a considerable problem of how category learning in the absence of verbal 
category labels can be measured. One coherent research strategy would be to further 
investigate the relationship between ca»goiy matching performance and the acquisition of 
categorical knowledge, as was attempted in Experiment 5c. If it is found that matching 
performance reliably predicts ability to categorise exemplars, then it may be possible to 
correlate subjects* reported use o f verbal category labels, in a task in which none are 
supplied, with the rate at which they acquire category representations. There is still the 
considerable problem of relying on subjects* reports of their use of labels; subjects* 
introspections are not a  favoured took of experimental psychology.
Alternatively, if the corr^Nuison of the effects of supplying different types of category 
label were to be pursued, an arbitrary collection learning task, using a matching procedure, 
might prove to be a useful test-bed for the investigation of labelling effects. In the arbitrary 
collection learning task subjects are constrained to using the labels supplied in order n> 
acquire category membership information. If interesting labelling effects are found under 
these cotKlitions. they could subsequently be scrutinised in the less artificial domain of 
learning procotyi^ally structured categories.
In Chapter 7, directions for future research into category labelling effects are discussed 
further.
c tw p m e
Chapter?
The empirical work rq x a w i in this thesis has investigated the role of verbal category 
labels in cattgory learning from a variety of angles. The issues examined include subjects' 
default assumptions concerning the extension of novel category labels, the importance o f the 
provision of labelled exemplars and other feedback in learning arbitrary collections and 
prototype-based categories, the effects of providing different types of label, the effects 
label discriminability, the relationship between naming non-verbal labels and category 
learning, the relationship between matching performance and category learning, and the 
effects of category label learning and exen^lar labelling on quantitative judgements about 
exemplars. These investigations have yielded answers to some questions, but have 
provoked the asking many more.
This concluding ch^>ter presents a summary of the empirical findings described in the 
earlier chapters, followed by discussion of the main themes that were generated by or taken 
up in the experimental work. The final sections review the theoretical analysis of category 
labelling, and suggest how further empirical investigation based on this aiuUysis might more 
inx>fitably progress.
I Summary empirical results.
The experiments in Chapter 2 attempted to investigate a hypothesised phenomenon of 
learned categorical perception, with a view to examining the role of category names in the 
effect. No evidence for learned categorical perception was found, using a simple 
requiring subjects to  estimate the difference in length between lines from the same or 
different learned categories. When the exem|rfars to be judged were presented widi their 
learned category names, however, a  category boundaiy effect was observed in die subjects' 
length judgements, as had previously been reported in studies of quantitative judgements of 
stimuli divided into two labelled categories. This effect was dq>endent on having previously 
learned the association between the category ruunes and the sets of lines they applied to.
In Chapter 3, subjects performed a sorting task with exemplars generated as distortions 
of irregular polygon prototypes. After having learned to sort the exen^ars  into categories.
C h tp m ?  194
the subjects were introduced to novel names applied to the exemplars. Subjects were found 
to assume that a novel name used to label an exemplar of a novel category also l^)pUed to 
ocher exemplars of that category, but not to exemfrfars of contrasting categories. If the 
exemplar belonged to an already named category, the new category name applied to it was 
assumed to be either a synonym for the known category name, or the name o f a subordinate 
category, but not the name of a superordinate category. These findings, with adult subjects, 
followed the predictions of a theory of children's word learning (Markman, 1989) which 
attributes to children the default assumption that each item should only belong to the 
extension of one category name. Subjects did not follow the principle of linguistic contrast 
(Clark, 1987) in their assumptions, and rrairored a preference which has been reported for 
young children (Taylor and Oelman, 1989) for subordinate over superordinate categories as 
the extension of ambiguous novel names.
In Chapters 4 and 6 , it was found that some category labels promoted better learning than 
others. When exemplars were labelled with pronounceable non-words, category learning 
was superior u> learning when exemplars were labelled with small square segments of black 
and white patterns. This superiority was found when the categories to be learned consisted 
o f  arbitrary collections of pictures of objects, pictures of unfamiliar objects, sets o f  unrelated 
polygon outlines, and categories where exemplars were generated as distortions of a 
polygon prototype. Subjects performed a discrimination task iq)proximately 0.1 second 
faster with the verbal labels than with the black and white pattern labels, and made a 
negligible number of discrimination errors with either type of label. With a set of 
multicoloured pattern segments, subjects performed the discrimination task faster thaq with 
the verbal labels, and the arbitrary collection learning task at a level intermediate between 
performance with the verbal labels and the black and white patterns as category labels. 
Where subjects reported having used verbal names for the pattern segment labels, arbitrary 
collection learning, but not prototype learning, was better than with patterns subjects did not 
report having named.
In Chapto* 5, learning of the schema-based polygon categories was compared widi and 
without the provision o f labelled exemplars, with error correcting feedback, and with 
labelled exemplan and error correcting feedback. The comparison was made at three levels 
of exemplar disiortion. The amount of exemplar distortion affected schetm learning but, 
contrary to the lesulu of a similar experiment reported by Homa and Cultice (1984), there 
were few differences between feedback conditions, and there was no interaction between the 
level of exemplar distertion and the effects of feedback. Learning was better when error
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coirsctinf fccdbadc and labelled exemplars were combined, dian when only errar conecdng 
feedback was supplied, but no feedback or labelling condition exceeded learning with 
neither.
In a category nwiching task widi prototypically-defined categories and verbal and non­
verbal labels equated far discriminability, performance was the sim ilv when exemplars were 
labelled with either kind of label, and better than when no labelled exemplars were provided 
(Chapter 6 , Experiment Sd). Category matching performance did not show any evidence of 
a learning effect, however, which supported a  hypothesis that category matching 
performance may be unsuitable as a  measure o f category learning with prototype-based 
categories.
II Discussion of empirical issues.
Quantitative judgements about exen^lars.
The possibility that category learning may affect the perception of or judgements 
concerning category members has received little empirical attention, yet if such effects exist 
they could be o f  considerable inr^ x>rt both to category learning itself and to other cognitive 
processes. To what extent does category learning affect the ability to treat exemplars as 
items in their own right? One form of this question has recently been posed by Medin and 
Barsalou (1987). who asked what effect learning a class prototype might have on the ability 
to discriminate between exemplars near the prototype. It has yet to  be answered.
Studies of category learning have generally examined how quickly sutgects reach some 
criterion on a learning task, and how well their categorical knowledge generalises to new 
exemi^ars. The idea that exemplars may be conventionalised in the direction of a concept or 
schema has been around for a long time (e.g. Bartlett. 1932), but the time course of such a 
process, or the extent of it, has not been quantifíed in studies of artificial category learning.
Learned categorical perception effects, if they exist, would represent the operation of this 
conventionalising process at the shortest extreme of the range of possible time scales. There 
is no evidence that learned categorical perception eHects exist, however, and the study 
reported in Chapter 2 did not give any cause to modify this conclusion. Even so, the 
neptive evidence is far from conclusive. Categorical perception effects, if they arise at all, 
might only arise after massive amounu of practice with a categorisation task. Phoneme 
perception, the paradigm case of categorical perception, utilises a categorisation that has been
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practised every day for years on end by adult human subjecu. Alternatively, the complexily 
of the stimuli may prove be an impottant factor in learned categorical peroeption. or any 
number o f other factors may be crucial. Since the effect exists only as a hypothesis, little 
can fhiitfully be said about it undl some evidence for its existence is produced.
Categorical perception a t a result of category learning should be seen as an extreme cate 
within a family o f  possible conventionalising effects: negative findingt in the context of 
learned categorical perception may still serve a useful purpose if they draw attention to the 
possibility o f quantitative study of the effects of category learning on perception, memory, or 
judgements involving exemplars of learned categories.
The results o f  experiment lb  show that when learned class membership is made explicit, 
by means of a category label, class membership can sway subjects’ judgements concerning 
exemplars. This finding is an extension of an effect already reported several times (e.g. 
Tajfel and Wilkes (1963)), but its juxuposition with the investigation of learned categorical 
perception nevertheless serves to point out the similarity between these two types of category 
boundary effec t, and the importance o f the category labei being suppiied by the 
experimenter, even when it has already been learned by the subject. If the effect generalises 
to other types o f  category, it would suggest that exemplars of known categories may be 
conventionalised more by a subject when someone eise confirms the subject's category 
membership judgement, or imposes a category judgement that the subject was nevertheless 
capable of making.
The interpretation o f category names.
The experiments reported in (Chapter 3 showed that adults share common default 
assumptions about the meaning of novei category names they encounter, and that these 
assumptions follow the same principles which have been suggested as important guidelines 
for children in their hypotheses about word meaning. Additkmaliy, adults and children alike 
appear readier to ascribe an ambiguous new category term to a new subordinate category 
rather than to a new superotdinate category.
For adults, it is not clear whether the use of default assumptions about the meaning of 
new names, in an artificial laboratory task, implies that they use such defauh assumptions in 
their day to day, real world category learning, or whether the assumptions are merely long 
disused, vestigial abilities leftover from childhood.
If the former possibility is true, this might suggest that adulu frequently leam categories
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without at the same time learning category names, and subsequently fit names to appropriate, 
i.e. nameless, candidate categories when new names are encountered. Often, on the other 
hand, new names may need to be mapped onto categories which already have known names. 
This situation is relatively common in adult life, as one encounters technical terms and 
assimilated foreign words. Mapping a new word onto an already named category requires 
the relaxation of the mutual exclusivity principle. Would adults* willingness to vkrfate 
mutual exclusivity be a function o f  the context in which the word is encountered (e.g. in a 
scientific or philosophical document) or perhaps the extent to which it **looks** foreign or 
technical?
The effects of exemplar labelling and feedback in schema learning.
In Chapter 5. where previous evidence concerning the role of feedback in schema 
learning was reviewed, a somewhat contradictory pattern of findings was described where 
some investigators have reported feedback to be beneficial, and others have found feedback 
to be ifteonsequential or even detrimental to learning. It was suggested that the contradictory 
Hfidings might stem in part from the use of the term feedback to cover different kinds of 
information in different cases. It was hypothesised that exemplar labelling and error 
correcting feedback may have different effects in category learning, and that this difference 
might account for previous apparently contradictory findings.
The results of experiments reported in Chapters 5 and 6  did not greatly simplify the issue 
of the importance of feedback. In the schema learning task employed, findings supported 
previous reports of feedback having no facilitatory effect on schema learning, and no 
interaction between the importance o f  feedback and task difficulty was found. The possible 
importance of a more precise definition of the term “feedback” was supported, in that 
although no type of feedback led to significantly better learning than subjects achieved when 
none at all was given, with category labelling plus error correction subjects performed the 
scheim learning task bener than w hen error correction only was supplied.
The influence of error correction and exemplar labelling in schema learning appean to be 
complex, and not to be taken for granted. A lthou^ in Experiment 4 (ChigMcr S) subjects 
did no better performing die achenui leaning task with exempla labelling than without, in 
Chapter 6  it was found that the type o f category label supplied could affect schema learning 
performance.
Many questions remain to be answered regarding the role of error correcting feedback,
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and category labels as feedback, in learning proiocypically structuied categories. One of the 
most perplexing is why does feedback sometimes hinder rather than help category learning? 
Several suggestions m i^ t  be proffered: does feedback distract subjects* attention fiom 
some more profiuble scrutiny or consideration o r  the exemplars? Can feedback lead 
subjecu to adopt a less than optimal learning strategy, as was suggested in Chapter 4 in the 
context of arbitrary collection learning? Can the provision of feedback undermine the 
subjecu* motivation to learn? b  instruction lew effective than the autonomous search for a 
method to reduce uncertainty in the category learning task?
In terms o f  simply documenting the effecu of different kinds of feedback, the attempt 
made in Chapter 3 to compare the effecu of cfror correction, exemplar labelling, and both, 
relative to learning performance where no feedback is given, represenu a step in ^»^t tmy 
be a profitable direction. If the non significant trends observed do prove, in further 
investigations, to be robust, then error correction alone appears to impair learning, while 
exemplar labelling alone, if it makes any difference, has a slight facUitatory effect Further 
comparisons, under conditions of more widely varying exemplar distortion, a larger sample 
o f  subjects, or sets or prototypes equated or counterbalanced for learning difficulty, might 
well clarify these issues.
Aibitrary collections.
The con^>arison of the learning of procotypically structured categories and arintrary 
collections of exen^lars undertaken in this thesis represenu a novel research method with 
potential for more extensive use in studies of category learning.
Learning performance with arbitrary collections can be looked upon as a baseline. 
Aibitrary collections have no systematic, similarity-based, internal structure. The extent to 
which subjects learn structured categories more effectively than they learn arbitrary 
ctrilections represents a measure of the importance o f  internal structure in category learning. 
This comparison might be used to assess, for example, the pbusibility of models category 
learning in which subjecu extract a parameterised description of the category structure, as 
opposed to storing descriptions of individual exem ^ars.
In Experiment 5b, subjects* learning performance with proiocype-baaed categories and 
arbitrary ccrflections (each consisting four unrelated exemplars) were compared in a 
category sorting task. The versions o f the task performed with each type of category had 
been constructed to be roughly equated for difficulty, and indeed subjecu showed similar
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rales of improvement in the number o f  correct sorting responses they made across blocks, 
and supplied similar confidence ratings, with prototype-based categories and with the 
arbitrary collections. Sorting decisions took markedly longer, however, fo r the exemplar- 
based categories than for the promcype based categories. Such an outcome could not be 
accommodated by a model of category learning in which prototype-based categories are 
learned by a process of storing representationt of individual exemplars (e.g. Medin and 
Schaffer, 1978) unless the number o f exemplars stored for each category is  considerably 
constrained.
In the arbitrary collection learning conditions, subjects needed to store representations of 
four exemplars per category in order to perform the task. In the prototype learning 
ccMKlitions, they saw tens of exemplars from each category (48 by th e  end of each 
condition). If they were storing representations of individual exemplars here, in order to 
make decisions faster than in the arbitrary collection learning task the number of exemplars 
stored per category would have to be less than four.
It would be an interesting exercise to conduct similar comparisons with fewer exemplars 
per arbitrary collection, in order to set an upper limit on the number of exemplars subjects 
might be allowed to store per prototype-based category by an exemplar storage model of 
category learning.
The use of arbitrary collections in category learning experiments yields other possibilities. 
In the experiments reported in Chapters 4 and 6 , arbitrary collection and prototype-based 
category learning were con^>ared in order to test the hypothesis that the effects of the type of 
label used to indicate category membership for exemplars should be greater when categories 
have no internal similarity structure than when the category is defined by the similarity of its 
exemplars to a prototype, and hence to each other.
Arbitrary collection learning may be a useful testbed for the assessment o f  the effects on 
category learning of the means by which exemplars are labelled - verbal labels and pattern 
segment labels as used in this thesis for example, or other feasible possibilities such as 
category labelling by tactual, auditory, or even olfactory cues. In arbitrary ccrilection 
learning, subjects* attention to and use of category membership information provided via 
labels can be guaranteed, whereas with similarity based categories, subjects m ay not need to 
use category labels at all under some circumstances. Of course, the study o f labelling effects 
in arbitrary collection learning itself is not the issue, and any such labelling effects uncovered 
in aibitriry collection learning should be investigated with more ecologically valid categories 
in due course.
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Apart from the use of arbitrary ooUection learning as a research tool for investigating 
issues in the learning of similarity-based categories, the possibility that arbitrary collections 
might exist, ecologically, as a specialised type of cognitive category has been advanced 
(Chapter 4). It has been suggested in this thesis that arbitrary ccrilections, hitherto only 
regarded as a  uaefiil example of what cognitive ottegories ore not like (e.g. Bambrough, 
1961), may mirror the status of concepts in an eariy stage of formation in adults (pending the 
formation of a unifying theory or selection rule) or children (again pending the formation of 
a theory, or pcMsibly pending more sophisticated conceptual development).
Confidence accuracy.
Confidence ratings were obtained from subjects in many of the category learning tasks 
described in the experimental chapKrs. Mean (raw) confidence ratings generally followed 
subjects* category learning performance, increasing with practice within categorisation tasks, 
and reflecting the differences in sorting, matching, or labelling perfcnmance between 
conditions.
Raw confidence ratings, however, take no account of whether subjects’ confidence is 
justified or misplaced. A measure was devised which would take account of this facet of 
confidence rating behaviour. This measure, termed “confidence accuracy”, was calculated 
as a subject’s rrtean confidence rating on trials on which they categorised correctly, minus 
their mean confidence rating when incorrect'
Confidence accuracy might be regarded as a meta-cognitive measure, indexing the, extent 
to which a subject “knows that they know”. If a subject can discriminate between situations 
where she does know what category something belongs to and occasions when she does 
not, this is a measure of categorical knowledge which might be to some extent orthogonal to 
actual cttegorising performance.
Confidence accivacy scores were relatively indeperxlent o f categorising performance, and 
showed a relatively stable relationship to the provision of different kinds of category label. 
In Experiments 3a. b, and c, confidence accuracy consistently followed the same trend 
between labelling conditions (VL>NVL>NLF>NLR) while matching performance followed 
this pattern in only Experiment 3b. Siiralariy, in Experiment 5d, confidence accuracy on test 
trials was greater with verbal than with non-veibal labels, while matching performance did
* TMi measure is similar lo tlie ''resolution*' score wMch has been invescigaied in studies of * e  
relationsiiip between accuracy and confidence raiiagt in face recognition judgements (see Cutler and 
Penrod. I9i9).
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not differentiate between the two conditions.
Thus there is some evidence from confidence accuracy scores that when subjects are 
provided with verbal category labels, they tend to have a more accurate insight into how 
good their categorising performance is > i.e. they are better at knowing that they know what 
ca^gory an exen^tlar belongs to - than when provided with non-verbal labels, and this 
greater insight does not directly reflect their level of categorising performance. On the odter 
hand, as pointed out in Chapter 4 , confidence accuracy scores may be no more than a 
measure <rf subjects’ compliance in the use of the confidence rating scale during the category 
learning task. If this is the case, then the phenomenon to be explained is why subjects may 
be more compliant when (xovided with verbal labels, regardless of how well they are 
performing the categorisation task.
Sorting and matching with prototype-based categories.
An issue raised in Chapter 6  is whether tasks based on category matching are suitable as a 
measure of category learning performance widi proiotypically structured categories (as has 
previously been assumed, e.g. Brown et al., 1968).
Category matching tasks have the advantage that no category labels, or discriminating 
reqxmses, for the categories are introduced by the experimental task. This may be useful to 
examine the influence of the fHovision category labels on category learning performance, but 
only if category matching performance actually reflects subjects’ progress in learning the 
categories.
It was suggested that, in tasks involving prototype-based categories, since members of 
the same category are, on average, more similar than members of different categories, 
subjects may perfon n the category matching task at levels substantially above chance without 
actually learning to categorise the exemplars. All that is required is for subjects to assume 
that the two moat similar exeti^lars belong to the same category. Where categories do not 
overlap or abut one another in the feature ^>ace, and if the subject learns to confine the 
comparison to dimensions of die exemplars whidi are relevant to category membership* , 
this heuristic may lead to errorless matching performance.
In Ch^xer 6 , an experiment was conducted to test the extreme hypothesis that subjects 
may form no representation o f the categories when performing a matching task with
'  As discussed im Chspier 6, learning whicli dimensions aie relevant to category membership 
represents a component of category leamii^, but does not in itself enable a subject to perfonn 
discriminative re^mnses for categories.
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prototypc-beacd, polygon exemplars. The outcome of the experiment was that there was no 
clear evidence that subjects who had performed a matching task to a criterion had learned 
less about the categories than subjects who had performed a labelling task to the same 
criterion. Nevertheless, it was suggested that the form o f the categorical knowledge may 
have been less specific for the m a ttin g  group, and suggestions were made for a revised 
version of the experiment which might clarify this issue. The experiment reported did not 
assess whether matching perfoniiance indexed category learning, but only whether subjects 
would reach a matching criterion without learning representations o f  the categories.
The results of an experiment using a matching task with prototype-based, pseudo- 
caierpiUar stimuli (Experiment 6 d) also direw doubt on the validity of category matching as a 
measure of category learning. In this experiment, subjects performed a matching at a 
high but stable level both at the outset o f  the task and throughout a large number of trials.
Category learning with verbal and non-verbal labels.
In an attempt to assess the importance o f  verbal labels in category learning, a comparison 
was made in several experiments of the effects of the use o f pronounceable non-words and 
Mack and white pattern segments to label exemplars.
The use of non-words to label exemplars led to better learning both of arbitrary 
collections and of prototype-based, polygon categories. In the latter case, this superiority 
was unexpected, since an earlier experiment with the schema learning task had suggested 
that the provision of labelled exemplars did not aid learning.
The effects of the two types of label might be summarised as follows: with arbitrary 
collection learning, where labels fxovide an important source of category membership 
information, the verbal labels produced better learning. In the schema learning task, even 
though labels were not an important source of category membership information, when they 
were provided it made a difference whether they took the form of non-words or Mack and 
white patterns. These results might be interpreted as showing that where labels are provided 
in a category learning task, people tend to use them, and better labels lead to better learning.
The comparison of learning with the verbal and Mack and white pattern labels provided 
some interesting and urtexpected data. As a technique for the investigation o f the importance 
of verbal labels in category learning, however, it is rife with uncertainties and complexities.
Subjects performed a label discrimination test faster (by approximately 0.1 second) with 
the verbal labels than with the black and white non-verbal labels. The number of
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dilcriinmation errors made with either type of label was negligible, however. Thus although 
the reaaon why category learning was better with the vertwl labels is unlikely lo be because 
subjects tended to mistake the non-verbal labels for one another, the effort invc^ved in 
discriminating the non-verbal labels does appear to be greater. If an explanation o f the 
verbal label category learning advantage is attempted in terms of die relative discriminability 
o f the labels, then the experiments show dial a small difference in discrimination time is 
suflktent to affect category learning on a task where the exem plm  are paired with their 
category labels on eadi trial for a  relatively long (five seconds) inspection period.
The use o f  another set of non-verbal labels on the arbitrary ccdlection learning task in 
Chapter 4 lent some support the the hypothesis that label discriminability was important lo 
the verbal label advantage. W ith the second set o f non-verbal labels, consisting of 
multicoloured pattern segments, subjects performed the label discrimination task faster than 
widi die verbal labels, and when the multicoloured patterns were used as category labels in 
the arbitrary collection learning task, performance was no worse than with the verbal labels.
On the other hand, if label discriminability were the key factor in the verbal label 
advantage in the arbitrary ccdlection learning task, the second set o f non-verbal labels, being 
more easily discriminable, might have been expected to produce better arbitrary collection 
learning than the verbal labels, rather than performance which was intermediate between the 
other two sets o f labels.
Another factor associated with differences in subjects’ performance on the arbitrary 
collection learning task was the reported use of names for the non-verbal labels. Subjects 
who reported naming the non-vertMl labels performed the arbitrary collection learning task 
better than subjects who did not rqxx t using names for the non-verbal labels (Experiments
3e. 6 b).
Might discriminability and naming have been related for the non-verbal labels? It is 
possible that the particular labels subjects reported using names for were the most easily 
discrirranable ones. It is also possiMe that naming the labels aided discrimination - studies 
reviewed in Chapter 1 have shown that the use of verbal labels for visual stimuli is 
associated with better recognition performance. As pointed out in Chi^iter 4, it is possible 
that the differences in time taken lo  perform the label discrimination task m i^ t be attributaNe 
to how easy the sets of non-verbal labels were to name, or how easy they were to remember. 
The discrimination task might equally well be termed a “very short term memory task'*.
Thus the comparison of category learning with verbal and non-verbal labels pixxluced 
some reliaMe effects, but these effects are somewhat difficult lo inm pret. If die technique
Chapter 7 204
were lo be pursued in the hope of investigating the importance of verbal labels in category 
learning, it may well be more informative to take a somewhat different approach. Instead of 
finding non-verbal labels that lead to worse category learning than verbal labels, and then 
trying to fathom out why this happens, it may be more interesting to ask **Can any caregory 
labels be found which lead to better category learning than verbal labelsT**
An attempt was made (Experiment 3f) to investigate the importartoe of pronounceability 
as a property o f  vertMtl category labels. Label pronounceability made no significant 
differertce to arbitrary ccrflection learning. It appeared thM the attempted comparison between 
pronounceaUe and unpronounceable words may have been foiled by subjects attending only 
to the first letters of the unpronounceable words. This prompted the observation that the 
fwopcrty of **wordness” may be relatively fragile. If  you remove some property from a 
word, it is possiMe that what remains may not be treated as a word minus the property, but 
as sometiiing else entirely. The possibilities for investigating the importance of verbal labels 
using a subtractive method may be limited by this factor.
There is no bar, apart from considerations o f practicality, on investigating other 
modalities of labelling than the visual. As mentioned above, category membership ought be 
indicated by some auditory, tactual, olfactory, or even gustatory cue. Regardless o f the 
modality of non-verbal labels, however, the issues o f whether they can be discriminaied or 
remembered as effectively as verbal labels, and whether they are named by subjects, would 
tug at the sleeve of the experimenter as persistently as they have in the investigations 
reported in this thesis.
Ill The role of verbal labels in category learning reviewed
In Chapter 1, two esuMished views of the importance of verbal labels in category 
learning were distinguished. In one view, embodied in extreme nominalism and in early 
behaviourist theories, associations between a category name and otherwise unrelated
la auempiiaf to predict what form these “super-labels** might take, one may wish to consider 
which properties of verbal labels might be important for their usefulness in category learning. If labels 
are lo te  maximally imeful as a guide lo where lo look for similarity, it is probably important that they 
should be auutimally recognisable, which implies that they should be both easily discriminable and 
memorable. To be a source of coherence between exemplars labels auy need, in addition, to ba aaaily 
ganeraisd by the subject. The ease of internally generating tome labels may ba greater than others. 
“Super-labels'*, then, might take the form of labels which are more easily generated than typical vertml 
labels. If any such labels exist. sndA>r labels which are more easily recognisable. If the properties of 
recogniaability and generatability couM be separately assessed (by contrasting recogiUtion and recall of 
labels psflMpt). or separately manipulated (by some form of pre-training, for example) die properties of 
super-labels might even throw some light on the relative importance of the similarity-signalling and 
coharencs-provl^ g roles of category latels.
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exemplars are the only forces which bind a concept together. In the later view, of similarity* 
baaed coherence, names direct learners* attention u> the similarity between exempltfs which 
are categorised together, and it is this simil«ity which makes a concept cohere. The two 
views differ m arkedly on how new exemi^an may be included within an existing concept 
For the fomier. o n ly  exemplars which have been labelled for the learner may be added to the 
concept; for the latter, if die learner perceives sufficient similarity between a  new exemplar 
and a known concept, the new exemplar may be treated as a member of the known category, 
bound into it by its similarity to known exemplars or an abstracted category description such 
as a prototype.
For the former, nominalist /  behaviourist view, the importance of the external provision 
of labelled exemplars during learning should be the same whether subjects are learning an 
arbitrary co llec tio n , or a set o f exemplars generated as distortions o f  a prototype. 
Comparison o f  learning under these two conditions in the experiments reported here 
(Chapters 4 and 5) show that this is clearty not the case. The learning of arbitrary collections 
was aided consideraUy by the {xovision of labelled exemplars, while in the schema learning 
task performance with labelled exemplars was no better than learning without. Not for 
nothing is the similarity-based c<^erence account the dominant conremporary view of 
category learning.
This is not to  say. however, that the type of name used to label exemplars might not 
influence category learning. In the similarity-based account o f coherence, names are still 
regarded as a source of information of where to look for coherence, and names may play this 
role more effectively than other category membership cues. In Experiment 5b, subjects 
learned prototype based categories more effectively when exen^lars were labelled with 
category names than when they were labelled with non-verbal category membership cues.
What of names as a source of conceptual coherence in themselves? As argued above, the 
idea that names are  the only source of conceptual coherence is obviously untenable, but this 
does not preclude the possibility that even where coherence is similarity-based, the 
association between exemplars and a common category name may be an added source of 
coherence.
Do die experiments reported in this thesis provide any evidence for diis coherence-giving 
role of category names? As suggested in Chapter 1 (Section Vi ), if learning is better when 
exen^dars are labelled with names than with non-verbal labels, and bodi types of label are 
equally effective in  providing category membership information, then the verbal label 
superiority might be attributed to the superior coherence providing properties o f  names. The
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difficulty is establishing that the same categocy membership infonnation was conveyed by 
the two types of label.
In the experiments comparing learning with the non-woid and black and while pattern 
segment labels, aldKw^ it was established that the pattern segments could be reliably told 
apart, subjecu were slower in doing this with the pattern segments than with the non-woids, 
and thus it could be argued that category membership information was conveyed more 
efficiently by the verbal labels than by the non-verbal labels. On the odwr hand, if the fact 
that the non-verbal labels were reliaMy discriminable satisfies the criterion for their being 
effective in conveying category membership information, the name-based coherence 
interpretation of the verbal label category learning advantage might be tenable. If the 
difference in label matching performance was interpreted as a difference in the short-term 
memorability of the verbal and non-verbal labels, then the coherence interpretation would 
seem quite reasonable. After all, if  associations with category labels were a source of 
coherence, where the labels are difficult to remember it would be expected that this 
coherence would be impaired.
As has already been stated several times, a major proMem with attempting to investigate 
the coherence-giving quality of category names by comparing learning with verbal and non­
verbal labels is that the equality o f  the two types o f label as a conveyer o f category 
membership information must be established. Another problem is that even if this and other 
obstacles (e.g. the naming of non-verbal labels) were conquered, and even if it were the case 
that name-based coherence was a factor in normal category learning, if experimentally 
induced non-verbal-label-based associations also induced similar conceptual coherence*, the 
coherence-giving properties of verbal labels would remain undetected.
In order to investigate the coherence-giving pnyeity of category names en^rically , it is 
clear that some paradigm other than those employed in this thesis must be devised. The 
comparison of category learning w ith verbal and non-verbal labels leaves name-based 
coherence confounded with the efficiency of names as a category membership cue. 
Likewise, the comparison of learning similarity-based categories and arbitrary collections 
does not separate the category cue and coherence aspects of names. Similarity-based 
categories are both more coherent than arbitrary collections, and less in need o f didactic 
category membership cues during learning.
Is the division of the influence o f  categocy names in category learning into just the two 
fimetions described so far an adequate theoretical basis for the study of category names in 
category learning? Is this the model o f  the influence of category names upon which future
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invetdsatioiit should be founded?
One cridcitni of this two-function model es described so far is that in this description 
there has been an oversimplification the neatness w ith which models category learning 
can be divided into those that ascribe conceptual coherence to similarity, and those which 
ascribe coherence to associations with names. Exemplar storage models might be more 
appropriately described as a hybrid.
The role of ca^gory labels in exemplar storage m odels of category learning (e.g. Ktedin 
and Schaffer, 1978) has not been spelled out in their formulation. So far in this discussion 
of the role of category labels, exemplar storage models have been treated as models where 
coherence relies on simil«ity between exemplars, aitd category names tell levners which 
groups of exemplars u> assess for similarity. This description is true as far as it goes, but it 
ignores a distinction between exemplar storage and parameter extraction theories of category 
learning, in that tite locus of the similarity comparison is different for the two classes of 
model, being at the time when parameters are stored o r  modified for parameter models, but 
at the time when category membership decisions come to  be required in the exemplar storage 
model. In the exemplar storage model, the similarity comparison is performed with a 
selection of remembered individuals which must be marked for category membership in 
some way. How category membership of exemplars in  storage is marked is not specified, 
but could be done in a number of non-verbal ways, such as the physical clustering 
exemplars of the same category, or the storage of some feature-like caregory membership 
cue. If this category membership marking involves the storage of category names, however, 
then the similarity based coherence of exemplar storage models relies on associations 
between exemplars and their names, and might be looked on as a variant of the name-based 
coherence nxxlel.
Thus, in certain formulations, a similarity-based exemplar storage model of category 
learning would be properly regarded as a model relying, albeit indirectly, on associations 
between category names and exemplars for conceptual coherence. Although the model 
would in this case become a hybrid between similarity and name-based orfterence, the two 
functions of category labels described so far remain adequate components to describe the 
part played by category names, even in such a case.
Moving to the second point concerning the sufficiency of two-function description of die 
potsiMe role o f category names in category learning, attention now turns u> parameter 
storage models and how they deal with apparent exceptions to similarity-baaed coherence. 
If. for example, a dc^phin is more similar to a fish than lo  a mammal, how does the concept
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of tnairanal incorporaie the dolphin? A prototype storage model, for instance, describes the 
central teiMfency of a category, but does not account for the inclusion o f outliers which may 
be closer to the central tendency of some contrasting category. One possibility is that 
exceptions may be marked by association with the appropriate category name. Non-verbal 
scrutions to the problem could also be found, such u  associating an outlier widi a central 
exemplar (e.g. dolphin reminds you of the concept “dog**) or associating an outlier with 
some amorphous representation of the quality o f “mammalness**. Nevertheless, for 
completeness, the description of the possiUe roles of category names in category learning 
should probaMy be extended to cover the use of a category name to m ark exceptions to 
similarity-based coherence. This might be termed a hypothesis o i verbal mediation for 
highly atypical exemplars.
The final point to be made here about the adequacy of the two-functions ascribed to 
category names in Chapter 1 is the suggestion that the original two, and now  three, functions 
should be augmented by a fourth hypothesised role. This role rests on  the property of 
reference - the relationship between a category name and the ca»gory which it represents. 
Reference allows a category name to function as a symbolic token for categories in thought. 
How category learning is affected by the use of categcxy names as a token to represent the 
category in thought is obviously a valid and important question, and can be distinguished 
from the specifîc hypotheses discussed earlier of name-mediated associations between 
exemplars being a source of conceptual coherence, and possibly a means of marking an 
exception to similarity-based coherence.
The territory one enters with this vague question of how category names as thdUght 
tc^ens might faciliute category learning is. unfortunately, a territory where experimental 
psychcriogy has as yet made few advances against a dense undergrowth o f  complexity. For 
example, the investigation of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis, as discussed in  Chapter 1, has 
yielded little or no insight into the issue of how language affects thought. Relevant islands 
of understanding may exist, however. There is a considerable literature on the use of verbal 
rehearsal in short term memory, for exan^le, and the investigation of the use of category 
names in rehearsal during learning might refnesent a path into one aspect o f  the impoctance 
of category names as thought tokens.
To summarise this discussion of an a^xopriate model for the influence of category 
names in category learning, two additions have been suggested to the original theoretical 
division of the r c ^  of category names into the functions o i names as a  possible source of 
coherence, and names as a category membership cue guiding the sevch fo r coherence baaed
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on similarity. These additions aie the possible roles of category names as means of mariung 
exceptional or atypical exemplars as members or similarity-based categories, and the broad 
and daunting possiMe roles of verbal labels as tokens to represent categories in thought 
during category learning.
IV Suggestions for ocher empirical investigations baaed on this analysis
The ideal circumstances in which to investigate the importance of category names in 
category learning requires the comparison o f the acquisition of category-related behaviour by 
people who use ca^gory names during learning, with that of otherwise identical people 
people who do not do so. Since it is normal for people to name or verbally describe the 
things they encounter, these circumstances are unobtainable with normal, adult human 
subjects.
The experiments reported in this thesis have shown that investigating the effects €»f how 
category membership information is supplied is relatively easy. Investigating the effects of 
the use o f category names during categwy learning is altogether more problematic, 
however, since whether category names are supplied or not, subjects may invent and use 
their own names for categories they are required to learn about.
Although the experim en t cannot prevent subjects inventing category names, and cannot 
take away category names once they have been supplied, it may be possiMe to influence the 
number of category names which are associated with a cattgory. As discussed in Chapter 1 
and elsewhere, each category is usually associated with only one name, and by and large, 
each name is associated with only one category. An experimental manipulation m i^ t be 
able to contrive that a category is associated with more than one name, or a name i t  
associated with more than one category.
Consider, for example, the following experimental design. Two different categories are 
learned on diflerent occasions in a sorting task, widi the same name used to indicate the 
category membership of exen^lars. Other categories are learned meanwhile with unique 
names. In a task requiring subjects to sort three categories into separate response boxes, 
where two o f the categories had been learned with the same name, would sorting 
performance with these two categories be worse dian sorting performance widt the category 
whose name was unique?
The experiment just described is similar to experiments performed previously tt> test the 
learned equivalence of cues hypothesis. The difTeience is that the stimuli involved are
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learned categories, not individual o b ^ t s .
Theoretically, if names are a source of category coherence, two unrelated categories 
whose exemplars have been associated with the same name should be more coherent, i.e. 
less distinct, than two categories which have been associated with different names.
What are the advantages and disadvantages of experiments investigMing the effects of 
distorting the one to one relationship between categories and category names? Since the 
category membership cues supplied during learning are all the same type (all words), dte 
efficiency with which category membership information is supplied during learning should 
be the same for all categories. Thus the role of names in providing category membership 
information and as a possible source o f coherence are not, in this case, confounded.
There are disadvantages, however. When a name is associated widt a second category, 
the pre*established meaning of the name might affect the learning of the second category it is 
used to label. Subjects might learn the second category in a way which differs ftom how 
they would have learned it without the influence of the meaning the the category name. They 
might, for exan^le, base their learning of the second category on characteristics which are 
most like features of the original category, rather than characteristics which would have 
formed the basis of their category representation were it not for the Massing effect of the 
already meaningful category name. In experimental manipulations of this kind invMving 
category names, it may be impossible to separate the simple, associationistic processes 
involving the name, from the more cognitive influences of the meaning of a previously 
encountered category name.
Another type o f experiment distorting the one to one relationship between categories and 
category names would be possible. In this case, the aim would be to examine the effects of 
associating one group of exemplars of a category with one name, and other exen^lars of the 
same cattgory with a different name. This might be done, for example, by telling subjects 
that one category had tv<o names, each of which l^)plied equally to every member of the 
category, and using the two names to indicate category membership of non overlapping 
subsets of exemplars of that category. Learning o f this category might be compared with 
subjects* learning of a category whose exemplars were all labelled using the same name. If 
the association o f exemplars with a common name is a source o f category coherence, it 
would be predicted that the category whose exenq>lars were associated with two names 
would be less coherent, i.e. harder to learn or remember, than the category whose exemplars 
were all associated with the same name.
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Appendix 5a. Instructions for Experiment 4.
Initial instructions.
Page 1
In this experiment your task is  to  learn to identify different species of leaf. The leaves 
you will be seeing are unlike any found on earth • in fact you are a naturalist who has 
travelled through space to a strange, tree covered planet
The basic task involves seeing examples of three species of leaf and trying to learn to scwt 
the leaves according to the species o f tree they come from.
You will be shown 36 leaves, one at a time, for you to classify hy species.
When you have tried to sort out the first set o f 36 leaves, you will travel to another 
planet, where there will be ancKher set of 36 leaves (taken from three new 
species of tree) for you to try to  sort out.
When you have visited four planets, the experiment is finished.
Page 2
On each trial (ie each time you are shown a leaO the leaf for you to identify is flashed up 
for a few seconds on the left o f the screen, then your three collecting boxes are shown along 
the right hand side of the screen.
Use the mouse to point and click on the box you wish to put that leaf into.
On some planets, you will be told whether )rou have put each leaf into the correct 
collecting box. Your aim on these planeu is to be correct as often as possible.
On other planets, you will not be told whether you have put each leaf into the correct 
box. On these planets, your aim  is to be as consistent as possible, so that at the end of tte  
36 trials the three species of leaf have, as far as possiUe, been put into three separate bows. 
Page 3
Also, on some planets you will be told the qwcies name of each leaf after you have put it 
into a collecting box, whereas on other planets you won't be given this information.
The leaves are always shown to you the same way up. However, at first it will be 
difficult to tell the di^erent species of leaves on each planet ^ a r t ,  and you may have to 
guess some or all o f the time.
It should be possible to learn to  identify each species of leaf with practice. On earth, no 
two leaves are identical, even if they come from the same species of 
tree or even the same branch o f  the same tree. With practice, however, you can learn to tell 
oak leaves from nuiple leaves, and so on.
In space, like on earth, leaves o f the same species are similar but not identical, and it 
takes practice to recognise leaves o f  a pardculv  ^ lecies.
Page 4
u c h  time you give an answer using the mouse, you will also be asked to ray how 
confident you are about your choice. You will give your confidence rating using the same 
scale you saw in the practice sessicm.
Please give your answers as soon as you have decided on them as the machine records 
how long you take to respond.
Don't make any written notes.
Do come and get help if you are unsure about anything.
Happy leaf-hunting!
If you wish to read the instructions again, p reu  the bar.
If you are ready to begin the experiment, press key
Instructions fo r indicating which box had been chosen each species, repeated after every
condition.
Here's a leaf with all the m ost typical characteristics of its species. Please point and click 
on the collecting box you have been using for this species.
(The subject then inàcated one box fo r  each o f the three prototypes as they were shown in 
turn and then redisplayed in a position adjacent to the selected box.J 
Want to correct any nüstakes m ade putting these leaves in the boxes?
[The subject could repeat the procedure o f selecting a box fo r  each prototype.)
^ u s e  for a while to rest if  you wish.
Appendicee 231
Appendix 6«. Instrucdont for Experiment 5a.
Initial ¡nstntctions
In this experiment your task is to learn to identify different q>ecies of leaf. The leaves 
you will be seeing are unlike any found on earth • in fact you are a  naturalist who has 
travelled through space visit strange, tree covered planets.
The basic task involves seeing examples o f three species of leaf and trying to learn to sort 
the leaves according to the species of tree they com e ffom.
You will be shown 36 leaves, one at a time, for you to classify bv species. When m  
have tried to sort out the first set of 36 leaves, you will travel to another planet, where there 
will be another set of 36 leaves (taken from three new species o f tree) for you to try to sort 
out.
When you have visited four planets, the experiment is finished.
On each trial (ie each time you are shown a leaf) the leaf for you to identify is flashed up 
for a few seconds on the left of the screen, then your three collecting boxes are shown ^ong 
the right hand side of the screen. Use the mouse to  point and click on the box you wish to 
put that leaf into. ,  .
Your aim is to be as ctMisistent as possible, so that at the end o f  die 36 tnals the three 
species of leaf have, u  far as possible, been put into three separate boxes.
On every planet you w ill be m id the species name of each leaf after you have put it into a 
collecting box. These names are those used for the species by natives of the planeu. On 
two planets these names are words, and on two planets these names are colourful patterns.
iS e  leaves are always shown to you the same way up. However, at first it will be , 
difficult to tell die different sec ies leaves on each [danet apart, and you may have to • 
guess some or all of the time. '
It should be possible to learn to identify each species of leaf with pracnce.
earth, no two leaves are identical, even if they come from the same species of tree or 
even the same branch of the same tree. With practice, however, you can learn to tell oak 
leaves from maple leaves, and so on. . . ^ .
In space, like on earth, leaves of the same species are similar but not idenucal. and it 
takes practice to recognise leaves of a particulw species.
Each time you give an answer using the mouse, you will also be asked to u y  how 
confident you are about y w  choice. You will give your confidence rating using the same 
scale you saw in the practice session.
Please give your answers u  soon as you have decided on them as the machine records 
how long you take to respond.
Don't make any written notes.
Do come and get help if you are unsure about anything.
H apw  leaf’huntingl
If you wish to read the instructions again, preas the space bar.
If you are ready to begin the experiment, press key "E".
Instructions fo r  indicating which box had been chosen fo r each species, repeated t^ e r  every 
condition.
Here's a leaf with all the most typical characteristics of itt species. Please point and cUck 
on the collecting box you have been using for this species.
[The subject then indicated one box fo r  each o f the three prototypes that were shown in turn 
and then moved to a position adjacent to the selected box.)
Want to correct any mistakes m td t putting these leaves in the boxes?
(The subject couklrepeat the procedure e f selecting a box fo r each prototype.]
Pause for a while to rest if you wish.
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Appendix 6b
The 24 shapes used as members of the exemplar-tescd categories in Experiment 5b.
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Appendix 6c. Intiructionx for Experiment Sb.
Initial instructions
In this experiment your task is to learn to identify different species of leaf. The leaves 
you will be seeing are unlike any found on earth - in fact you are a naturalist who has 
travelled through space to visit strange, tree covered planets.
The basic taskinvolvesseeingexamplesof threespeciesof leaf and tiyingtoleam  to sort 
the leaves according to the species of tree they come RDtn.
You will be shown 4< leaves, one at a time, for you to classify by species.
When you have tried to sort out the first set of 48 leaves, you will travel to another 
planet, where th e n  will be another set of 48 leaves (taken from three new species of tree) for 
you to try to sort o u t
When you have visited four planets, the experiment it  finished.
O i etch  trial (ie each time you ate shosm a leaf) the leaf for you to identify is flashed up 
for a few seconds on the left o f  the screen, then your three collecting boxes are shown along 
the right hand side of the screen.
Use the mouse to point and click on the box you srith to pul that leaf into. Your atm la to 
be as consistent ax possible, to th a ttllh e e n d o fth e 4 8  trials the three species of leaf have, 
as far as possible, been put Into three separate boxes.
O n  every planet you trill be told the species o f each leaf after you have put it into a
collecting box. On two planeu you arc told the species by being shown a word which is the 
name of that species. On the other two planets, j r ó  are told the species by being shown 
a small square pattern, which is a picture of the DNA of the species the leaf belongs to. .
On two planets, each species of tree grows just one kind of leaf. Leaves of the same * 
species do vary a  little in shape, however, just as leaves on trees on Earth do. (For example, 
no two oak leaves are identical, but you can still learn to tell an oak leaf fiom. say, a birch 
leaf, because you leam to recognise a "typical" or average leaf ftom each species.)
So on these planets, there are three species of tree each bearing its own particular type of 
leaf. Leaves o f  the same tree still vary in shape a little, however, just as the leaves of trees 
on earth do. .  ^ ^
On the other two planets, the leaves of each species of tree follow a rather unexpected 
rule. On these planeu, each species of tree bears four compietely differendy shaped kinds of 
leaf! Although this makes life rather tricky for a naniraUst trying to identify the leaves, there 
is some hope for you. The four kinds of leaf on each species of oee always a o w  into their 
own shape very precisely, so that two leaves of the same kind always look identical.
Do not worry about trying to remember all this about the different kinds of leaf and tree 
on each planet you will be told what to expect on each planet just before you are sent there.
On every planet, after you have sorted the 48 leaves, you are then asked to show which 
box you decided to use for each o f the three species.
Each time you give an answer using the mouse, you trill also be asked to u y  how 
confident you are about your choice. You trill give your confidence rating using the same 
scale you saw in the pnctice session. __ .
Please give your answers as soon as you have decided on them as the machine records 
how long you take to respond.
Don't make any written notes.
Do come and get help If you are unsure about anything.
Happy leaif-huntingl
Q uestion about subjects’ use o f verbal UbeUJor the non w b a l ¡abets at end experim ent
Now I would like you to answer a fow short questions - this will only take a minuie then 
the whole experiment trill be over. . . . .  ,
Did you make up any names for the species DNA panenis? If  so, pleaae type in the name 
you used next to each pattern as it is shown to you, then press RETURN. If you didn t 
make up a name, just press RETURN each lime. If you did make up a name but have 
forgotten it, type ^ F” then RETURN.
AflpendtcM
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initial instm aionsfor subjects in the labelling grotgf.
In this experiment your task is to learn to identify different species of leaf. The leaves 
you will be seeing are unlike any found on eaith • in foot you are a naturalist who has 
travelled through space to visit a strange, tree covered plsinet, called Zipio. On this planet 
there are three species of tree.
Each Ziptionian species of tree grows Just one kind of leaf. Leaves of the same species 
do vary a  little in s h ^ .  however, as leaves on trees on Eanh do- For example, no two 
oak leaves are identical, but you can still learn to  tell an oak leaf ffom. s ^ ,  a birch leaf, 
because you leam to recognise a ‘’typical’* or avenge leaf foom each species.
So, on these planeu there are three species o f tree, each bearing itt own panicular type of 
leaf. Leaves o f  the same tree still vary in shape a  little, however, just as the leaves of trees 
on eanh do. ^
Your task is to leam to identify the three mecies. On each tnal you will be shown a leaf 
for a few seconds. Then three grey boxes will appear on the screen. These are your 
collecting boxes. You then use the mouse pointer to show which collecting box you think 
that leaf should be put into. There is one collecting box for each of the three species. The 
boxes are labelled with words • these are the Zipsonian names for the species • and with 
patterns, which are pictures of the DNA for that species of tree.
After you have choaen a collecting box for the leaf, you w iU be told whether you were 
rig h to rw ro n g , and which species the leaf actually belonged to.
This is the confidence scale (the c o i^ n c e  scale was d ts p U ^  on the screen/. W h n  
you give your answers you will use it to  say how sure you are. Point and click anywhere» 
along the scale
!I ■ very sure 
I « sure 
? *  unsure 
?? «  very unsure
At first it will be quite difficult to recognise thedifferent species of leaf, and you will have 
to guess when you make your answer«, w ith  practice, however, it should become easier to 
recognise the three species.
leaves are always shown on the screen the same way up.
When you have answered correctly ten times in a row. you will move on to the next suge 
of the experiment
Don't ntake any written notes.
Do come and get help if you are unsure about anything.
Happy leaf’hunting!
/n itia l instructions read hy subjects in  the masching group.
In fhi« experiment your task is to leam to identify different species o f leaf. The leaves 
you will be seeing are unlike any found on earth • in h e t you are a n an n lis t who has
travelled through space to visit a strange, «ee covered plaiiet, called Z ip ia Onthisplanet
there are three spades of tree.
Each Ziptionian species of tree grows just one kind of leaf. Leaves o f the same spedes 
do vary a l i ^ e  in shape, however. Just as leaves on trees on Earth do. For example, iw two 
oak leaves are identical, but you can still leam to tell an oak leaf ftom, s m , a birch leaf, 
because you leam to recognise a "typical*' or average leaf from each species.
So, on these planets them are three spedes o f  nee, each beariire its ow n particular type of 
leaf. Leaves o f  the same tree still v a ry  in shape a Uttle, however, just as the leaves o f trees
on earth do.
Your tadt is to leam to recognise the three ^tedes. On each trial jfou will be shown a leaf 
for a  few seconds. Thenthreegrey boxes will appear on the screen. These tfs  your 
collecting boxes. You then use the mouse pointer to show which ooUeedng box you think
that leaf should be put into. ^   ^ ^
There is one cofleciing box for each o f the three species. H ie boxes are each labelled
with a picture of « k a f  from the fpecies yo u are m eam io put in  that box. Afteryouhave
chosen a coUecting box for the leaf, you wUl be told whether you were right or wrong.
This is the conñdence scale. (Tha cotffidenct scaU was show n on the scrttn .J  When you 
give your answers you wlU use it to say how sure you are.
Point and click anywhere along the scale
1! «  very sure 
1 «  sure 
? m unsure 
?? •  very unsure
At first it will be quite difficult to recognise the different species of leaf, and you will 
have to guess when you make your answers. With practice, however, it should become 
easier to recognise the three species.
The leaves are always shown on the screen the same way up.
When you have answered conectly ten times in a row, you will n»ve on to the next suge 
of the experiment
Don't make any written notes.
Do come and get help if you are unsure about anything.
Happy leaf-hunting!
In itial instructions read by subjects in the control condition.
In this experiment your task is to learn to identify different species of leaf. The leaves vou 
will be seeing are unlike any found on earth • in fact you are a  naturalist who has travellei 
th i^ g h  space to visit a strange, tree covered planet called Zipto. On this planet there art 
three species tree.
Each Ziptionianqjecies of tree grows just one kind of leaf. Leaves of the same species 
do vary a  little in shape, however, just as leaves on trees on Earth do. For exunple, i»  two 
oak leaves are identical, but you can still learn to tell an oak leaf from, sapr, a birch leaf, 
because you leam to recognise a "typical’* or average leaf from each species.
So. on this planet there are three species of tree, each bearing iu  own particular type of 
leaf. Leaves of the same tree stiU vary in shape a little, however, just as the leaves of trees 
on earth do.
This is the confidence scale. [The corpulence scale was show n. J When you give your 
answers you will use it to say how sure you are. Ptjint and click anywhere along the scale
!t •  very sure 
1 «  sure 
7 «  unsure 
?? •  very unsure
The leaves are always shown on the screen the same way up.
Don’t nuke any written notes.
Do come and get help if you are unsure about anything.
Happy leaf-hunting!
Instructions read by labelling and m atching groups before the category recognition test.
Now I im  «oto* to ihow you » m e  more toivet! Hiere w ill be M  of there, ^  you ¡toll 
see them one i t  a  ome. There leave« will be a mixture of the leave« ftxim planet Zipto. which 
you are already quite familiar with, and three new «pede« o f  leave« from «nother nearby
** *>SiCTw h leaf ia «hown u  you. you will be a«ked to decide whethre it U "old" or "new”.
You five your anewere by pointing and clicktoj on one of the an«wre boxe« which 
are «hom beiow .lf you ditok the leaf belong« » o n e  of the three Ziptonian
apeciea. you thould anawer "old". If you think the leaf belong« »  » m e  other ipeciea (one
ofthe three Zogonianapeciea) then you ahould reply "new". _^_ ^
Point and cUck on one o f the «newer boxea when you are ready to begin.
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Instuctions read by control group subjeca before the category recognition test.
Here are three leavea, one from each of the three apeciet  of tree which v o w  on the i^anet
Zipto. [Three exempUtrs.one/rom each category^y^shmim a  t l » ^  o f the screen./
Now you are fo in i to  see some more leaves. There wUl be 36 of th m . and you w ill see 
them one at a time. Tneae leaves will be a mixiuie of leaves fioiu planet Zipto and three new
species of leaves fcom another neaiby planet, Zof. ^ ___
‘ After each leaf is shown to you, you wUl be asked to decide w hedi» It is from a p t o  or 
from Zog. You five your answers by poindni and clickinf on one of the answer boxes 
which are shown below. If you don’t know die answer, make a  guess.
instructions read by a ll subjects before the sorting test.
The next sage of the experiment involves just the three species of leavre f ro ii^ a n e t 
a p to . These are the leaves which you learned a ^ t  in the fir«
You will be shown the leaves one at a time. Every leaf you see will belong to one of the
shown a leaf, three grey coUeciinf boxes wiU appear on the right 
hand tide of the screen, one at the top, one in the middle, a i^  one at the b o t t ^
Each species belongs in one of the three boxes • one i n ^  top tax , one specks in the 
middle boxi and one in the bottom box. Your job U to woik cwt which specas belongs in
which box. After you have chosen a box by pointing and choking on it with the m ouse, 
you will be told whether you were right or wrong. ^  . j , . __ . „ u
’  When you have been correct ten rimes in a row. this stage o f the experiment will end  yid 
the whole experiment wiU be very neatly over.
Appandteam



